Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

GLASGOW CORPORATION ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL

Read the Third time and passed.

STANDING ORDERS (PRIVATE BUSINESS)

Ordered,
That the Amendments to Standing Orders relating to Private Business hereinafter stated in the Schedule be made.

Schedule

Standing Order 1, line 7, leave out "or metropolitan".

Line 36, leave out "or metropolitan".

Standing Order 4A, line 39, leave out "or metropolitan".

Standing Order 25, line 18, leave out "the London County Council".

Standing Order 32, line 11, after "river", insert "authority or catchment".

Standing Order 33, line 5, leave out first "board" and insert "authority".

Line 11, leave out "board, or each of those boards "and insert" authority or board, or each of them".

Standing Order 36, line 11, leave out "metropolitan".

Standing Order 40, leave out lines 8 to 11.

Standing Order 42, line 4, leave out first "board" and insert "authority".

Line 8, after second "the", insert "authority or".

Standing Order 43, line 7, after "river", insert "authority or catchment".

Standing Order 47, line 28, leave out "(other than metropolitan boroughs)".

Standing Order 60, line 8, leave out "and London County Council".

Standing. Order 99, line 1, leave out "board" and insert "authority".

Standing Order 180, line 7, leave out "and London County Council".—[The Chairman of Ways and Means.]

Oral Answers to Questions — GIBRALTAR

White Paper

Mr. Kilfedder: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he will make a statement on Gibraltar, following the visit there of the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State.

Mr. Fisher: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if, in the light of the attitude and actions of the Spanish Government, he will now state the policy of Her Majesty's Government in respect to Gibraltar.

The Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mrs. Eirene White): During my visit to Gibraltar in February I saw for myself the difficulties which are being imposed on the people of Gibraltar through the arbitrary and unreasonable actions of the Spanish authorities and the admirable spirit in which they are being met. I was able to reaffirm to the Governor and his Ministers the determination of Her Majesty's Government to protect the welfare and the legitimate interest of the people of Gibraltar. That policy remains unaltered.
In the last few weeks there has been no improvement in the situation on the frontier and indeed the Spanish authorities have introduced some further restrictive measures.
My right hon. Friends the Foreign Secretary and the Colonial Secretary have, therefore, thought it right to inform the House and the country more fully of the facts about our differences with Spain and of the position taken by Her Majesty's Government. They are arranging to present a joint White Paper which will be laid during the next few days.

Mr. Kilfedder: I am grateful to the Under-Secretary for that deply. Will she make it quite clear to the Franco reégime that, while we are unable to do anything about the repressive measures taken in Spain itself, this nation will not tolerate any longer the restrictions imposed by Franco on the frontier; and that the people of Gibraltar will receive the fullest possible support and the quickest


possible action from Her Majesty's Government?

Mrs. White: In the hon. Gentleman will await the White Paper he will see that our position is made amply clear.

Mr. Fisher: Is the hon. Lady aware that Gibraltar is now living, even more so than when she was there, under a state of economic blockade by Spain, with virtually 40 percent. of her economy being cut? Is she aware that the unanimous view of the people, certainly when I was there, was that while our words of support were welcome, they had been ineffective? Will Her Majesty's Government now do something to help them? In this connection, does the hon. Lady appreciate that they are particularly indignant about the passport issue, that the Spanish have rejected British passports from Gibraltar, and could not we consider warning the Spanish Government that if this goes on we may have to reject Spanish passports into Britain?

Mrs. White: I am sure that the visit of the hon. Gentleman and of his right hon. Friends was welcome in Gibraltar. I am also sure that he will appreciate that questions concerning passports are not for the Colonial Office but for the Foreign Office. Some reference will be made to this matter in the White Paper, although it is not really the concern of my right hon. Friend.

Mr. H. Hynd: Will my hon. Friend in the White Paper deal with the question of British tourists to Spain? Will she point out to the Spanish Government that if they continue with this line of action there are ways and means of taking action on our part?

Mrs. White: I do not think that at this stage it would be very wise for me to anticipate the contents of the White Paper.

Spanish Workmen (Frontier Permits)

Mr. Wingfield Digby: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what study he has made of the possibility of bringing in and housing workers from outside Gibraltar to replace Spanish workmen who have been warned that their frontier permits will be withdrawn.

Mrs. White: The Gibraltar Government have, of course, studied the problems which would arise if frontier permits were withdrawn from the Spanish work force. I have every hope that alternative arrangements could be made.

Mr. Digby: Is the hon. Lady aware that many of us still hope that these permits will not be withdrawn, because we do not wish to see hardship imposed on Spanish workpeople who have done a good job on the Rock for many years?

Mrs. White: We entirely agree with the view expressed by the hon. Member. There has, up to now, been no widespread withdrawal of such permits and we hope that no such action will be taken.

Sir A. V. Harvey: In the event of this happening, will the hon. Lady give an assurance that funds will be made available to house these people as they should be housed; and that funds are available to house those people who have lost their permits to reside in Spain and have come to Gibraltar?

Mrs. White: We are discussing these matters with the Government of Gibraltar, who are making their own plans.

Oral Answers to Questions — HIGH COMMISSION TERRITORIES

Political Refugees

Mr. Hamling: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what measures are taken to ensure the protection of political refugees escaping to British Protectorates from South Africa; and what steps he is taking to prevent their being apprehended by South African police patrols violating the border of Her Majesty's Protectorates.

Mrs. White: Refugees are provided with the same degree of protection as the rest of the populations of the three territories. In the one known case in which a refugee was apprehended by South African Police, which occurred in 1961, the South African Government ordered his release and allowed his return after the facts were brought to their notice.

Mr. Hamling: Is my hon. Friend aware that on this side concern has been expressed in the past not only about


the particular case she mentions but about the fear of other interventions? Will she have another look at this matter?

Mrs. White: Should there be any further such occurrence the strongest representations would, of course, be made, but we have no knowledge of any, apart from those to which I have referred.

Bechuanaland (Bushmen)

Dame Joan Vickers: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether, in view of the danger of the extermination of the bushmen of the Kalahari district of Bechuanaland, what arrangements are being made to safeguard their livelihood and improve their living conditions.

Mrs. White: My information does not support the suggestion that the bush-men are in any danger of extermination.
The Bechuanaland Government has been conducting a survey of the bush-men problem over a number of years. The final report of the survey officer has new been submitted and is under consideration locally. Meanwhile, following an earlier interim report, an area in the central Kalahari has been set aside for the bushmen as a hunting reserve. Three boreholes have been provided by Government in this area for the use of the bushmen and the animals which provide their food, and a further five are at present being drilled with the generous assistance of Oxfam.

Dame John Vickers: Will the hon. Lady look at this matter again, because my information is that there are continual encroachments on to the grazing lands of the bushmen, that some have been made by poachers to trap leopards, and that the witnesses have been shot? The bushmen's life has been disrupted and there is not sufficient medical attention in that area.

Mrs. White: If the hon. Lady would be good enough to send me particulars of any instance which she has in mind, we will, of course, study them. On my recent visit to Bechuanaland I noticed that the Bechuanaland Democratic Party, which is now the Government there, made as one of its proposals during

the election "fair treatment for the bushmen".

Mr. James Johnson: Since there is a lack of water over this area, has my hon. Friend considered any scheme for piping water from the Okovanga swamps?

Mrs. White: As I made clear, the immediate proposals are for boreholes which seem to be satisfactory and more economical.

Health Services

Mr. Dempsey: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what proposals he has for developing the health services in Colonial Territories in the next financial year.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Anthony Greenwood): The development of health services is a matter to be considered in the context of the development plans of the Colonial Governments concerned, having regard to other priorities and to available financial resources. The British Government assists by means of continued Colonial Development and Welfare grants and by making available a wide range of technical assistance and the Colonial Office and Ministry of Overseas Development maintain close consultation with the territorial Governments about their plans.

Mr. Dempsey: Is my right hon. Friend aware that in some of these territories there is an inadequate supply of essential health services? Would he not agree that but for the excellent missionary work of church societies, even maternity services, a tuberculosis service and an infectious diseases service might be nonexistent in some territories? Can he say whether the aid he has in mind will assist these voluntary organisations in the excellent work they are doing for these people?

Mr. Greenwood: These organisations are, of course, doing admirable work in the territories where they are operating, and I appreciate that in many territories more could be done for the well-being of the population, but it is primarily for the Colonial Governments and Legislatures to decide the priority to be given to the further development of their health services, as distinct from other services and other requirements in their territory.

Maintenance of Order (Tear Smoke)

Mr. William Hamilton: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he will enumerate and identify the number of occasions in the last five years on which gas has been used as a weapon to maintain order in dependent territories.

Mr. Greenwood: Two forms of nontoxic tear smoke, known as CN and CS, have been used by police forces in territories which are still dependent on 124 occasions over the last five years. Ninety seven of them in British Guiana. They have been used, for example, to disarm persons running amok, to quell prison disturbances, to apprehend armed criminals and to disperse rioters. I am arranging for a list to be included in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
There are standing instructions in all colonial police forces that tear smoke is only to be employed in preference to the use of batons or firearms. I am drawing the attention of all Governors to this Question and Answer.
Questions about the use of tear smoke by British troops should be addressed to the Secretary of State for Defence.

Mr. Hamilton: Does not my right hon. Friend think it appalling that this information has been withheld from this House for so long? Can he give an undertaking that if and when the Government take a decision to use this substance again, a specific statement to that effect will be made to this House in order that we may question him on it?

Mr. Greenwood: I am not aware that there has been any attempt to withhold this information; I think it is simply that it has not been asked for in the past. But it is important to remember that the use of this tear smoke is not indiscriminate; that there is not known to be any case within the period in question where permanent harmful effects have been caused, and that the other agent of this kind, which has been much in the news recently—DM—is not supplied to colonial police forces.

Mr. J. Amery: Whilst most of us in the House would, I think, have disagreed

with the slogan of a movement with which I believe the hon. Member for Fife, West (Mr. William Hamilton) was associated—"Better Red than Dead" could we not all agree that it is better to cry than die?

Mr. Bessell: Would the Minister agree that it is far better to use tear smoke, which will probably be far less harmful in the long term than batons used indiscriminately, which might cause severe physical damage? Will he therefore take that into account, and not allow members of the Government to be over-emotional on the subject?

Mr. Greenwood: I do not think that any of us could be very happy about the use of this tear smoke on any occasion, but I think, equally clearly, that it must be regarded as preferable to the use of other forms of violence. There are many situations, of course, in which it is difficult to effect arrest or avoid a riot without the use of tear smoke of the kind issued to colonial police, but, certainly, it is extremely important that its use should be kept to the minimum. That is why the Colonial Police Regulations contain a reference to its use, and that is why I shall circulate this Question and Answer to all Colonial Governments.

Mr. Driberg: Can my right hon. Friend define the difference between this tear gas and the "other agent" to which he referred in his supplementary reply, which is described as non-lethal but is clearly much more than mere tear gas and is clearly, to some extent, toxic?

Mr. Greenwood: I would find it difficult at this notice to define the third agent, DM, but I can say that neither CN nor CS in itself produces permanent harmful effects. CN is a lachrymatory agent which also causes irritation of the respiratory passages, and may cause irritation of the skin. Its effects last approximately three minutes. CS causes more severe irritation, and the average period of incapacity is from five to fifteen minutes. I am afraid that I have not the information about the other agent, DM, about which my hon. Friend asked.

Following is the list:

Territory
Date
Circumstances


Aden
…
September, 1962
To disperse illegal assemblies.




30th May, 1963
To disperse demonstrators.




31st May, 1963
To disperse demonstrators.


Bahamas
…
(Two occasions in last 5 years)
In apprehending armed criminal barricaded in house


Basutoland
…
May, 1960
To disperse demonstrators.




October, 1961
To restore order and prevent destruction of property


Bechuanaland Protectorate
…
November, 1963
To disperse rioting youths.


Bermuda
…
February, 1965
To disperse rioters.


British Guiana
…
1960
Twice.




1961
Once.




1962
Six times.




1963
51 times (during serious disturbances in the course of the general strike, during which there were 9 deaths).




1964
37 times (during the prolonged disturbances and inter-racial violence during which some 160 lives were lost).


British Honduras
…
November, 1961
To disperse looters following Hurricane Hattie.


Fiji
…
March, 1965
To restore order in prison disturbance.


Hong Kong
…
May, 1964
To apprehend murderer armed with machine gun.




January, 1965
To arrest and disarm without injury armed madman.


Mauritius
…
November, 1961
To disperse illegal procession.




November, 1963
To disperse disorderly crowd.




April, 1964
To disperse disorderly crowd.




August, 1964
To disperse rioting strikers.


St. Lucia
…
July, 1963
To apprehend armed criminal.




August, 1963
In attempt to recapture escaped prisoner.




October, 1963
To restore order in local prison.


Swaziland
…
April, 1962
To disperse crowd and prevent destruction of property.




May, 1963
To prevent crowd attempting to remove persons from lawful police custody.




May, 1963
To disperse crowd attempting to release person under arrest.




June, 1963
To restore order after prison riot.




March, 1964
To disperse rioters.




January, 1965
To disperse demonstrators.

Basutoland (Constitution)

Mr. Sandys: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what are his plans for implementing the conclusions of the Basutoland Constitutional Conference of 1964.

Mrs. White: The Basutoland Order, 1965, was made on 29th January and embodies the new Constitution which was agreed in outline at the Conference last May. The Order will come into operation after the elections for the new National Assembly, which have been fixed for 29th April.

Mr. Sandys: May I be assured that the Government are still basing their policy on the firm belief that the request already made for independence will be confirmed a year after the elections in accordance with the assurance which we gave?

Mrs. White: If the request is received from the new Basutoland Government, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, it requires the agreement of both Houses of the new Legislature. Failing that, a referendum would have to be held. If the request is received in the proper form, the present Government will accede to it.

Mr. Sandys: That was not quite the point. We gave an assurance at the conference that in the interval we would base our policy and action on the assumption that the request for independence would be confirmed a year after the elections.

Mrs. White: I do not think there will be anything in our policy which would be contrary to that.

Mr. Sandys: Are the Government making preparations?

Oral Answers to Questions — HONG KONG

Seamen's Recruitment Committee

Mr. Rankin: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he has studied the Final Report of the Seamen's Recruitment Committee appointed by the Governor of Hong Kong on 14th March, 1963, in the light of certain resolutions passed at the first Asian Maritime Conference of the International Labour Organisation, held at Nuwara Eliya, Ceylon, in 1953; and how many of the recommendations of the Committee have been accepted and are in operation.

Mrs. White: Yes, Sir. All the recommendations of the Committee have been accepted in principle subject to some variation in detail. Legislation is being drafted and it is hoped that the Seamen's Recruitment Office will be in full operation by October.

Mr. Rankin: Is my hon. Friend aware that a year ago the Transport and General Workers' Union seconded a senior officer to work under the auspices of the International Federation of Trade Unions in Hong Kong in order to inquire into conditions there? Is she further aware that his report has revealed that conditions for seamen sailing out of Hong Kong in regard to wages and other matters connected with their work are a disgrace to civilisation? Will she realise that mere acceptance of the report is insufficient? Will she—[Hon. MEMBERS: "Speech."]—press the Hong Kong Government to act on this Report as quickly as possible, because of the fact that the conditions—

Mr. Speaker: Order. The Minister had better answer as far as we have got.

Mrs. White: As I have already informed my hon. Friend, the main recommendation was that a Seamen's Recruitment Office should be established in order to avoid the very unsatisfactory things to which he has referred. This is to be done by October, which I think is as quickly as possible.

Mr. Rankin: While I welcome that reply—[HON. MEMBERS: "Order."]—I must nevertheless—

Mr. Speaker: I do not know what the hon. Member is doing, but he is not

using words for the purpose of giving notice or raising any point of order.

Mr. Rankin: Further to that point of order—[HON. MEMBERS: "It is not."]— I beg to give notice that I shall raise this matter on the Adjournment in order that I may complete my supplementary question.

Marriage Laws

Dame Joan Vickers: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what is the policy of the Hong Kong Government with regard to changing the marriage laws for women in order to conform with the United Nations convention concerning the consent to marriage, minimum age of marriage and registration of marriages.

Mrs. White: The Marriage Ordinance, under which some 50 percent. of marriages are celebrated, already conforms with the United Nations Convention.
Proposals for legislation relating to Chinese marriages are being prepared, having regard to the provisions of the Convention.

Dame Joan Vickers: I thank the hon. Lady for looking at this matter. I am sure that she is as interested as I am in getting this settled and I hope that she will have more success in the future.

Textiles

Mr. A. Royle: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what discussions are taking place regarding the textile quota from Hong Kong; and if he will give an assurance that the Colony's position will be safeguarded by his Department against pressures brought to bear on Her Majesty's Government by other interested parties.

Mrs. White: My right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade is considering what proposals to make to the cotton textile exporting countries with regard to the level of exports after 1965 to the United Kingdom. The Colonial Office will naturally be closely concerned with the formulation of these proposals in so far as they affect Colonial Territories, including Hong Kong.

Mr. Royle: Will the hon. Lady give an assurance that she will press that control of the textile quota will remain


in the hands of Hong Kong in the future after these talks and also that Hong Kong will not be penalised at these talks because of breaches made in the present quota by India and Pakistan?

Mrs. White: Matters concerning those other territories are not for my right hon. Friend. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that we will do everything we can to safeguard the position of Hong Kong, for which we are responsible.

Sir C. Osborne: Will the hon. Lady ensure that Lancashire's interests are not forgotten in all this?

Mrs. White: I have no doubt whatever that my right hon. Friend will be fully aware of the interests of Lancashire.

Mr. Mapp: Will my hon. Friend agree with me that, though there is a large measure of responsibility for the Commonwealth, perhaps the viable part of Hong Kong, too, nevertheless we in Lancashire hope that the decisions about these quotas will be held within the Government's hands and not necessarily in those of Hong Kong?

Mrs. White: As my hon. Friend will appreciate, these negotiations will be conducted by the President of the Board of Trade. Our responsibility is simply to safeguard the position of Colonial Territories.

Oral Answers to Questions — NEW HEBRIDES

Constitution

Mr. Channon: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what discussions he has had with the French Government about constitutional advance for the New Hebrides.

Mr. Bryant Godman Irvine: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he will state the policy of Her Majesty's Government on the New Hebrides.

Mr. Greenwood: I am at present considering how best to make progress in co-operation with the French Government on constitutional and other matters. I have had no discussions so far with the French Government.

Mr. Channon: Would the Secretary of State agree that this would be an ideal opportunity for the Prime Minister to discuss this matter with President de Gaulle in the next few days? Does he not think that it is an extraordinary anomaly that this condominium should survive in its present form, and so little attempt should be made to get constitutional advance for it?

Mr. Greenwood: I cannot anticipate what my right hon. Friend will be discussing during his talks with President de Gaulle. There are many aspects of the present administrative set-up in the New Hebrides which are far from satisfactory. Quite recently, my senior adviser visited the South Pacific and went to the New Hebrides. I am awaiting his report.

Mr. Irvine: As there are at least some people in the South Pacific who are under the impression that Her Majesty's Government have very little interest in the New Hebrides, will the right hon. Gentleman take steps to see that that illusion is dispelled?

Mr. Greenwood: As I said, one of my senior advisers has recently visited the New Hebrides and I hope that that will have dispelled any impression of apathy which may have arisen over the years.

Mr. J. Amery: Will the right hon. Gentleman have in mind the great importance of establishing the closest co-operation with France on the whole sphere of work of the South Pacific Commission?

Mr. Greenwood: I hope to establish the closest co-operation with all nations over the work of that Commission.

Oral Answers to Questions — COLONIAL TERRITORIES

Secretary of State (Correspondence)

Mr. Channon: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what arrangements he makes in his Department for dealing with correspondence from Members of Parliament and others.

Mr. Greenwood: There are standing arrangements under which a formal acknowledgment by printed postcard should be sent as soon as a letter is received. An interim reply should be


sent within a few days if for any reason, for example, the need for reference to a Governor, there is likely to be a delay in sending a final reply.
Replies to letters from Members of Parliament are signed by myself or by the Under-Secretary of State as the case may be. Replies to other letters may be signed by myself or my Private Secretary or by an official.

Mr. Channon: Does not the Secretary of State think, nevertheless, that it must have been very unsatisfactory to have connected with this process over a number of months someone who is so grossly out of line with Government policy? Does he not think that it is about time that he made it clear in the House whether or not he agrees with the views of the Government on Vietnam or with those of his former Parliamentary Private Secretary?

Mr. Speaker: Order. None of that arises out of that Answer.

Mr. A. Royle: On a point of order. In view of the fact that a Parliamentary Private Secretary has a great deal to do with the answering of correspondence by the Secretary of State, could this not be considered in order—

Mr. Speaker: Unless I misheard the answer, there was no reference to the P.P.S. at all. If there had been, I should amend my Ruling. I did not hear it.

Mr. Greenwood: The Parliamentary Private Secretary had nothing to do with my correspondence, but he was an admirable Parliamentary Private Secretary—

Mr. Speaker: Order. We cannot have speeches resulting from disorderly questions.

Oral Answers to Questions — MAURITIUS

Immigration Mission

Mr. James Johnson: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if the Commission proposed to visit Commonwealth territories to investigate and discuss immigration issues will visit Mauritius.

Mr. Greenwood: It has not yet been decided which Commonwealth countries the mission will visit.

Mr. Johnson: Is my right hon. Friend aware of the terrifying nature of the over-population of Mauritius? According to Professor Titmuss, the population of 700,000 will double by 1982, which is only a little over 15 years ahead. Are there any schemes for birth control of any nature, particularly among the Hindu population, to curb this terrifying advance?

Mr. Greenwood: I do not think that the latter part of that supplementary question arises out of the original Question. The important thing to remember is that this is a very serious problem in Mauritius. I have discussed it with the Premier of Mauritius. The normal contacts between the Government of Mauritius and Her Majesty's Government are through the Colonial Office, and we are constantly in touch with this problem. I shall again be discussing it with the Premier next week when I visit Mauritius.

Mr. Chapman: Does not this reinforce our case that it is time that we had a Commonwealth-wide conference on migration within the Commonwealth, and that other countries took their share?

Mr. Greenwood: The best thing for the time being is to await the report of the mission which the Government propose to send to Commonwealth countries.

Oral Answers to Questions — SEYCHELLES

Fishing Industry

Mr. James Johnson: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what action he is taking to improve the efficiency of the fishing industry of the Seychelles Islands.

Mr. Greenwood: Low-interest loans to fishermen are provided to cover the cost of larger boats with engines and other equipment and 50 percent. grants to assist them to experiment with new techniques. I understand that loans totalling £2,000 using money given by the Freedom from Hunger Campaign have already been made, and that a further £3,000 from this source is likely to be lent during the next two or three months. Grants totalling £750 have also recently been made. These grants are supplied from Colonial Development and Welfare funds.

Mr. Johnson: I thank my right hon. Friend for that reply, but as he is himself visiting Mauritius in the coming weeks may I ask him to consider taking a northern detour to the Seychelles to see the condition of these fishermen, because they do need an enormous amount of capital?

Mr. Greenwood: My hon. Friend would make an admirable siren, but I am afraid that, in view of the Parliamentary situation, I must resist his blandishments.

Mr. R. Carr: Adverting to our repeated attempts to understand the division of responsibility between the right hon. Gentleman's Department and that of his right hon. Friend the Minister of Overseas Development, can the right hon. Gentleman explain how he comes to be responsible for this matter rather than his right hon. Friend?

Mr. Greenwood: This is money going to the Seychelles, not only from the Freedom from Hunger Campaign but under Colonial Development and Welfare funds, for which we have, of course, some continuing responsibility.

Mr. Hector Hughes: Whatever action my right hon. Friend may take with regard to the fishing in the Seychelles, will he make it clear that the fish caught in those waters cannot compare with the fish caught in the North Sea off north east Scotland—

Mr. Speaker: The Minister may do it, but he cannot do it on this Question.

Oral Answers to Questions — ADEN AND SOUTH ARABIA

Situation

Mr. Shinwell: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what measures are being taken by Her Majesty's Government to negotiate a political solution to the conflict in South Arabia.

Mr. J. Amery: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he will make a statement, following his talks, on the situation in Aden and the South Arabian Federation.

Mr. Greenwood: I appreciate that this is a problem which calls for a political solution and in the course of an intensive and most useful review of the situation,

I have discussed with the High Commissioner proposals designed to further political and constitutional progress in the area and to promote co-operation between the Governments of the territory and the political parties. I hope to be in a position to make a further statement before long.

Mr. Shinwell: When my right hon. Friend is making his statement will he tell us what all this adventure is about? Is it intended to protect British interests? What are the British interests? Or is it in the interests of law and order, or for what reason? Is he aware that we are spending a lot of money there, and losing forces, in my opinion, unnecessarily, and will he take the initiative and bring this affair to an end?

Mr. Greenwood: We have certain treaty obligations to the people of these areas, and I do not think that it would add to their confidence if it were to seem that we were resiling from those obligations.

Mr. Sandys: In the meantime, will the right hon. Gentleman continue to give the Federal Government full support in the discharge of their constitutional responsibility for internal security in a very difficult situation?

Mr. Greenwood: We shall do everything we can to give to the duly constituted authorities in the South Arabian Federation the support required in what, as the right hon. Gentleman says, is a very difficult and trying situation indeed.

Mr. Amery: While we are awaiting the right hon. Gentleman's further statement, may I ask whether he is aware that we on this side would be very strongly opposed to any steps that appeared to placate our opponents, whether inside the territory or outside it, at the expense of our proven friends in the Federal Government?

Mr. Greenwood: I have already made it clear that I think that it would be quite wrong for us to appear to be resiling from the obligations under the treaties into which we have entered, and I think that it would be wiser if I were to leave it at that at this stage.

Mr. Shinwell: Does not my right hon. Friend understand that he must not


succumb to the blandishments of members of the party opposite? It is not a question of placating opponents, but of taking a suitable initiative in order to bring the adventure to a speedy end.

Mr. Greenwood: I propose to resist all blandishments, from whatever quarter they come. I made it perfectly clear that I have already discussed certain initiatives with the High Commissioner, and I think that it would be injudicious for me to go further than that on this occasion.

Aden-Yemen Road

Mr. J. Amery: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what consideration he has given, with the Federal Government, to the closing of the main road from Aden to the Yemen.

Mr. Greenwood: I have considered the suggestion carefully and the Federal Government have also examined from time to time the desirability of closing the road, as was done for a few days at the end of 1963. There is, however, no evidence to support the suggestion that the Egyptian Army and Yemen Republic are largely supplied by this road. The balance of advantage has recently seemed to lie in mounting spot checks on traffic using the road rather than on closing it, to ensure that it does not become a means of entry into the Federation for dissidents, arms and explosives. Closure of the road for any length of time would have a damaging effect on the economy of Aden because of the loss of trade and because the labour force is dependent upon immigration from the Yemen.
I shall, however, continue to keep the matter under review and to consult the High Commissioner and the appropriate authorities when it seems necessary.

Mr. Amery: Can the right hon. Gentleman give us an assurance that no aviation fuel is going from Aden to the Yemen which could be used by the Egyptian authorities for bombing tribes and villages in the Yemen?

Mr. Greenwood: Yes. My information is that no aviation spirit is now supplied to the Yemen from Aden, although other fuels, including kerosene, are.

Mr. Shinwell: At any time since 16th October last have Her Majesty's Govern-

ment sought to enter into discussions with the Egyptian Government to ascertain whether it is possible to bring this affair to a conclusion?

Mr. Greenwood: That question must be addressed to my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, but my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) must be well aware that there have been discussions between the Foreign Secretary and the Ambassador of the United Arab Republic in London.

Security

Mr. Fisher: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether, in view of the further recent grenade and bazooka incidents in Aden and the surrender of Egyptian mercenaries and their arms in Dhala, he will make a further statement about the security situation in South Arabia.

Mr. Greenwood: Since my reply to a similar Question by the hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) on 23rd March, there have been 12 further attacks in Aden which have resulted in the death of an Arab and injuries to 10 other people. Thanks to vigorous action by the military forces, the situation elsewhere in South Arabia has shown some improvement of late, but the rebels are trained and equipped with modern weapons and there are no grounds for complacency. I have taken advantage of the High Commissioner's recent visit to London to review with him what is being done to meet this campaign of violence which, as the House knows, is directed and controlled from outside South Arabia.

Mr. Fisher: Would the right hon. Gentleman agree that the casualty toll, both dead and wounded and both British and Arab, is growing alarmingly high? I think that there have been 50 incidents now. It seems rather extraordinary that we cannot give adequate protection to the citizens of a British Colony which is also a British military base. What action does the right hon. Gentleman now propose to take against these Egyptian-financed, Egyptian-organised, and Egyptian-armed terrorist activities?

Mr. Greenwood: The damage done and the loss of life are indeed tragic, but the fact that they are not higher is


a tribute to the action which British Forces, Federal Regular Forces and also the Arab police are taking in this situation. A number of steps are being taken at present. We are stepping up patrols by the security force, and the House will have noticed that a curfew was imposed for the two nights of 31st March and 1st April only. We have the situation constantly under review. I took the opportunity of the High Commissioner's visit last week to discuss it with him and I am satisfied that he and the other authorities there are doing everything possible in this very trying situation.

Mr. Hugh Fraser: What steps are being taken by the Foreign Secretary to make suitable protests to the Egyptian Government and to make it quite clear that this is becoming much more serious than a purely local, internal situation?

Mr. Greenwood: If the right hon. Gentleman had been in the House earlier he would have heard that that is a question for my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary.

Mr. J. Amery: In view of the right hon. Gentleman's statement that this terrorism is largely inspired from outside, will he make the text of his reply available to his right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence who seemed quite unaware the other day of the Egyptian origin of a great deal of this activity?

Mr. Greenwood: I do not think that my right hon. Friend gave that impression at all. What he was saying was that at that stage he had no evidence in his possession that the weapons had been supplied from outside, but from the evidence now before me there is no doubt that that was the case and that this group of dissidents, as in many other cases, had been organised outside, equipped outside, and infiltrated from outside.

Newspapers, Aden (Licences)

Mr. Bagier: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies how many applications for licences to publish newspapers in Aden have been rejected during the past three months; how many have been granted; and how many licences are at present in force.

Mr. Greenwood: No applications for licences to publish newspapers in Aden have been rejected during the past three

months; 28 applications have been granted in that period, including ones made on behalf of the Aden T.U.C. and the People's Socialist Party; and 40 licences are at present in force.

Mr. Bagier: May I thank my right hon. Friend for that Answer? Can he say who possesses the authority to license newspapers in Aden? Will he undertake to supply a list of such other licensed publications as are in existence at the moment?

Mr. Greenwood: Yes, Sir. There is some division of responsibility between the Federal authorities and the Aden Government, but approval of applications for licences rests with the Chief Minister of Aden State. I will consult the High Commissioner and circulate a further reply in the OFFICIAL REPORT, giving details of those publications of which the names are available.

Public Meetings, Aden

Mr. Tinn: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what restriction applies to the holding of public meetings in Aden.

Mr. Greenwood: A meeting of five or more persons requires a permit from the Federal Minister of Internal Security, who has delegated his authority as regards Aden to the Aden Commissioner of Police. In practice permits are given as liberally as the security position per mits. In particular, permission is freely given for meetings of the executive bodies of trade unions. In the first 10 days of March permits for eight meetings of the general bodies of unions were sought and all were granted. Permits are not required for meetings for religious purposes, or for sport, recreation or social intercourse.

Mr. Tinn: Is my right hon. Friend aware of the widespread support for the initiative which he has taken in improving the situation in Aden and of the hope that a further easement of these conditions will be possible in the not-too-distant future?

Oral Answers to Questions — DOMINICA

Schools

Mr. Chapman: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what new schools are to be built in Dominica in


the coming year; when a new primary school is to be provided north of Portsmouth; and what information has now been provided for the territorial government about British-made prefabricated schools that are hurricane-resistant.

Mr. Greenwood: The Dominica Government have included three new primary schools in their development programme among which is one at Savannapaille north of Portsmouth. It is for that Government to decide when to proceed with it. Our building advisers are considering what helpful advice can be given to the Dominican and other governments in the area about hurricane-resistant prefabricated buildings.

Mr. Chapman: Will my right hon. Friend put every urgency into this matter? Is he aware that the position in relation to the condition of schools and the shortage of schools in Dominica is about the worst in the Caribbean? Would he insist that this is a matter for very urgent attention?

Mr. Greenwood: Many of these matters are urgent, but it is extremely difficult for Her Majesty's Government to insist on a matter which is within the terms of responsibility of a Colonial Government. Perhaps my hon. Friend is not aware that so far only one firm application has been received from Dominica for Colonial Development and Welfare money for schools.

Oral Answers to Questions — FIJI

Constitutional Conference

Mr. Bryant Godman Irvine: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what basis of representation he proposes for the Fiji Constitutional Conference due to be held on 26th July, 1965.

Mrs. White: My right hon. Friend has invited the 18 unofficial members of the Legislative Council to come to London for the conference.

Mr. Irvine: As the hon. Lady is to visit Fiji some time in the next few weeks, I understand, can she give any indication as to whether that visit is in any way connected with the proposed conference?

Mrs. White: One of the objects of the visit is to give opportunities for those who will not be directly represented at the conference to make their views known to a Minister prior to the conference.

Oral Answers to Questions — BRITISH GUIANA

Independence

Mr. Sandys: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies when he proposes to convene a conference to consider the grant of independence to British Guiana.

Mr. Greenwood: No decision has yet been taken.

Mr. Sandys: Will the Secretary of State confirm that he stands by the assurance I gave on behalf of the British Government that a conference would be convened after the elections to fix a date for independence, because that was a very honourable and firm undertaking?

Mr. Greenwood: Yes. The pledge given by Her Majesty's Government at that time remains the policy of the present Administration, but the question of fixing the date is a matter for discussion. I fully understand the anxiety which the right hon. Gentleman has—indeed, I share it—but a good deal of ground has to be prepared before a date for a conference could be announced.

Mr. Rose: Will my right hon. Friend ensure, before taking any final action before independence, that the leaders of both major political parties in British Guiana are consulted and that they agree to the terms of any independence declaration?

Mr. Greenwood: I would be acting improperly if I appeared to be prejudging the constitutional conference.

Situation

Mr. Chapman: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he will make a statement on the situation in British Guiana.

Mr. Greenwood: I am glad to say that the situation in British Guiana, both politically and economically, continues to justify the cautious optimism which I expressed after my recent visit.
The new Government have made an encouraging start in seeking to restore public confidence. On the subject of racial imbalance my exchange of views with Mr. Burnham is progressing I regret that members of the Opposition continue to boycott the House of Assembly; I very much hope that they will reconsider this attitude.
The internal security situation remains relatively quiet. There have been instances of sabotage and of arson on sugar estates but there has so far been no resurgence of the inter-racial violence with which the country has been troubled in recent years.
On the economic side, there has been a return of business confidence and the Government are tackling the preparation of a new long-term development programme. Meanwhile aid from the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada and other sources will enable development expenditure to be increased this year.

Mr. Chapman: Will my right hon. Friend accept the congratulations of many of us that he has been able to reduce the temperature and improve the conditions so notably in British Guiana in recent months? Will my right hon. Friend express—I am sure on behalf of all hon. Members—the hope to the Opposition in British Guiana that they will stop this stupid boycott of the National Assembly and will take their place in this democratic Assembly and begin to make the country work properly?

Mr. Greenwood: I am obliged to my hon. Friend. When I was there recently I went to a great deal of trouble to try to persuade members of the P.P.E. of the importance of taking a full part in the democratic processes of British Guiana, because I think that it is essential to build confidence in the stability of the country and attract the investment which British Guiana needs.

Mr. Sandys: What progress has been made in setting up a special security force to augment the resources of the police?

Mr. Greenwood: I saw the unit of the special security force when I was there. I was most impressed with the efficiency of the force and also that from a racial

point of view it is balanced equally between the two main races in British Guiana, which I think is essential for peaceful development in the territory.

Mr. Michael Foot: What progress is being made towards the release of persons, political leaders in particular, detained without trial in British Guiana? Would not this help to assist the situation generally?

Mr. Greenwood: I am grateful to my hon. Friend, because over the last few months the number of detainees has been reduced from 41 to 14. It is not without significance that none of the 14 at present in detention has exercised the right to appeal to a tribunal against their being kept in detention. I do not like this form of conducting the affairs of a country any more than my hon. Friend does, but in the difficult situation in British Guiana it would be wrong to express any lack of confidence in the way in which the Government are using the powers which they possess in the person of the Governor.

Mr. Thorpe: Is it not a fact that 13 of the 14 detained for political reasons without trial are in opposition to the party of Mr. Burnham, the Prime Minister, and that Mr. Burnham himself has expressed the hope that they may shortly be released? Is not that in itself a fairly strong implication that the political situation would be improved and not impaired by the release of these men at present detained without trial and without charge?

Mr. Greenwood: I share the hope that has been expressed. I think that the figure is 14 out of 14, but equally it is true that 21 out of the 27 released were also members of the party in opposition to Mr. Burnham.

Oral Answers to Questions — NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS (CIVIL SERVANTS)

Mr. Younger: asked the Prime Minister if he is aware of the recent practice in newspapers and periodicals of attributing opinions to individual civil servants who are unable to issue a repudiation or take any other action; and if he will amend the regulations


of the service so as to enable civil servants to issue denials or to pursue a remedy at law if this is considered appropriate.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson): I have noticed some signs of this, but I do not think that the hon. Member's suggestion is necessary.

Mr. Younger: Is the Prime Minister aware that a leading Sunday newspaper announced last month in a leading article its express intention to probe the private and political opinions of senior civil servants? Does he not agree that this would undermine the principle of Ministerial responsibility and would put these civil servants in an intolerable position?

The Prime Minister: I entirely agree with what the hon. Member has said. He expressed perfectly my own view, and I am sure that of hon. Members in all parts of the House, about this. Although I think that this new venture has been done for what are regarded as the best of reasons, this is a system we do not have in this country. It is familiar in Washington where there is probing of individual Departments. The job of the Cabinet and Cabinet Committees is to see that things are brought up where there are disagreements between Departments, as there must be, but to look for evidence of it, to seek and probe for evidence of it in this way, is, I think, harmful to the conduct of government and the way we do it. I assure the House that this new departure is being met quite firmly as far as we are concerned and that anyone appointed to do this job will have no more facilities than any other journalist.

Sir Knox Cunningham: Will the Prime Minister consider this in reverse, extending it to those Ministers who leak their views to the Press and by so doing avoid taking responsibility for them?

Mr. Speaker: Order. That does not arise from the Answer.

Oral Answers to Questions — POLARIS WARHEADS (UNDERGROUND TESTING)

Mr. Stratton Mills: asked the Prime Minister what plans Her Majesty's

Government have for the underground testing of Polaris warheads.

Mr. Marten: asked the Prime Minister what plans Her Majesty's Government have for the underground testing of Polaris warheads.

Mrs. Renee Short: asked the Prime Minister what plans Her Majesty's Government have for the underground testing of Polaris warheads.

The Prime Minister: I have nothing to add to the statements which I made in the House in reply to Questions on 4th February and 16th March.

Mr. Stratton Mills: Will the Prime Minister distinguish betwen the public interest and his own party political interest? Does he recall that, on 15th July last, the former Minister of Defence announced a forthcoming test of a Polaris warhead in Nevada? Why is the right hon. Gentleman not prepared to give information to the House about forthcoming tests which he is planning in Nevada for later this year?

The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman is quite false in the accusation he has just made. As regards past announcements, it was very rare for these tests to be announced. The hon. Gentleman is quite wrong to say that we have any such plan.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I am not, of course, pressing the Prime Minister to say when the tests will be held, but does he recall that, in a debate on 17th December, he said that this missile could not be tested under the Test Ban Agreement? Is that not quite wrong? These missiles can be tested underground, either by the Americans or by ourselves, whichever is convenient. Therefore, does he withdraw what he said before?

The Prime Minister: No, Sir. What I said then was the exact fact. I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman would not want to depart from the present practice in these matters. I have warned the Front Bench opposite that, if they want to depart from the present practice, we are quite prepared to do so by referring to the last series which they undertook.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: This is no reason at all, and it discloses no secret


whatever to say that these missiles and warheads can be tested underground and, therefore, it is not a breach of the Test Ban Agreement, as the right hon. Gentleman said. Does the right hon. Gentleman stick to what he said or does he withdraw it?

The Prime Minister: What I said on that occasion I stick to. It was very carefully checked, and it was true.

Mr. Monslow: In the light of the development of the American Poseidon, could my right hon. Friend say whether our own submarines will be obsolete in the near future?

The Prime Minister: We are certainly not considering changing over from the Polaris programme to the Poseidon programme. In any case, the United States is itself only just now starting development of the Poseidon weapon, and the House will realise what an enormous cost would be involved if we were to try to keep up with the Joneses in this particular respect.

Mr. Marten: May I revert to the Question raised by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition? I have just referred to column 701 of HANSARD of 17th December, when the right hon. Gentleman clearly said that these warheads could not be tested under the Test Ban Agreement. I feel quite certain that that is wrong. Will the right hon. Gentleman reconsider his answer?

The Prime Minister: Certainly—I think that the right hon. Gentleman had this in mind—under the Test Ban Agreement underground tests are possible for certain components, for small tests, but the full test of a full Polaris warhead with the whole power it has could not be done underground. It is a completely unreasonable thing to suggest.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: The Prime Minister knows quite well that a full test of the Polaris warhead is not involved here. We must not go into secret matters, of course, but is it not true that this is a test of a trigger mechanism, and everybody knows it, which can be carried out underground? Will not the right hon. Gentleman revise his answer?

The Prime Minister: The question of testing individual components is possible. What I said in the debate—I have not

the text before me—[Interruption.]—I do not want to compete with the technical knowledge of the hon. and gallant Member for Knutsford (Sir W. Bromley-Davenport). The right hon. Gentleman knows that what I was referring to was the necessity to reshape the whole of our warhead to fit into the Polaris, and this has not been tested and cannot be tested. That is what I was referring to, and what I then said was perfectly correct.

Oral Answers to Questions — COMMISSIONS AND INQUIRIES

Mr. Kenneth Lewis: asked the Prime Minister how many independent commissions or inquiries have been set up by Her Majesty's Government since October, 1964; and how many independent advisers have been employed by Ministers since that date.

The Prime Minister: Seventeen and five respectively.

Mr. Lewis: Is the Prime Minister aware that, on my count, the number of people appointed to commissions, as advisers and so on, is greater than the number of days he and his party have been in office? As he was 13 years in Opposition, why do we now have to have government by study group?

The Prime Minister: The need for these inquiries arises precisely because we were in opposition 13 years and because things were not done which should have been done under the Conservative Government.

Mr. Dean: Does the Prime Minister recall that in a Written Answer to me recently he told me that there were 251 standing advisory committees in existence at the moment, of which about half report confidentially? Is it not time that we had a committee similar to the Franks Committee to look into the whole working of these standing advisory committees to see whether they conform with free and open government?

The Prime Minister: I think that the hon. Gentleman is correct in the figures which he has taken from information which I previously gave the House, but, of course, there were included a number of committees, commissions and inquiries set up before last October as well as


those since. The Question on the Order Paper refers to those appointed since last October.

Oral Answers to Questions — PUBLIC EXPENDITURE (CONTROL)

Mr. Driberg: asked the Prime Minister if he is aware that, as the end of each financial year approaches, public money is sometimes spent unnecessarily because Departments and Services fear that, unless they spend up to the limit authorised for the year, in succeeding years they will be subjected to Treasury pressure to reduce their estimates; and if, in order to avoid waste and facilitate long-term planning, he will request the Treasury and the spending Departments to consider how best to remedy this practice.

The Prime Minister: The system for controlling public expenditure includes several features to counteract any tendency of the kind referred to by my hon. Friend. But my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer is constantly seeking to improve the system and will examine any specific evidence that my hon. Friend cares to send him.

Mr. Driberg: Since this kind of thing is still taking place—and I will send my right hon. Friend one or two examples of it from the last few weeks—could he say why the Treasury, whose object, obviously, is to save money, takes so long to come round to a reform which would represent a net saving in many cases?

The Prime Minister: The matter is not quite so easy as it appears, as anyone who has been a member of the Public Accounts Committee will confirm. It is essential to the House's control of expenditure that there be a clear date after which expenditure ceases. In recent years, there have been certain easements of this, mainly following the Report of the Plowden Committee on Government expenditure, and, as I say, we are prepared to consider any further improvements. But to scrap the end date, 31st March, the date required for our national accounting system, would lead to great risks for us.

Sir E. Boyle: Will the right hon. Gentleman take from a former Financial

Secretary that this is really not so simple as the hon. Member for Barking (Mr. Driberg) has suggested, and that, in the case of Departments whose pattern of expenditure is such that their work cannot easily be divided or end-stopped between years, the Treasury has tried to take this into account in dealing with their estimates?

The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir. This was one of the main themes of the Plowden Report, and I seem to remember —the right hon. Gentleman will correct me if I am wrong—that it was the theme of a speech of the right hon. Gentleman himself when he was Financial Secretary four or five years ago, before the Plowden Committee reported. One of the problems of continuing expenditure, where it is committed in one year and spent in another, is that it represents already a breach in this particular form.

Oral Answers to Questions — COMMONWEALTH TRADE

Mr. Chataway: asked the Prime Minister whether he will propose to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers policies to increase, for each of their countries, the proportion of their total trade carried on within the Commonwealth.

The Prime Minister: I shall have proposals on these matters for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting.

Mr. Chataway: Does the Prime Minister still believe that the proportion of our trade with the Commonwealth could be greatly increased or does not he now think it likely that, over a long period, it will continue to decline, as was persuasively argued in his pamphlet, "Why Britain should enter the Common Market", written a couple of years ago by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations?

The Prime Minister: I am glad the hon. Gentleman is widening his reading. I should be very sorry to feel that he was really as defeatist about increasing Commonwealth Trade as he suggests. For some years now, there has been a decline, and it is regrettable that the decline accelerated in the past four or five years. I am not underestimating the difficulties of reversing the decline. I wish that somebody had started on it


a bit earlier; that is all. We shall certainly do what we can to halt the decline and reverse the trend, and I should not like to begin approaching the problem with the pessimism of the hon. Gentleman.

Sir C. Osborne: Does not the Prime Minister agree that this decision is not entirely in our hands, that, as Commonwealth Governments become independent, they decide for themselves on these matters and that, therefore, we cannot increase this trade by our own actions?

The Prime Minister: I would remind the hon. Member that he has, in many speeches, emphasised the need for a more vigorous export effort by some of our own companies and salesmen and he will agree that we have not been taking full advantage of these markets that are to be found in the Commonwealth as well as in other areas.
It is true that the growth of indigenous industries in these areas makes it harder for us to sell, particularly where quotas are put an. But I cannot accept the view that, if a Commonwealth country is developing its own industry, we can no longer sell in that market but can sell only in the most highly developed countries, which are those of Western Europe.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Is this not where the Commonwealth Secretariat might help a great deal by disseminating information about trade in the Commonwealth? What progress is being made towards the creation of the Secretariat?

The Prime Minister: I think that an important part of the work of the Commonwealth Secretariat will be that of carrying on work done previously by more informal arrangements between the Commonwealth countries. There has been substantial agreement on the form of the Secretariat and the possibility of an appointment is being considered. I do not know whether we shall be able to make that appointment in advance of the Commonwealth conference. To get broad agreement, soundings are being taken on this point at the moment.

Mr. Snow: In my right hon. Friend's analysis of the position, did he examine the situation in which Commonwealth countries such as Australia are still exporting to this country the bulk of their raw materials and processed food

but are reducing their imports from Britain and importing more and more from other countries, using our money?

The Prime Minister: When my hon. Friend says "our" money I would point out to him that there is complete interchange in the sterling area and that we cannot do all this on a bilateral basis. It is true that some of the more advanced countries of the Commonwealth have been seeking markets elsewhere and alternative sources of supply. I do not want to be controversial about this but I feel that they may feel themselves to have been driven to it by the actions of Governments here in recent years.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: May I ask the Leader of the House whether he will state the business of the House for next week?

The Lord President of the Council (Mr. Herbert Bowden): Yes, Sir. The business for next week will be as follows:

MONDAY, 5TH APRIL—Second Reading of the Rent Bill, and of the Industrial and Provident Societies Bill [Lords], which is a consolidation Measure.

Motion on the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (Immunities and Privileges) Order.

TUESDAY, 6TH APRIL—AS already announced, my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer will open his Budget on Tuesday, 6th April.

The general debate on the Budget Resolutions and the Economic Situation will be continued on Wednesday, 7th April, and Thursday 8th April, and brought to a conclusion on Monday, 12th April.

FRIDAY, 9TH APRIL—Private Members' Bills.

The House will wish to know that it is intended to propose that the House should rise for the Easter Adjournment on THURSDAY, 15TH APRIL, until TUESDAY, 27TH APRIL.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Can the right hon. Gentleman say when the Government's decision on the future of the TSR2 will be announced?

Mr. Bowden: No, Sir. I cannot say at the moment. I said last Thursday that the announcement will be made in the House.

Sir W. Bromley-Davenport: On business for next week, I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman could approach the Prime Minister with regard to the length of time that it takes him to answer Questions. We have spent 16 minutes on the Prime Minister's Questions today and he has answered five. He gave long, interminable answers, in most of which he omitted to include the point.

Mr. Bowden: The hon. and gallant Gentleman will be aware that it is only in recent years that the Prime Minister has come on at 3.15 p.m. We think that this is an improvement on the old position. It means that at least the Prime Minister is reached for Questions, which was often not the case under former Administrations.
I take this opportunity to say that a further experiment is being undertaken between Easter and Whitsun which might result—although I would not promise anything more definite than that—in Departments being reached more speedily. This is by agreement through the usual channels.

Mr. Hamling: May I draw my right hon. Friend's attention to Motion No. 161 on the Order Paper standing in the name of the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) and the names of some of his hon. Friends?

[That this House deplores the conduct of Her Majesty's Government in refusing to accept the motion for the adjournment of the debate on the Third Reading of the Consolidated Fund Bill so as to allow a debate on a Private Member's Bill designed to aid elderly persons, and then shortly afterwards closuring the debate.]

Is my right hon. Friend aware that an Amendment to that Motion has been put down by 97 hon. Members of this side?

[To leave out from "House" to end and add "welcomes the action of Her Majesty's Government in increasing retirement pensions, in improving National Assistance rates, maternity benefits, sickness and unemployment benefits, abolishing the widows' earnings rule, trebling the 10s. widows' pension, removing prescript-

tion charges, and in undertaking a complete review of the social security system; and deplores the callous neglect of these problems in the last 13 years by the previous administration which could not have been remedied by any private Member's Bill".]

Is my right hon. Friend prepared to provide time to debate the Motion and the Amendment at an early date? If he cannot find Government time, will he prevail upon the Opposition to offer a Supply day?

Mr. Bowden: I have seen the Motion. It is not unusual for a debate on the Consolidated Fund Bill to run very late. It is true that this one ran rather later than usual and was closured after 20 hours; but it is not unusual for the Bill to run late. It is an occasion for private Members and running late is the sort of thing likely to happen on every occasion.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: Can the right hon. Gentleman give an absolute assurance that there is no intention next week to obstruct private Members' time?

Mr. Bowden: I can give the right hon. and learned Gentleman an absolute assurance that when the Consolidated Fund Bill is down for Third Reading the Government of the day will get it. I was rather surprised to find a former Leader of the House attempting to move the adjournment of the debate on the Consolidated Fund Bill, which he knows, if anyone should know, would have resulted in the Bill not being reached because it had to obtain the Royal Assent on Monday of this week.

Mr. Shinwell: My right hon. Friend referred to an experiment relating to the Prime Minister's Questions and to the usual channels having been informed. Can he explain why the hon. and gallant Member for Knutsford (Sir W. Bromley-Davenport) is excluded from discussions relating to the usual channels?

Mr. Speaker: Order. I do not think that it is the duty of the Leader of the House to do that.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: Is the Leader of the House aware that it would have been possible to have completed the debate on the Third Reading of the Consolidated Fund Bill on Monday night?

Mr. Bowden: The right hon. and learned Gentleman is, I should think, aware that on this occasion we had to obtain the Royal Assent to the Bill on Monday.

Sir L. Heald: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that Motion No. 161 deplores the conduct of Her Majesty's Government on Friday last in relation to a Private Member's Bill which had been put down for Second Reading by the Leader of the House himself in that capacity? In view of his special responsibilities to the House for the rights of all private Members, irrespective of party, will the right hon. Gentleman arrange a debate forthwith so that the House may be fully informed of the circumstances which led to the blocking of the National Insurance (Further Provisions) Bill, which was introduced by my hon. Friend the Member for Abingdon (Mr. Neave)?

Mr. Bowden: The House would imagine, from the points raised by the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) and other right hon. and hon. Gentlemen, that this is the only Private Member's Bill that has ever at any time failed to get a Second Reading. My researches show that, during the 13 years of the former Administration, 43 Private Member's Bills which, to a greater or lesser extent, could have helped the aged and poor, were not given time by the Government.

Mr. William Clark: As the Chancellor of the Exchequer has already anticipated his Budget to some extent, and as the corporation tax will have a tremendous effect on our economy, can the Leader of the House ask his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer to announce the rate of corporation tax rather than wait until 1966?

Mr. Bowden: The hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well that I cannot possibly anticipate my right hon. Friend's speech.

Mr. Blenkinsop: In relation to next week's business and not other matters, can my right hon. Friend say whether it is possible to say anything further about a debate on the arts and the Government White Paper on the subject?

Mr. Bowden: My hon. Friend will be aware that I have said on a number of

occasions that we hoped to have this debate before Easter. That is not now possible, but it is still very much in mind.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Have the right hon. Gentleman's researches into the fate of Private Members' Bills disclosed any precedent for failure to discuss a Bill which had won first place in the Ballot and was the first Order of the Day?

Mr. Bowden: My researches have found that the right hon. Gentleman himself opposed the Bill.

Hon. Members: Oh.

Mr. Speaker: Let there be a great deal less noise, so that we can get on with business questions.

Mr. William Hamilton: Will my right hon. Friend take the House into his confidence and tell us exactly what this experiment with Questions is to be? Can he tell us whether the Select Committee on Procedure will be reporting to the House about Questions before Easter, because we are very anxious to put down Questions for July?

Mr. Bowden: Whatever this experiment may do, it does not in any way anticipate anything which may come to us from the Select Committee on Procedure. It is a little difficult to explain in detail, but what is happening is that four Ministers are not attracting many Questions and we are taking them out of the roster and are putting them at a specific point, making more time for the Ministers to whom Questions are addressed.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Does the right hon. Gentleman's reply to me mean that in the view of the Government there is no distinction between opposing a Bill and preventing its discussion?

Hon. Members: Answer.

Mr. Speaker: Order. The House must be sensible, because we will stop these questions very soon and this noise is cutting out a lot of Members who want to ask questions. Nor can we now have a debate on the events of some past day. Were a Motion to be moved, we could discuss it, but not now.

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: Can the right hon. Gentleman say that, if there is to be an announcement on the future of the TSR2,


it will not be included in the Budget speech? Is he aware that if this very important and successful project is cancelled, although that would be very welcome to the United States aircraft industry, it would be deeply resented not only by our aircraft industry, but throughout the whole of our engineering industries and by the scientists and technologists who work in them?

Mr. Bowden: I cannot possibly go further than I have already gone when I promised that a statement on the TSR2 would be made in the House.

Mr. Grimond: Without returning to the events of last week, is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there are various matters concerned with the procedures of the House to be considered—Questions, the Consolidated Fund Bill and our own Motion on the composition of Standing Committees? Can he tell the House when the Select Committee on Procedure will report? Presumably, this will not be for a very long time. Would the right hon. Gentleman therefore consider whether, in the meantime, we could have a debate on the procedures of the House of Commons?

Mr. Bowden: The Select Committee on Procedure is empowered to make an interim report if it wishes. I am not aware firmly whether one is coming, but I understand that it is a possibility. Having made an interim report, the Committee would, of course, go on to consider further matters. The House could easily debate the early report if it so wished.

Mr. Soames: Following the right hon. Gentleman's reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon, North (Sir I. Orr-Ewing), is he aware that we have always considered, in view of what has been previously said about this matter, that a statement on the future of the TSR2 would be made by the Government as a statement on its own? In view of what the right hon. Gentleman has said, is he aware that if there is any possibility of this statement being wrapped up, as it were, in the statement on the Budget, we would require an extra day to discuss this very important matter?

Mr. Hugh Jenkins: Is my right hon. Friend aware that hon. Members opposite who are urging unrestricted public

expenditure on the TSR2 are exactly the same Members who are also urging on the Government restrictions on, and reductions of, public investment?

Mr. Speaker: That bears no resemblance to a business question.

Sir A. V. Harvey: Reverting to the forthcoming statement on the TSR2 and the many thousands of workers who are on tenterhooks about whether this project will go on, will the Leader of the House give an assurance that when it is made it will be made separately from any other debate or issue?

Mr. Bowden: I will give an assurance, because of the seriousness of the situation which the hon. Gentleman correctly mentioned, that as soon as possible it will be made in the House. I cannot go beyond that.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Cannot the Leader of the House say that when it is made this statement will be made as a separate statement and not contained or hidden away in some other longer statement?

Mr. Bowden: No, I cannot.

Mr. Michael Foot: On the TSR2, is my right hon. Friend aware that he is setting a most dangerous precedent in gross breach of past practice when he gives an undertaking that an important statement is to be made to the House of Commons first?

Mr. Marten: Can the Leader of the House say that if this statement, which may be about the cancellation of the TSR2, is wrapped up in the Budget, we shall, nevertheless, be able to move the Adjournment of the House under Standing Order No. 9?

Mr. Bowden: I do not know why the House should imagine that this statement is likely to be wrapped up in the Budget. I have said quite firmly that as soon as it is possible to make a statement, a statement will be made, and in the House.

Mr. Spriggs: Can my right hon. Friend say when the Motion No. 132 will be discussed?

[That this House, taking note of and sharing the profound concern and misgivings of the borough police authorities in England and Wales as to the provision


made in section 2 of the Police Act 1964 for the appointment of magistrates to police authorities, calls upon the Secretary of State, pending the introduction of amending legislation, to amend the Police Act 1964 (Commencement No. 1) Order 1964 so that the provisions whereby the borough magistrates appoint one third of the watch committee shall not, as thereby provided, come into effect on 1st June, 1965.]

Mr. Bowden: No, Sir. I cannot give any firm promise, but I will keep it in mind.

Mr. Robert Cooke: Will the right hon. Gentleman tell the House which four Ministers are to appear less frequently at Question Time? Is the Paymaster-General to be included in these four and perhaps to be available only for all-night sitting duty in future?

Mr. Bowden: I have not said that any of my right hon. Friends are likely to appear less frequently. What I have said is that they will appear at a specific point. For the interest of the House, my right hon. Friends concerned are the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, the Attorney-General, the Minister without Portfolio and the Paymaster-General.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: As the Leader of the House is considering experiments at Question Time, would he consider the

experiment of allowing us to put questions to the Leader of the Opposition?

Mr. Peter Emery: Will the right hon. Gentleman do all in his power to see that a statement is made by the Leader of the House next week to ensure that when private Members' time is causing a problem in the House, the Leader of the House will not delegate his responsibilities to the Paymaster-General?

Mr. Speaker: I have already said that we cannot go back to that.
The time has come when we ought to bring this to an end, or we shall be trespassing on the ensuing debate.

BILL PRESENTED

HOUSE BUYERS PROTECTION

Mr. Speaker: Bill to amend the law so as to establish statutory conditions as to the quality of materials and work in new or converted houses and fiats intended for sale, presented by Mr. Alfred Morris; supported by Mr. Harold Lever, Mr. Charles R. Morris, Mr. Leslie Lever, Mr. Dan Jones, Mr. William Hamling, and Mr. Arnold Gregory; read the First time; to be read a Second time tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 119.]

ADJOURNMENT

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Edward Short.]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

3.49 p.m.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Michael Stewart): The opening speech in a foreign affairs debate must necessarily be selective. I have no doubt that during the debate hon. Members will raise a number of matters which I shall not be able to cover, but to which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister will give his attention at the end of the debate. But, even if one is selective, such a speech must deal with many parts of the world and with many problems, and in the hope of giving coherence to the picture I want at the outset to state a guiding theme.
When we discuss international affairs we must necessarily say a great deal about restoring or keeping the peace. This involves frequent mention of the necessity to resist aggression and to keep up our defences. But we all know that human affairs cannot be rightly ordered by defence and by the use of power alone. The sole purpose of such activities is to make it possible for a nation to be able to use in peace their creative energies for the production of wealth and to turn their minds and hearts to the wise use of it.
We understand this in home affairs, where the maintenance of peace and order, although essential, is only one item and we spend much of our time discussing trade and the production of wealth and the economic and social uses of it. As the world becomes more civilised, we shall hope to see a similar development in foreign affairs and that the emphasis will need to be less on defence and the use of power and increasingly on the fruitful co-operation of nations for productive ends. I stress that because it is necessary for me to begin by giving attention to a part of the world where at present it is power and force which occupy the forefront of the scene.
The House will remember that in 1954 there was in Vietnam a partial and limping settlement. I call it that because South Vietnam and the United States were not parties to it and because the free elections to which it referred and on which the reunification of Vietnam was to depend were not possible either

in the Communist dominated North or in the disturbed South. There emerged what one might call a de facto settlement with Vietnam divided into North and South at the 17th parallel.
Yet even that limited settlement could have been helpful to both North and South. For a time both parts continued to endeavour to put themselves in order and to make economic and social progress. Those possibilities remained open until, in 1959, there was a call by the Government of North Vietnam for an intensification of the Vietcong activities in the South and for full-scale guerilla warfare against the Government of South Vietnam. Not only did the Northern Government call for that; they then proceeded to help it with more weapons and military advice, as was made clear by the majority report of the International Control Commission in 1962.
Faced with that situation, South Vietnam appealed to the United States for help, and the United States responded. But it is important to notice that in 1959, when this pressure from the North began, and even as late as 1961— nearly two years later—there were still only 700 members of the United States Armed Forces in South Vietnam. I think it important to remind the House of this, because it cannot be claimed that the action taken by the North was the result of a considerable United States military presence in the South. The action from the North preceded the arrival of United States forces in any considerable degree in the South.
It was not until 1964, after United States vessels had been attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin, that the United States struck back at the territory of North Vietnam itself. In 1965, came the incidents where United States forces were attacked at Pleiku and QuiNhon. The House knows the passage of events since then.
It might be argued—and in Communist quarters it is argued—that the whole problem could be solved if the United States simply withdrew its forces and left North Vietnam and the Vietcong to deal with the whole situation. I suppose that it might be said that that solution has the merit of simplicity since it would leave nothing to negotiate or to confer about. But for the United


States to do that would be, in the first place, a breach of its clear undertaking to South Vietnam. It would leave the problem of what would happen to the very many Vietnamese who do not wish to live under a Communist Government, and we should notice that when the de facto division between North and South occurred 1 million people moved down from the North to live in the South.
It would further be an admission that what is, in fact, the aggression from the North had succeeded. I assure the House that that event would be regarded with profound alarm by all the non-Communist countries in that part of the world. I have noticed from the very many letters which I have received about this matter, and which my hon. Friends and hon. Members opposite have sent to me from their constituents, that, although many of them ask urgently, and naturally, that Her Majesty's Government should do everything possible to get a peaceful solution, very few indeed ask for the complete and unconditional withdrawal of the United States forces.
I make that point because if we reject, as I think we should reject, that solution, we must ask: what is the position if United States forces remain in South Vietnam and are continually struck at and those strikes are aided and directed from the North and often carried out by people who have been sent down from the North for that purpose? It does not seem to me possible to ask the United States, in that situation, to say that its forces are to be struck at in that manner and that they are to be bound by the condition that they could never in any circumstances strike at the territory of North Vietnam from which the attacks on them are directed.
I put these points before the House because I believe that they are essential features in the situation, though unwelcome. It will follow from what I have said that many hon. Members will ask themselves, "If this is so, is there not grave danger that, with strike and counter-strike, there will be a continued escalation of the war with growing danger to the people of the world?". On that matter, we should notice this. As I have told the House, there was a period of nearly five years, from 1959 to 1964, between the time when the northern pressure and aggression on the South began

and the time when the United States first struck at the territory of North Vietnam.
That is one piece of evidence to weigh. Another is the statement by Mr. Adlai Stevenson, on behalf of the United States Government, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, that if there were "a prompt and assured cessation" of the aggression the United States would be prepared to withdraw its forces and cooperate in a programme of aid for South-East Asia.
More recently, President Johnson has expressed the matter thus:
It is and it will remain the policy of the United States to furnish assistance to support South Vietnam for as long as is required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under control'. The military actions of the United States will be such, and only such, as serve that purpose—at the lowest possible cost in human life to our allies, to our own men, and to our adversaries, too.
I do not feel that that can be regarded as the language of a man or a nation eager to engage in a reckless escalation of the conflict. There is close and continuous consultation between London and Washington on this matter, and, of course, Her Majesty's Government form and express their own judgment of events as they occur, but I repeat, that on the evidence and the record, I think that it would be wrong to argue that the action of the United States is the action of a country engaged in a reckless escalation of the conflict.
I think that at this point I ought also to say something about methods of warfare. If this debate had occurred a few days earlier, I should have been expected to deal particularly with the use of gas. As the debate occurs when it does, I might perhaps refer more to the terrible incident in Saigon the other day. There is no doubt that cruelties have been committed by both North and South Vietnamese forces, apart from what might have been done on the battlefield, or against men in action.
In 1963, 2,000 unarmed civilians were killed by the Vietcong, and nearly 2,800 in 1964. Recently, at the village of Kinh Mon, a policeman was murdered by the Vietcong and his body cut into pieces. At the funeral, the Vietcong exploded an anti-tank mine, killing one of the mourners, and wounding a score of others. At Pleiku, two bus loads of


people, civilian men, women and children, were murdered as a pure act of terror by the Vietcong. I am not going to continue the list. I mention these episodes only so that the House shall see the horror and cruelties of this war in proper perspective.
Surely one lesson that we must draw from every story of horror that can be produced by anyone from any quarter is the imperative need to try to reach a settlement of this dispute? On that matter, Great Britain had a special responsibility, as one of the two cochairmen of the Geneva Conference on Vietnam of 1954, and accordingly, as far back as 20th February, we addressed to the Soviet Government, our fellow cochairman, a proposal that we and they jointly should invite all the Powers concerned to state their views on this whole matter in the hope and expectation that out of that something like a basis for settlement could be secured. We deliberately made this a modest proposal, since it was known that the two cochairmen did not view this matter in exactly the same light, and it was important, therefore, to search for what measure of agreement could be found.
We had the Soviet reply after about three weeks. It came immediately before Mr. Gromyko's visit here. It was simply a suggestion that we and the Soviet Union should issue a statement which was entirely a condemnation of the United States, and a demand for the withdrawal of its troops. It seemed to me that, apart from anything else, for us to have done that would have been a complete misunderstanding of the rôle of co-chairman. It is not for co-chairmen as such, I think, to engage in propagandist statements. They should endeavour to reach statements on which they can agree, and which might help to promote a settlement.
But, unhappily, this attitude expressed in the Soviet reply is similar in tone and substance to the other comments from the Communist Powers concerned with the conflict. For example, on 7th March, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia gave an account of the "Indo-Chinese People's conference," and described the line taken by the Communist representatives from Vietnam who said. in effect:

We absolutely refuse a conference on our country, we absolutely refuse a negotiated solution, we demand that the Americans leave without conditions.
Similarly, on 10th March, the Commander-in-Chief of North Vietnam said:
The United States Government must stop at once its acts of provocation, sabotage and aggression against the democratic government of Vietnam, end the aggressive war in South Vietnam, withdraw United States troops and weapons from there and let the South Vietnamese people settle their own affairs by themselves in accordance with the programme of the South Vietnamese Liberation Front. The problem of peaceful reunification of Vietnam is the affair of the Vietnamese people, it will be settled by the Vietnam Fatherland Front and the South-Vietnamese Liberation Front.
The House will notice in that statement not only that it is not thinking in terms of conference or negotiation at all, but that the affairs of Vietnam are subsequently to be settled exclusively by Communist organisations, and that by these proposals no non-Communist in Vietnam would have any chance of taking part in framing the future of his country.
On 12th March, the Chinese Government spoke in similar terms. When Mr. Gromyko was here my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and I pressed him most earnestly on the question of what possible basis he saw for conference, negotiation, talk, call it what one will, about Vietnam, but he, too, stuck to the position that the first, and, indeed, only, essential, was unconditional withdrawal by the United States.
I think we should notice that this Communist attitude at the present time—and I stress "at the present time"—differs very markedly from the attitude over the question of Laos in 1961. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition told the House on 24th March, and later told television viewers, that he had on that occasion employed British diplomacy to bring the Russians and Americans together to make an honourable settlement, and I think that he was implying that we had only to imitate his course to get that result.
But it is important to notice that although in December, 1960, the Soviet Government themselves proposed a conference on Laos, it was five months after that that the conference was convened, and that it then took the conference 14 months to reach agreement. I in no


way criticise what the right hon. Gentleman did then, certainly not, but he started with one substantial advantage which is not present in this situation at the moment, namely, that the Communist side actually wanted and proposed a conference.

Mr. J. J. Mendelson: My right hon. Friend has referred to what was said by the representative of Cambodia. Has he seen an agency report which has come out of New York, dated 31st March, of a statement by the former Foreign Minister of Cambodia, who is now the representative at the United Nations, about the recent conference in Cairo of non-aligned nations, that Cambodia and Yugoslavia had proposed to President Ho Chi Min the reconvening of the 1954 conference and said:
President Ho Chi Min favourably responded to the initiative of the non-aligned countries stressing that his Government expect action and is ready to take part in a conference of the participants of the Geneva Agreement."?

Mr. Stewart: My right hon. Friend will have noticed that I laid great stress on the words "at present" when I was describing the Communist attitude. I was about to lead to the point that there are these very recent reports. If there is a change there, as I shall show the House later, we have a changed situation but, in view of some suggestions that all that was needed was an initiative to bring the Powers round the table, I want to emphasise that until this very latest development the attitude of the other side has been, as expressed by the remarks which I have quoted, that it did not want a conference or anything else, and I was saying that in 1953 both sides wanted a conference and expressed their wish for one, but even so it was not until July, 1954, that agreement was reached at Geneva.
What we have had to struggle with during these last weeks is a situation where the repeated attitude of the Communist side was that it saw no need for negotiations or a conference at all. It has sometimes been suggested that this attitude of the Communist Powers can be blamed on us; that if we had been prepared to engage in phrases condemnatory of the United States, or to dissociate ourselves from its actions, we

should have got a better response. But I think that we should notice what response others have been getting—France, India and Yugoslavia.
The French approach glanced at, but no result from it; the Indian ignored and the People's Daily, in Peking, saying on 22nd March of the Yugoslav initiative,
The Tito clique serves America
and going on to say that President Tito had no right to express opinions about Vietnam. However, having said that, I trust this will not discourage any nation or group of nations that feels it can help in bringing about such a settlement from any initiative that it may think wise. Later, I will say something of the action that we are taking.
Hon. Members will have seen the report of a further initiative by a group of nonaligned nations. Her Majesty's Government view this initiative with sympathy and are in earnest agreement with its aim of reaching a peaceful solution for the serious situation in Vietnam.
The Communist attitude has been difficult, indeed, impossible, so far, but I most earnestly hope and trust—and there are now some signs of more ground for hope than even a day ago—that this attitude is not final. In that situation we shall still seek a settlement. Since our fellow co-chairman will not at present act with us, we intend, as I explained during my recent visit to the United States, to act ourselves as co-chairman and to invite an expression of views from all the Powers concerned, and we shall endeavour to get from them by persistent inquiry what can be the basis for a settlement.
Similarly, as the House knows, Mr. Patrick Gordon Walker will be visiting capitals in the Far East, because we believe that approaches to try to break through the wall of resistance we have so far met should be made by a considerable variety of means, not merely by ordinary diplomatic exchanges but by inquiries of any kind that seem likely to prove fruitful.
I will mention another possibility. As far back as 2nd February we made another proposal to the Russians, this time in connection with our duties as co-chairmen for the conference on Laos. The proposal that we made was itself a limited one, simply that we should carry


out the duty imposed on us as cochairmen for Laos to make recommendations for the future of the International Control Commission for that country. Although that was a limited proposal it was a definite proposal and we await the Russian reply that could get talks started on one aspect of South-East Asia —talks which can be widened if there is willingness to widen them, to deal with the main anxiety facing us at the present time.
Hon. Members may have seen an article in this morning's Press pointing out that there are precedents for a conference starting with one limited objective and being widened to deal with a greater problem. It is natural and right that while we are engaged in these activities we should be in close consultation with our ally, the United States. It would not, I think, serve any useful purpose for us merely to strike attitudes without any regard to whether we were keeping in touch with our ally. That would be a neglect of our proper duty as co-chairmen.
It might be said that the United States Government should spell out more fully what was required as a satisfactory assurance by North Vietnam that it was prepared to cease attacks on the South, or that the United States should describe the exact process through which a ceasefire might be reached, or that it should describe more fully how it pictures the future of Vietnam, for all these things must at some time be part of the discussion.
It is difficult for the United States to do this so long as there is no indication from the other side of its preparedness to consider a settlement on any terms. If and when there is a clear indication to that effect, when the other side communicates in any form that it desires a cessation of hostilities, or considers there is room for negotiation, then the door would be open and there would be something which could be regarded as a basis for negotiation; and then the thoroughly sound proposition that this whole problem must have a political and not merely a military solution could become alive and real.
The various inquiries and initiatives that we are taking in the forms that I have mentioned, and in others that may

appear to be fruitful in the future, are directed at getting that indication and opening that door, at making it possible to secure not merely a military but a satisfactory political settlement of this vexed and agonising and threatening question.
Before turning from South-East Asia, I think that the House would expect me to say a brief word on events as between Malaysia and Indonesia. Indonesia is carrying out what is now called a confrontation—a harassment —of Malaysia, and is ostensibly doing that on the ground that Indonesia objects to the incorporation in Malaysia of certain territories in Borneo. I think it important to remember that there is a clear United Nations verdict that the incorporation of those territories in Malaysia was in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, and that Indonesian observers present at the time agreed with that conclusion. In those circumstances, there seems to be no justification for this process of confrontation, as it is called.
If one looks at the comparative size, population, and resources of Indonesia and Malaysia it clearly cannot be maintained that Malaysia is a threat to Indonesia. If the Indonesians are anxious —and I would concede that this may be a real anxiety—about the presence of a considerable proportion of British forces in that area, they have only to bring the confrontation to an end and that anxiety can be removed.
I have had to say a good deal about the necessity for resistance, but, following the theme that I tried to set at the beginning, I think it important to say that when one is dealing with the Communist world one must not think only in terms of resistance.

Mr. William Warbey: May I interrupt my right hon. Friend? Before he leaves the question of Malaysia, I wonder whether he would explain how it helps Britain's mediating rôle in Vietnam if British troops, sent to Malaysia to protect Malaysia against Indonesian attack, spend their time in training South Vietnamese Army personnel to counter guerrilla activities in Vietnam?

Mr. Stewart: I think that my hon. Friend had better develop what he has


to say about that if he catches Mr. Speaker's eye, but I would point out that such complaint as he is making has not been raised by any of the parties to the dispute as a serious element in it.
I was saying that in so far as Communism is a power which tries to extend its domain by force it must expect to be resisted. In so far as it is a doctrine which says that mankind can be led forward into the kind of world that science makes possible only if it will submit to the domination of the Communist Party and the apparatus of the one-party State, it -is a doctrine which we, for our part, reject. But in so far as it is a protest—historically, this is an important aspect of Communism—against backwardness, and in so far as its aim is the modernisation and development of some of the poorest countries in the world, then that is an aim which we can share and an aim in the fulfilment of which we can work with Communist countries.
I wish to say a word about particular Communist countries. First, China. We wish to have good relations with China. It was the last Labour Government which established relations with the present regime in China. We recognise that she is a great Power whose influence is growing and we support her claim to her rightful seat at the United Nations. We are anxious to continue that growth of trade with China. We maintain scientific and cultural contacts and we have a Mission in Peking.
It is disappointing that the political content of what we have been seeking to do here is still small, and it is true that as long as China's attitude to world affairs is dominated by hatred of the United States China will not be able to take the place in the world to which its size, industry, the ingenuity of its people and great cultural heritage entitles that country.
I think that the House will remember the tribulations which China went through in this century and the last; not only the tribulations but the humiliations to which China was often subjected by Western Powers. We have to remember that to understand China's attitude today, but in the end—this is something all nations have to learn—we cannot build policy on past grievances, however justified. We

must hope that when the bitterness of those memories fades, China will be prepared to co-operate in the solution of problems which at present it seems determined only to exacerbate.
As to the Soviet Union, one thing I noticed in the conversations with Mr. Gromyko was that although we could not agree on a common line of action as co-chairmen, he was anxious to keep the function of co-chairmanship alive. We have noticed, also, that the Soviet Union was very ready to co-operate in the establishment of the Peace-keeping Committee which is seeking to solve the difficulties of the United Nations and that it is also anxious that fruitful discussions on disarmament should be proceeded with.
When Mr. Gromyko was in London I told him how essential it was that the direct discussions on disarmament should not be allowed to lapse and I pressed him to agree that the 18—Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva should meet again soon. Mr. Gromyko promised to let us have an early reply. It was handed to our Ambassador in Moscow on Tuesday. In it the Russians suggest that the problem of disarmament should now be referred to the United Nations Disarmament Commission. This reply has also been given to the Americans and communicated to the President of the Security Council.
In our view, the issue of disarmament is so vital that we must be ready to discuss it in any forum. We are still of the opinion that the Geneva Conference is the most useful, experienced and businesslike body for detailed consideration of the problem of disarmament and worthwhile negotiations on the subject. We should not want to see it superseded, but since disarmament could not be discussed at the 19th Session of the General Assembly, we should certainly be prepared to take part in a joint debate if this turned out to be the general wish of the United Nations.
I am glad to see that Governor Adlai Stevenson, on behalf of the United States Government, has said that the United States would participate constructively if such a meeting is approved. We shall have proposals of our own on disarmament to put forward; there will be Russian proposals which Mr. Gromyko described and, no doubt, proposals from other sources.
I wish to say a word about the smaller Communist countries of Eastern Europe. It is gratifying to note that trade with them is growing, as are personal, educational and cultural links. We were glad to welcome a group of Bulgarian Ministers here recently and I shall be paying a visit to Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in the coming month. As to the general question of relations between Communist and non-Communist groups, I think it important all the time that we should not suppose that the division between Communist and non-Communist is the whole picture of mankind.

Mr. Michael Foot: What my right hon. Friend is saying in relation to the Communist world is very interesting. Can he tell us what representations he made to the United States Government that they should alter their attitude on the representation of China at the United Nations?

Mr. Stewart: I have not myself taken up that subject with them at present.
I was saying that we must not suppose—

Mr. Sydney Silverman: I do not want to press my right hon. Friend too far on this. I know the difficulties, but he had a word to say about China not basing its policy on past grievances. In this respect it is not, is it, a past grievance? The United States has insistently refused to recognise China's existence for 16 years, and still does.

Mr. Stewart: We have shown quite clearly what is our view on the desirability of recognition. The question which was referred to by my hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) was taken up before I took office, with the United States in December, and no doubt that is a matter to which we shall return.
I was saying that we must not suppose that the division between Communist and non-Communist is the whole picture of mankind. At no time, I think, is it more important to remember that than when we are looking at African problems. The countries of Africa, though they differ as much one from another as do the countries of Europe, are united in their desire to assert quite clearly their newly-

won independence. One way in which they do so is by their natural refusal to be neatly lined up and docketed as either pro-Western or pro-Communist, and we must accept that.
The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition once spoke of the difficulties of the United Nations being due, I think he said, at any rate in part, to the selfishness of some of the newer illations in using the United Nations for selfish purposes. It is not wholly unknown for older nations to use international institutions for rather narrowly conceived purposes. I think that we must expect that nations that have newly-won their independence will have a very strong concern for their own status, their own dignity, their own interests, and one must approach that with sympathy. These African countries are also united in their need for aid. It is quite natural that they should not want to receive all, or too great a proportion, of aid from countries which were formerly colonial Powers. That is also an aspect of their newly-won independence.
In so far as the aid they get from Communist countries helps their economic development we welcome it. Our own aid is considerable. Forty-two percent. of all our overseas aid goes to Africa; and it is for African countries themselves to judge from what quarters they should receive aid, and under what conditions. When we look at any African group or leader or party the first question we ought to ask is not "Is he pro-East or pro-West?" but rather, "Has he the confidence of his people? Does he desire to bring them forward to liberty and social progress?" If the answer to that question is "Yes", we should seek to be his friend.
The demand for economic progress and social justice rises in Africa. We want to see it combined with democratic institutions. If we want to see that, it is important for us to show in our own country that we do not regard the democratic machine merely as a machine to be worshipped for its own sake, but to show that it can be used to solve economic problems and to produce social justice. Further, if we wish to have any status at all in Africa we must make it quite clear at home and abroad that we reject in any form any doctrine that is based on race or racial superiority.
Not only in Africa but in the Middle East as a whole we see this combination of an urge towards reform and an assertion of independence. I believe that even the severest critic of President Nasser would not deny the considerable work of reform that he has carried out in his own country. One may deplore that, like earlier reforming leaders in history, he has chosen to combine that with military adventures which do not help his own country and which, indeed, jeopardise the work of reform that he is striving to do there.
One aspect of this is the continued effort at subversion in the Federation of Southern Arabia, aimed at frustrating our policy of bringing that country forward to full and early independence. But this development of social and economic reforms which can be seen in Egypt can also be seen in greater or lesser degree in other Arab countries. Israel is a country which is an outstanding example of providing a free and enriched life for people from all over the world who have experienced persecution and difficulty. When Mr. Eshkol, the Prime Minister of Israel, was here recently I made it clear to him that we are firmly determined to maintain friendly relations with Israel and that our desire to be on friendly terms with the Arab countries cannot be bought by estranging us from Israel. In another part of the Middle East, in Iran, also, we see a substantial attempt being made to bring that country forward into the modern world.
Yet in these countries, all in different ways and different degrees seeking to reform and modernise themselves, the scene is bedevilled by hostilities which have their roots in the past and which are not, in my judgment, essential or inescapable results of any present facts. In those circumstances, our task is at all times to discourage violent solutions of problems to play our part in helping programmes of economic and social reform.

Sir Godfrey Nicholson: Would the right hon. Gentleman add to the wise words he is speaking that this country is most anxious that in all these countries the rights of individuals should be preserved and that the regime, however idealistic it may be in its reforming aims, should not be based on concentra-

tion camps and imprisonment without trial?

Mr. Stewart: I think that there is a limit to what we can go round telling everybody. I have said earlier that if we want countries elsewhere to admire and practice democratic institutions perhaps the most useful thing we can do is to show how well we can make our own democratic institutions work here.

Mr. Stephen Hastings: Mr. Stephen Hastings (Mid-Bedfordshire) rose——

Mr. Stewart: I have almost finished.
We have all over the world a ferment of desire for progress and reform and a ferment of nationalism. The problem is whether the world can be carried through this ferment without violent conflict breaking out. The world's instrument for that purpose at present is the United Nations, now afflicted with difficulty over its finances and the future of the organisation of peace keeping.
Chapter VI of the Charter of United Nations provides for peaceful settlement of disputes. Chapter VII provides for the enforcement of United Nations decisions where peaceful settlement has failed. It is our view that there are situations between Chapters VI and VII, situations where it will be possible to get peaceful settlement in time but where in the meantime it is necessary to have some kind of force to keep order and to preserve the peace. Cyprus and the Congo are examples of that.
We believe that in the organising of peace-keeping operations the prime but not the only rôle lies with the Security Council and that the General Assembly, also, has a part to play. We shall bring forward in the Peace-Keeping Committee the detailed proposals giving expression to that principle. Meanwhile, the offer of logistic support for the United Nations peace-keeping operations, which I made on 23rd February, was intended not only for its value in itself, but as a manifestation of our determination that the United Nations shall reach a solution of this problem.
These, then, are our principles and aims: to resist aggression, which means close and continued consultation with our Allies; to understand and whenever possible to co-operate with the Communist world; to help new nations progressively to shift the


emphasis of international affairs from defence to welfare and to uphold the authority of the United Nations. They are not aims we can achieve alone; and we should notice here our relations with our nearest neighbours on the Continent of Europe. We are a European country. Our future is bound up with theirs. This is as true in economics and in politics as it is in defence.
It is possible to envisage a situation in which two of the groups we find in Europe —E.E.C. and E.F.T.A.—could become one group. Such a development, although —for reasons which the House knows—it is not as yet practicable, is a development that would in itself be welcome. But since it is not at present practicable, it seems to us right and sensible to concentrate on immediate measures that bring those two groupings closer together, which as the House knows, I developed in a speech in Brussels not long ago, and which I need not repeat here. It seemed to me that those measures had the further advantage that they could bring these two groupings in Western Europe closer together without in themselves erecting any barriers to better understanding with Eastern Europe.
I mentioned at the outset of my speech, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, the part played in international affairs by the true concept of power and of welfare, of keeping the peace and of using the peace constructively. I have tried to show that in many fields—in Europe, in the Far East, in the Middle East, in Africa and in the structure of the United Nations—there is much for this country to do both in keeping the peace and in helping to promote human welfare—promoting it by material aid, by scientific co-operation and by the services of skilled administrators and technicians.
It is the tragedy of human affairs that that aspect of international politics which is concerned with defence and power stands plainly in front of us at present and can be described plainly enough and starkly and is such that the tenderhearted may recoil from it, while the more constructive and hopeful aspects of international affairs, which necessarily lie more in the future, cannot so easily be described with precision and are such that the cynic may easily sneer at them.
But we must have faith. We must work for the future. Resolution and readiness to defend are one essential. Imagination and capacity to create are the other. If resolution fails, the opportunity to create is lost. If resolution had failed us in 1940, all our hopes for the present would have failed with it. But if imagination fails, defence has lost its purpose and courage has been in vain. It is the combination of resolution and imagination that can bring us up the long road that leads from a world disorganised, excessive in armaments and deficient in prosperity to a world so organised that the creative energies of man can leap forward to exalt the welfare of nations and the dignity of human life.

4.42 p.m.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: This is the first time since the right hon. Gentleman took office as Foreign Secretary that he has been able to open a foreign affairs debate. I am quite sure that I speak for the whole House when I say that we are immensely grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for the manner and the matter of the speech that he has made to us today.
I accept at once the theme propounded at the beginning of the right hon. Gentleman's speech when he said, in effect, that diplomacy today is a blend of strength and conciliation. Although it may be unfortunate and a sad commentary on mankind that strength has to play so large a part in this equation, nevertheless this is so. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman in saying, too, as I think he really said, that the pursuit of peace is today an act of faith but that what we want to try to do is to make it a reality on the ground.
Therefore, I will try, during my speech, to follow the right hon. Gentleman's example. I will examine, perhaps a little more than he did, the strategy of power and diplomacy in the whole context of what still remains the Communist threat to the free world. I agree, however, with the right hon. Gentleman, and I echo his remarks, when he said that while we have to sustain resolution and persevere, because otherwise free men would be overrun, nevertheless we also have to use our imagination, otherwise mankind will never take itself out of the situation into which we seem to have got ourselves


in this twentieth century, when men ought to know better than they apparently do.
Inevitably, as has been foreshadowed, the greater part of the Foreign Secretary's speech was concentrated upon Vietnam and Asia. I will turn to that situation first, saying, too, that I found myself agreeing with almost everything that the right hon. Gentleman said on the analysis of the situation in South Vietnam. If we are to avoid false conclusions and, therefore, subsequent errors in action, we must be clear in our minds why this war started at all. I was very glad, therefore, that the Foreign Secretary answered the question so clearly.
It is quite apparent to anybody who had anything to do with those matters in those days that from the day when the Geneva Agreement was signed in 1954, North Vietnam was determined not to observe and honour the agreement. North Vietnam placed in South Vietnam cells of subversion. It started infiltration, and that infiltration has lately turned into what can properly be called an invasion.
The Prime Minister said the other day that there has been a change of policy by North Vietnam. I am not sure that I agree with him. I think that this policy has been pursued all the time, although now it is certainly a change of degree and what was rather sporadic infiltration has now become something more of the nature of an organised invasion. The House must be clear that but for this action of North Vietnam, there would have been no war.
As things were, had not South Vietnam sought American aid, that country would have been taken over. There can be no doubt about that. That was the position, and it is the position today that were the Americans to withdraw, South Vietnam would no longer exist as an independent country.
The Foreign Secretary was right and fair to point out that in that part of Asia there is a parallel case. But for the protection of the sea, Malaysia would today be subjected to the same procedure; infiltration almost indistinguishable from invasion. Therefore, Malayasia would be in the same plight. There, the native elected Government have appealed for and received British support because they could not by themselves meet the threat; and if they could not meet the threat

Malaysia would have been taken over by Indonesia.
What I am asking is that the critics of the United States should remember that we in Malaysia are in a precisely similar situation to the Americans in South Vietnam.

Mr. Warbey: I wish to come back to the point that the right hon. Gentleman has just made about Vietnam, when he talked about preserving the independence of the State of South Vietnam. The right hon. Gentleman knows very well that the Geneva Agreements laid down clearly in the final declaration that Vietnam is one country and that there are not two States, a State of North Vietnam and a State of South Vietnam. Why does the right hon. Gentleman go on persisting with this nonsense and pretence that there are two separate States in Vietnam?

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: In reply to the hon. Member, who no doubt, if he catches your eye, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, will speak later in the debate, there can be no united Vietnam if one half tries to dominate the other. That is the answer to the hon. Member and that is what is happening. One half of Vietnam is being threatened and invaded by the other. On that basis, there can be no peace. Therefore, we are trying to do in Malaysia what the United States is, in effect, doing in South Vietnam, and that is, at the request of a small country, coming to the aid of its Government and preventing domination.
If, today, we concentrate our attention in this debate largely on Vietnam rather than Malaysia, it is because the Chinese are in support of the North Vietnamese invasion and all the implications of that for the future. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the war in Vietnam in the widest setting, both military and diplomatic, and that is what I shall try to do.
During the last five years or so, the Western world, as agents for free peoples, have had one great strategic success, and that is that the Communist bloc has been split in half. There has been another further great gain, and that is that the right hook which could have been delivered by the Soviet Union against Europe was held. It is worth recalling why this was held. It was held because it was opposed by military strength which would seem to be overwhelming. Until it was understood by the Soviet Union that


that strength was overwhelming and that, therefore, aggression could not pay, diplomacy was unable to act, and it was only when the Soviet Union understood that aggression could not pay that diplomacy came into its own and we were able to establish between the Western world and the Soviet Union a co-existence which was tolerable. I think that it is worth remembering this lesson.
I would echo the sentiments expressed by the right hon. Gentleman about China. We on this side of the House have advocated Chinese entry into the United Nations. I also echo what he said about the kind of facile distinction sometimes made as if the world were divided only into Communists and others. That, also, is true. But the question today is whether China is still possessed of the Communist devil and whether under the ideology which the Chinese are practising today it is prepared to use force to expand right through South-East Asia and beyond.
There is no doubt that the Chinese are capable of delivering what I might call a left hook at the free peoples of the world through South-East Asia. If China is planning in terms of the use of force it may think that it may gain very important advantages—first of all, the domination of South-East Asia and the use of South-East Asia for its surplus population; secondly, the isolation of Australia and New Zealand from the Indian Ocean; and, thirdly, the confrontation and blackmail of a weakened Indian sub-continent, against which it has already demonstrated its power. There are also temptations for the Chinese, as we know, further afield.
If the Chinese have such aims—and I profoundly hope that they have not—and if the way were left wide open to them without any resistance, then the balance of power in the world could be turned fatally against the free peoples. One's hope must be that China, as was the case with Russia before, has recognised, and will recognise, the folly of aggression in a nuclear age. But the right hon. Gentleman was right to remind us that there is no guarantee at present that this will be so, and that is why certain countries in South-East Asia formed the S.E.A.T.O. Alliance,

bringing to their aid the countries of the West, where the power lay.
I suggest, it I may, that hon. Members, and particularly some hon. Members below the Gangway opposite, should try to realise what the Americans are doing. [HON. MEMBERS: "We know."] The Americans today—

Mr. K. Zilliacus: Mr. K. Zilliacus (Manchester, Gorton) rose——

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I am about to make a point which I dare say the hon. Member has not yet appreciated. What the Americans are doing is this: they are holding the aggression from the North southwards in advance of the S.E.A.T.O. Treaty area and, therefore, in advance of an area in which Britain has a direct commitment to intervene. Have the hon. Member and his hon. Friends understood that? When I negotiated—

Mrs. Anne Kerr: Mrs. Anne Kerr (Rochester and Chatham) rose——

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I will give way when I have completed this argument. I am not trying in the least to be controversial.
What I am trying to do is to establish a fact which the whole House ought to understand, and, in particular, hon. Members below the Gangway opposite—that America is holding an aggression in advance of the S.E.A.T.O. area. When we were negotiating the Laos agreement, I was all the time all-too-conscious of the fact that it needed only the penetration of Thailand by the Vietmin or Vietcong to activate the S.E.A.T.O. Alliance, and in that case, if that happened, there would be an escalation of the war between the great and nuclear Powers. The Americans are doing a service to the whole of the free world in holding this aggression in advance of the S.E.A.T.O. area.

Mrs. Kerr: How does the right hon. Gentleman explain that the United States has been supplying Indonesia with arms? What are his comments on that, if they are our allies?

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: As we know, there is a trade in small arms which goes on between most countries in the world, but I have to check this with the Government; perhaps the Prime Minister can


say whether the Americans are supplying many arms to Indonesia at the present time. I should very much doubt it.

Mr. Stan Newens: Will the right hon. Gentleman tell us what freedom exists in South Vietnam? He has spoken at great length about the defence of the free world. It would be enlightening to some of us if he would tell us what freedom exists in South Vietnam, which we are supposed to be defending.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Whatever internal conditions exist in South Vietnam or any other country, they are no excuse for external aggression.
I should like to continue, perhaps with a little less interruption, this point, which is a valid point, about the Americans holding aggression in advance of the S.E.A.T.O. area when requests are made for the Americans to define their limits of action. It is quite apparent from what was said by the Foreign Secretary that they cannot do so. The limits of the war must depend on and can be defined only in terms of the intentions of the aggressor. It is right that the objectives of the United States should be understood not only by their allies, but by possible foes, and I was glad that the Foreign Secretary reminded the House of the statement made by Mr. Adlai Stevenson and of another statement made by President Johnson.
If I may I want to read to the House two more statements which were made. The President of the United States said. on 25th March:
If aggression is stopped the people and Government of South Vietnam will be free to settle their own future and the need for supporting military action there will end.
That was preceded by a statement by Mr. Rusk, on 4th March:
 The United States seeks no bases or special position or rights in South-East Asia Our troops could come home tomorrow if the aggressors would go back north and stay at home.
That is the position of the United States. It is the same as our position in Malaysia. None of us wants to have troops on Asian soil, but we are both in obligation to countries who have asked us in to to defend them under treaty obligations. Our troops could be removed, like the Americans, if the aggression were to cease. 
The question, therefore, is not whether the United States wants to establish a foothold in Asia. The answer to that is an emphatic "No", as these quotations prove. The question is whether the Chinese are bent on aggression, using North Vietnam as a tool, or whether the Chinese can be brought to underwrite a peace which is real—this is the question—and thus enable the United States to withdraw. 
When we begin to think in terms of a political settlement I believe that there are two considerations which are overriding. There must be effective policing forces on the ground to stop the infiltration of guerrillas and arms. Anything short of that, and the war will begin again. The only thing that would happen if there were an inadequate policing on the ground would be that South Vietnam, by reason of lifting their guard, would be put at a fatal disadvantage in the future. From the start, if there is a peace settlement we must be clear what the policing force is to be on the ground. 
Equally important is the political machinery in control of the police force. In neither South Vietnam nor Laos have the independent commissions, consisting of neutral countries, been allowed in the past to function in Communist-held territory. That is true, and that is the reason why in Laos the peace may break.

Mr. Warbey: Mr. Warbey rose——

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: No. I am trying—

Mr. Warbey: Mr. Warbey rose——

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Dr. Horace King): Order.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I am trying to make a coherent argument—

Mr. Warbey: The right hon. Gentleman must be truthful about this.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: The hon. Gentleman may have a chance later to state his views. I happen to have been through the whole of the Laos Conference, to have followed it extremely closely, and nobody can deny that the independent Commission of neutrals was not allowed to operate in Communist-held territory.

Mr. Warbey: The right hon. Gentleman—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order. I must ask the hon. Member for Ashfield (Mr. Warbey) to refrain from interrupting when the right hon. Gentleman has not given way.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: What I am therefore suggesting the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary should remember is this. One's conclusion must be that the policing cannot be undertaken exclusively by neutrals in future, and that in any policing machinery that there is and in any controlling commission it is certain that there will not be success unless the United States and China are part of the controlling machinery.
The Foreign Secretary recalled the Laos negotiations. He said that he thought that at that time the Communists wanted a settlement and a conference. I must say that I do not remember that. I remember pressing them hard for many months before they would agree, but there was one factor at that time which I thought made the situation a little less favourable than it possibly is today and that was that the Russians were actively intervening with a supply of arms. They are not yet doing so in Vietnam. Do not let him take Mr. Gromyko's "No" as really meaning "No" —not until he has repeated it about 100 times at stated intervals. It is an automatic reaction on his part, and had we accepted it in the last Government we would never have got agreement about anything—Laos, the Test-Ban Treaty, or a relaxation of tension over Berlin. I hope, therefore, that the Government will continue to search for a settlement. I hope they will not get out on a limb, away from the allies; I was reassured by what the right hon. Gentleman said.
The only thing I notice was that I do not think Mr. Gordon Walker is going to visit any country in the S.E.A.T.O. Alliance. I am not sure whether the Prime Minister can say whether that is true. If it is true, I hope that it will be remedied, because Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and other countries are vitally affected by this. We are, in this case, talking and are negotiating, or are proposing to negotiate, about their security and future. I hope, therefore, that he will go to S.E.A.T.O. countries.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson): As his itinerary has been

finalised, it is my impression that he will be visiting Thailand, but I will make sure about this and answer the right hon. Gentleman tonight.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: It is important that we should keep in touch with our allies. Therefore, I find myself in complete agreement with the right hon. Gentleman's approach to the situation in South Vietnam and I turn to another area which falls into the strategic picture. It is the Middle East, and the right hon. Gentleman touched on this subject. There again, the use of infiltration and subversion, backed by force and ambition, is assuming new dimensions. The former Foreign Secretary expressed the Government's intention of getting on better terms with Nasser, rather, I think, with the implication that we in the Conservative Government had failed in our duty. I wonder if the right hon. Gentleman can report any progress, and I would welcome any evidence—

Mr. William Yates: Before my right hon. Friend continues, is he aware that he has referred to the President of a country, the head of a sovereign State? Should he not refer to him as President Nasser and not just Nasser?

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I think that the former Foreign Secretary expressed the Government's intention to get on better terms with Nasser—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]—and there was a slight implication that we in the Conservative Government had failed in our duty. As I said, I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman can report any progress. I will, in this connection, put some questions to him.
Is it true that whereas in about the autumn of last year there were 30,000 troops in the Yemen there are now 47,000 troops there? Is the right hon. Gentleman able to give an estimate of the number? Is there any other explanation of this, therefore, than that the Egyptians are making this a base for operations, either against Saudi Arabia or Aden and the Gulf, or both? The right hon. Gentleman has lately had visits from the Shah of Persia, Iran, from the Prime Minister of Israel and the Rulers of the Gulf, and he knows the apprehension that these ambitions are causing.
Some hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite have sometimes been critical of Britain's presence in the Gulf and they have been sceptical, I think, of our assessment of the Egyptian intentions. But is it now understood that if Britain were to move out of this area of the Gulf the vacuum would immediately be filled by Egypt, with the widest and most dangerous repercussions over the whole of this inflammable area? I feel bound to include a word on the Middle East. It is the gateway to Africa in this strategic picture, because here the Russians are assisting the Egyptians with arms in the knowledge of the Egyptian expansionist intentions.
It is, of course, one of the techniques of the Communist countries, when they are up against a hard front—as they have been in Europe—to switch to another one which is softer. The Prime Minister is now well aware of the massive activities of both the Russians and the Chinese in East Africa—indeed, over most of the African continent—certainly not aimed at promoting stability in the newly independent countries.
Will the Prime Minister, when he replies—or the Foreign Secretary at another time—make it plain that if there is trouble in the Yemen—and it looks to me very much as though it is brewing—the men and materials are ready against any increased attacks upon the Aden Federation? In view of the precarious situation in the Middle East and the increased activities which we have to undertake in the Far East—and in particular the difficulties of supply—will he give a categorical undertaking that Her Majesty's Government mean to maintain the Simonstown Agreement, which seems to me to be absolutely vital in this general strategic context?
This debate has concentrated very largely east of Suez, so I will not seek, except in the barest outline, as did the right hon. Gentleman, to forecast the possibilities in the evolution of Europe. The threat to Europe which brought the N.A.T.O. Alliance into being has been eased. I believe that it is unlikely to be resumed in the stark and dangerous form which it took in the post-war years. But one cannot rest the security of a nation or nations on instinct, and so

long as Berlin is divided and so long as East Berlin is denied self-expression, the threat to peace remains in Europe, even though it is less than it was. 
N.A.T.O. may be reorganised, but it must remain as an alliance, with American participation in it, and at its centre there must be nuclear power, because it is inconceivable, as I think both sides of the House agree, that if there is war in Europe and if there is a premeditated or an unpremeditated aggression enlarging into a big campaign there would not be a nuclear exchange. Therefore, N.A.T.O. cannot lift its guard, although it may reorganise itself, so long as there is the possible danger of the centre of Europe being dominated by one great Power, and historically that has always been the greatest danger to ourselves. The evolution of Europe, the reorganisation of N.A.T.O., Britain's relations, economic and political, with the Continent—on which I was glad that the Foreign Secretary said a word—are subjects which we can, with advantage, debate another day. Every development, almost every day, underlines the truth of what I tried to express the other day when I said that the world pattern of the foreseeable future was one of great constellations of economic and physical power. I think that the Foreign Secretary said very much the same thing. Europe will be one of these constellations of power, and the case for economic co-operation will compel us and others to join forces in order to meet the competition from the United States. 
If there is co-operation on the widest scale and we develop large joint units of production, we shall have a market complementary in size to those of the United States or, later, of the Soviet Union. Gradually perhaps, but certainly, Europe will, with the encouragement of the United States, assume greater responsibility for its own defence. I must tell the Prime Minister that I do not think that it will be a pattern which will include an A.N.F.—I think that is already dead—but that it will be a pattern in which the United States, France and ourselves are nuclear Powers contributing nuclear weapons to the alliance, with the ultimate right to withdraw, and that this is the pattern on which we shall build the future of the


European and Atlantic force. The Prime Minister has been to Bonn and the United States, and he is to go to Paris. We look forward another day to being given the Government's thoughts on the future of Europe and the future of N.A.T.O. in the Western Alliance.
The right hon. Gentleman touched on the giving of aid. I thought that he almost made the giving of aid the reward for passing some kind of political examination. I hope that he did not mean that. We should get into dreadful confusion if that were so. 
On the question of disarmament, I am bound to say that the proposal of the Russians to transfer the talks on disarmament back from the Committee of 18 to the Commission in the United Nations is a retrograde step. It cannot possibly be anything else. In my opinion, it means that disarmament has been parked by the Russians sine die.
The Government came into office holding out great hopes of change for the better. So far we have had some exemplary communiques but very little information. The Foreign Secretary has given us more today, but we shall soon be justified, on these other matters, in asking for the results. 
I have tried to put the problem of Vietnam into the world strategic setting, military and diplomatic. I think that it is deplorable—as I said at the start and as the Foreign Secretary has said on a number of occasions—and unworthy of Man that we have to talk in terms of force and of deterrents. The whole weight of British diplomacy should be turned today to trying to see that disputes are negotiated and that they do not leave the table before a settlement is reached. Let us recognise—I hope that the whole House recognises—that diplomacy must stem from strength and that no results in law or order or peace will be achieved unless that is so.

5.14 p.m.

Mr. Philip Noel-Baker: In answer to the Leader of the Opposition's last sentence, I would say that if we want to negotiate with China from a position of comparative strength, the sooner we do it the better for the West.
I know that many hon. Members want to speak in the debate, so I shall try to be appropriately brief. I start by answering taunts which have come from Tory benches against those of us who have put Motions down about Vietnam, taunts that we are anti-American and that the right policy for loyal allies is to act in universal co-operation with the United States and to support whatever they may do. What is the record of the Tory Party in this regard? The Prime Minister referred the other day to Suez. Over Suez, they flouted President Eisenhower, they concealed their plans, they drove him into leading the whole world, all our N.A.T.O. allies, and almost all the Commonwealth, against them. Over Katanga, they opposed and sabotaged the policies which the United States was striving to uphold. The Leader of the Opposition's Berwick speech was a virulent attack on the United Nations, and it came at a moment of crisis, when the United States was straining every nerve to hold the U.N. together and build up its authority and strength.
We believe that, over Suez, President Eisenhower rendered a great service to the British people, to the Commonwealth and to the world. We hope that, by our Motions—put down in loyal friendship for the American people and in loyal acceptance of the great ideals for which they stand—we may have rendered them some service in the grave crisis through which we are living today.
We had four main points in mind when we put down our Motions—gas; napalm, white phosphorous and the other terror weapons; General Maxwell Taylor's statement on 23rd March; U Thant's appeal for a cease fire and a negotiated peace.
I shall not spend long on gas. I was at the first gas attack at Ypres in April, 1915, and I remember well the passionate anger which swept the Western world. The futile use of vomiting gas in Vietnam was, I believe, the first time that gas has ever been used in Asia. Delivered from aircraft, it was wholly unsuccessful on the three occasions on which it was used; it achieved no military result at all. But it opened up a dangerous possibility of escalation in unconventional weapons of various kinds—the Russians


are strong in gas and germs. It gave the Communists the biggest propaganda weapon with the Asians that they have had for many a day. We know now that the use of gas was undertaken without the knowledge or approval of President Johnson, and I think we can be certain that it will not be used again.
The terror weapons—napalm, white phosphorous, Lazy Dogs—are made more terrible and more indiscriminate by the fact that they are delivered from the air. I do not say that they are worse than the atrocities committed by the Communist guerrillas. I have no doubt that the facts given by the Foreign Secretary this afternoon are approximately right. Over a period of years I lived at very close quarters with the Communist revolt in Greece, and I know the frightful things which guerrillas, who are always desperate men, will do to intimidate the civil population.
But look at the other side. How will the simple people of Vietnam react when a village is bombed because it flies a Vietcong flag and 34 children are admitted to have been killed or when a ship is attacked at sea and soldiers in South Vietnam uniform are found dead on the deck and civilians blown from the deck are drowned? Or when a great forest—as happened yesterday—25 miles from Saigon is set alight by napalm bombs? How many innocent peasants will have perished in that conflagration? For how long will their villages be impoverished and perhaps ruined by the destruction of their trees? A British journalist who has seen these raids wrote of napalm, white phosphorous and Lazy Dogs:
These weapons are doing the Communists' job for them by alienating the sympathies of the South Vietnamese.
We all detest, we all condemn, the ghastly vengeance of the bomb outside the U.S. Embassy the other day. But these things happen in guerrilla war. They happened in Ireland. They happened in Palestine with the Irgun. Terror begets terror, and it will inevitably increase, as it has increased since 7th February, while fighting still goes on.
That brings me to General Maxwell Taylor's statement on 23rd March, when he said in terms:
There is no limit to the potential increase of the war in Vietnam.

As I read the various reports of what he said, it seemed to me to constitute a plain demand for unconditional surrender by the Vietcong, and a threat of unlimited war to back it up. The concept of unlimited war was first launched in modern times in 1939. In Vietnam it holds the prospect of escalation in the violence used—indeed, that escalation has already begun—but it holds the risk of still more serious escalation than that.
In January this year, Mao Tse-tung gave his famous interview to Mr. Snow, in which he said:
There will be no war with the United States, unless American forces invade our Chinese soil.
At that time, the Soviet Government were negotiating with President de Gaulle with a view to common action for a negotiated peace in Vietnam. Today, Chou En-lai is in Albania saying that China will give military help to North Vietnam if the American attacks go on. Marshal Chen Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, this week wrote a formal letter to the Foreign Minister of North Vietnam, in which he gave a pledge that China would send arms and forces whenever the Government of Hanoi asked them so to do. I know Chen Yi—it would be very rash to disregard his solemn warning.
Suppose that 100-bomber raids go on. Suppose they reach nearer to Hanoi. How long will it be possible for Russia not to send the anti-aircraft missiles, manned by Russian troops, for which, beyond all doubt, the Government of Hanoi have already asked? A wider war is all too possible if present military operations go on unchecked.
Here is a statement written on Monday of this week from Peking by a Special Correspondent of The Times:
China's commitment to events in Vietnam is not at all matter for speculation; it is absolute and unflinching and will not be deflected even by nuclear threats.
The Special Correspondent also says:
The Chinese are convinced that the uprising in the South has popular support; that no political action other than guerrilla warfare was open to opponents of the Diem règime; that this régime was imposed by the Americans and that all its successors have rested on American power and lacked popular support. They further believe that the Geneva agreement did not provide for a permanent division of Vietnam and that the countries meeting in Geneva foresaw elections to unify it, which the Diem Government refused.


I do not agree with every word there, butt what it says about the Geneva Declaration is, as has been mentioned already, perfectly true. The Declaration signed by Sir Anthony Eden did provide for elections in July, 1956, to unify the country.
The United States issued a White Paper on 18th February of this year which argued, as the Leader of the Opposition appeared to argue, that this was a plain case of international aggression by one sovereign State against another sovereign State, and that, in effect, there is no real civil war in South Vietnam at all. But on the American figures in that White Paper of 18th February, at most one-fifth, and more probably only one-tenth, of the Vietcong forces have come from North Vietnam. However great the reinforcement from the North, this is a civil war in South Vietnam.
That brings me to the fourth point with which I want to deal—U Thant's contention that continued fighting, while it may bring escalation, holds no hope of victory, or of an acceptable solution, for either side. After the bombing of the United States Embassy on Tuesday, the United States Deputy Ambassador, Mr. Alexis Johnson, who was injured by the bomb, issued a statement, reported from Saigon:
If the Vietgong expected that the action would intimidate American Government officials they are thoroughly mistaken.
Those identical words are used by the spokesmen of Hanoi after every 100-bomber raid. 
Mr. Walter Lippmann is reported in The Times on Tuesday, as saying that
… it was manifest that the bombing had not changed the course of the war. The President was now under pressure to extend it to population centres round Hanoi and Haiphong and to be prepared to send 350,000 American troops to South-East Asia.'
The article in The Times goes to say:
Mr. Lippmann did not doubt that American air power could devastate North Vietnam and, in the event of Chinese intervention, do great damage to China. He went on: 'But if we had an American Army of 350,000 men in South Vietnam and extended the war in the air, we would have on our hands an interminable war without the prospect of a solution. To talk about freedom and national independence amidst such violence and chaos would be to talk nonsense.

Further fighting will not bring a settlement nearer; every battle proves that U Thant is right.
I rejoice that the Government are working for a conference now. I warmly congratulate my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary on the efforts he has made. His talks with Mr. Gromyko, his decision to go on acting as a Co-Chairman even if he has to act alone, his visit to Washington, his decision to send Mr. Gordon Walker on a mission to the East—all these have shown new and very welcome drive, initiative and courage. President Lyndon Johnson's statement last Thursday, after his talk with my right hon. Friend, was an immense advance. If the Vietcong, Hanoi, Peking should still refuse a conference in the hope of driving the American forces into the sea, they will deserve the universal condemnation of mankind.
I hope that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will consider one point. The conference should come before the cease-fire, as it did in 1954, and the subsequent political arrangements should follow after that. If we seek to settle the results before we summon the conference, it will mean an indefinite and a most dangerous delay.
I offer one final suggestion to my right hon. Friend. World opinion, even in the nuclear age, is potentially by far the greatest force in international affairs. Today, the Foreign Secretary has told us that 17 Governments—some of them are the Governments of great nations, among them India—are issuing a joint appeal for a cease-fire and a negotiated peace. President Ayub Khan of Pakistan made that same demand in Peking two weeks ago. The Prime Minister of Canada voiced the same opinion earlier this year. President de Gaulle, who knows almost as much about Vietnam as U Thant, has been saying it for many months.
I hope that my right hon. Friends the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary will concert their action with that of France and of the other Governments who have declared the interest and the aspirations of mankind. It is the vital interest of every nation that this cruel war should stop and that reason should find a settlement which gives the Vietnam nation the peace with freedom which they desire. The whole House will wish my right hon.


Friends the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary God Speed in their efforts to this end.

5.30 p.m.

Mr. J. Grimond: I join in the congratulations which have been offered to the right hon. Member for Fulham (Mr. M. Stewart) on his first speech as Foreign Secretary, but I must strike a note of disagreement, or at least scepticism, as aganst the coalition between the two Front Benches on the American policy in Vietnam. I certainly do not do this because I am in any sense anti-American. No one would be more pleased than I if I could convince myself that this policy is likely to succeed, but I have doubts about the ultimate success of this policy and I would like to put them to the House.
I would not expect the Americans to leave South Vietnam unilaterally. Nor do I deny that there is aggression and infiltration from the north. I am as horrified as are the Foreign Secretary and the Leader of the Opposition by the bombing of the United States Embassy and the other atrocities committed by the Vietcong. Again, I realise that this country has a limited rôle to play. There is not a great deal we can do. I must confess that at times in the Foreign Secretary's speech I felt that he was rather giving away prizes to the good boys of the world who were behaving according to how the British think they should behave. Putting it bluntly, a great deal of the world does not mind whether the British think they behave well or badly. I am afraid, also putting it bluntly, that to most of the world we are known simply as a nation which owes a great deal of money. Therefore, I do not put any very great stress upon what we may do, but that does not prevent us from expressing our view in the House to the best of our ability.
If American policy in Vietnam is to succeed, it must have a definite objective, the means must be reasonable to the purpose, and it must show some signs of succeeding. I reject many of the comparisons which have been made with situations elsewhere. I notice that many of those who were not at all opposed to appreasement in bygone days have been very frightened of anything which could possibly be labelled appeasement now. But in Europe, for instance, both in the days of the Nazis and in the days when

perhaps Russia was threatening Europe, the situation was different. There the attacks were made or were threatened against defined sovereign States with stable Governments resting upon popular support. At least there is some doubt about the popular support of the South Vietnamese Government. At least there is some doubt about the stability of the country. There is some doubt, as the right hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. Philip Noel-Baker) said, about how Vietnam came to be divided.
Then it is said—I think that it was said by the Leader of the Opposition—that we must always most strenuously resist any attempt from without to support a revolutionary movement. I would agree with him, but it is really hypocritical to pretend that our views on this subject are not coloured by the type of revolutionary movement within the country. Some of us remember the Spanish War. Very different views were expressed on infiltration in the days of the Spanish War. We must be honest with ourselves over this.
The case of Malaysia is quoted. There again, I should have thought that it was different. We can claim that there is a stable Government in Malaysia resting on popular support. There is a defined frontier and, to my mind, our defence of Malaysia has an objective which we can achieve.
Before I come on to quote some American views on this matter, I should like to touch on the question of napalm and gas, which was raised by the right hon. Member for Derby, South. Of course, logically it is just as unpleasant —far more so, probably—to have one's guts torn out by high explosive as it is, say, to be gassed or to be deluged with napalm. However, in the public opinion of the world, as the right hon. Gentleman said, one of the strengths of the western nations is that in a very torn and tattered state of morality they have stood up for certain standards, even illogical ones. There is no doubt that we should protest very violently—and rightly so—were napalm used by Communists in a situation in which they were involved. I think that we were right to protest about its use in the Yemen. Therefore, I do not think that we can shut our eyes to the effects of this act on public opinion throughout the


world, as the right hon. Gentleman said, quite apart from its inherent brutality.
It is, to say the least, unfortunate that most of the new and interesting weapons of destruction should be tried out on Asiatic people. Not only atomic weapons, but now Lazy Dog and napalm are used in Asia. We should not delude ourselves that this will escape the notice of people, not only in other parts of Asia, but perhaps in Africa and South America, too.
Nor do I feel that in supporting our Allies—and support them I agree we should—we should be more American than the Americans themselves. The right hon. Member for Derby, South quoted from an article by Mr. Lippmann. I had intended to quote some of the very passages which the right hon. Gentleman read. In addition to what has been already read to the House, Mr. Lippmann pointed out that in his view the South Vietnamese Government are losing control of the country; in fact the policy is not succeeding. He finishes by saying this:
In South-East Asia we have entangled ourselves in one of the many upheavals against the old regime, and we shall not make things any better by thrashing around with ascending violence".
I do not know enough about it to know whether Walter Lippmann is right or wrong, but he is an experienced and well-informed commentator. I think it is right that the people of this country, who in my opinion are deplorably ignorant about the state of opinion in the world and the facts of world affairs, should have it drawn to their attention that in the New York Herald Tribune there are extremely critical articles, by a very experienced commentator, of the policy of the American Government.
Then there is the New York Times. On 29th March, it began a leading article in this way:
The limited American air war against North Vietnam is now entering on its eighth week. It is not too soon to ask what it has accomplished and why it has not accomplished more.
The article goes on to point out that, in the view of the New York Times, this policy is not succeeding. It then says:
Hanoi, which a few weeks ago privately indicated agreement to French and United

Nations proposals of negotiations—while refusing a cease-fire—now rejects such proposals.
I should like to ask the Foreign Secretary whether this is true. Was there a moment when it appeared that some proposals for agreement might have been more acceptable to the North Vietnamese than appears from the situation now, or, indeed, from the Foreign Secretary's statements at the Dispatch Box today? I do not know enough about this, but it is alleged in the New York Times. I emphasise that this is the New York Times. It is not the hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Zilliacus) or the hon. Member for Ashfield (Mr. Warbey) who is writing these things. Many of the things said in the New York Times would have aroused very great ill feeling in this country had they come from certain quarters below the Gangway opposite. This is a highly responsible paper. It goes on to make a plea that there should be what it calls "persuasive peace proposals".
Today, the New York Times contains a further leading article which begins in this way:
The sense of doom that seems to lie over the Vietnamese conflict was given a horrible symbol in the terrorist attack on the American Embassy in Saigon.
The war escalates, and it can do nothing but escalate since both sides continue on courses that must crash because they are opposing, adamant and dependent on force … the conflict has been moving not like a vicious circle but like a vicious ascending spiral, ever since the reprisal policy begun after the Vietcong attack on Pleiku last month.
This is the New York Times, not the hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton, who will appreciate that his views, even if he happens to be right, are often suspect. Not very long ago negotiation was a promising possibility according to the New York Times and
a serious peace offensive might bring desirable results".
I should like to know the answer to these statements. They are not irresponsible and they can be paralleled in the
Christian Science Monitor and other American papers.
Furthermore, it seems to me that the great skill of President Kennedy's handling of the Cuban affair was that he did not push the Communists right up against a wall. He left them a way out. I very much hope that the Americans


will do the same here and will not force the Communist countries to lay the whole of their prestige on the table, as it were.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Is the right hon. Gentleman making enough allowance for the statement by President Johnson and Mr. Dean Rusk which I quoted? Is not there a way out for the Communists in that the Americans have made quite clear that if there is an honourable peace they will withdraw their forces from Asia?

Mr. Grimond: I agree with the right hon. Member the Leader of the Opposition that the Americans should say that they are willing to open negotiations before a cease-fire and are proposing aid to South-East Asia. I applaud this and believe it to be useful. I know that the Leader of the Opposition has great experience of this part of the world and was instrumental in having the last agreement reached, but the importance factor about the situation then was that the prestige of the world Powers was not directly involved. As we know, it is very much easier to settle a situation which fundamentally grew out of French difficulties in that part of the world than it is to settle a situation where the prestige of America, Russia, or China for that matter, is directly involved.
I welcome what the Foreign Secretary said about his determination to go on as a single co-chairman and try to get the parties together, but exactly who might be invited to the conference? Which of the Asiatic Powers would be invited? I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman would have the support of everyone in this country if he pressed the Russians very hard on this matter. I agree that they should be asked again and again.
They have a responsibility, and they should not be allowed to slide out of it. It is true that one of the dangers of the situation is that in the end we may find that the main beneficiary is China and that if Russia is put into a difficult situation she might be driven back to a more extreme position than any in the last four or five years. We may find that the cold war has hotted up in satellite countries. I do not think that Russia can avoid that danger by avoiding her responsibility as co-chairman.
Much as I respect and like him. I doubt the utility of Mr. Patrick Gordon Walker's visit. I should like to have the reaction of our representatives in the area and their answers to the question of how far this is a genuine civil war and how far it would die out at once if infiltration from outside ceased. I should like to know their view about a future form of Government which might give some stability in South Vietnam. It may be that talk about freedom and democracy in such an area is rather nonsensical. The people there must be in a state of perpetual terror. The best we might hope for is a Titoist regime which, if free from China's influence, might not be altogether a bad thing. Personally, I am always sceptical of people who do a rapid tour round various countries and come back thinking that they are leading experts on them. I was caught this way myself once, and once I was in the company of Mr. Gordon Walker. It is a little unkind, but, true, to add that at the moment Mr. Gordon Walker is a little accident prone.
In addition to the proposals made by the Foreign Secretary, I think that we might have some valuable experience to give to the Americans on how to cope with the military situation. We had this sort of situation in Malaya. You cannot cope with it by bombing. You must have troops on the ground. I suspect that this is one of the lessons which the Americans must yet learn, if they are to police the frontier that too would need many troops on the ground.
As to the forthcoming visit to Paris, there is, again, a lot of talk about joining the Common Market. My party is pleased to hear it, but we cannot drift into negotiation again with uninformed public opinion and without a clear understanding of what is involved. If we are sincere about the Common Market, we should make a firm declaration that we intend to join it—not to associate with it, not to move on parallel lines which never meet—but to join it. We should also declare that we appreciate the political implications of this move.
When I hear the Prime Minister talk about this, and I read the conditions laid down by the late Hugh Gaitskell or hear that Britain will join but cannot give up her sovereignty, it seems to me that that we are laying down conditions which


would make it impossible to join. Joining means some diminution of sovereignty and, in the long run, some restriction on freedom of action. We have already done that in N.A.T.O. and our other alliances. If we cannot sign the Treaty of Rome, without any negotiation, because that is against the Treaty. We should, of course, have to have negotiations with our Commonwealth and E.F.T.A. partners. But we should have to have broad negotiations, followed if we joined with detailed discussions on particular matters.
I do not think that for the next year or two we shall be able to join. Therefore, what can we say to Europeans and what can the Prime Minister say to President de Gaulle? I should have thought that he could convince President de Gaulle that we are now determined to be good Europeans, and that meant that we are really coming in as partners with Europe, that our relations with France are one of the key matters in getting into the Common Market, and that in the defence field we are prepared to coperate deeply both over conventional and nuclear weapons. But we should make clear that when we say that we are not looking for a Third Force or a Gaullist Europe and that we mean to do this within the context of N.A.T.O.
There is another matter which I do not think the Prime Minister should himself raise with President de Gaulle, but one that should be raised soon, and that is the question of agriculture. I have an ugly suspicion that it may well prove in the next year or so that practically the only reason why Europeans want us is because of their agricultural policy, and their agricultural policy may be extremely unacceptable to this country. There is a danger in this. It is ironical that it was some of the farmers of this country who most bitterly opposed entry into Europe, They would not have had to put tractors across the roads of southern England if they have been in Europe now. They would have had all out of the Price Reviews they wanted, and more.
It has been said that there may be trouble in the Yemen, but another part of the Middle East where it is possible that there may be trouble is Israel. I should like the Prime Minister to tell us how seriously he regards the dispute between the Arabs and Israel over the

Jordan waters. Does he maintain that the Tripartite Declaration is still in force? It has always been said to be in force. It is one of the very vaguest and most dangerous undertakings in which this country has ever been involved. If we want to guarantee the frontiers of Israel, we should have a much more precise guarantee on a much wider basis. If the Arabs succeed in diverting water from Israel, and Israel takes steps which involve crossing the frontiers this country is under an obligation to send troops to reinstate the frontiers on behalf of the Arabs. We are entitled to know whether that is the view of the Government, and how dangerous they consider the situation is.
I have addressed some questions to the Government about Vietnam. I do not think that the House is at present in a condition to do much else. I have expressed some doubts about the likelihood of success of the American policy. I should like to see even more strenuous efforts made to achieve a negotiated peace. I close in this way. I still believe that this country's main priority in foreign affairs lies across the Channel. It is our relations with Europe and with N.A.T.O. which really matter, and the sooner we can scale down our obligations in the Far East the better it will be.
By all means let us fulfil those definite undertakings which we have given, but let us realise that a vague peace-keeping rôle in the Indian Ocean is not a rôle which we either can or should pursue.

5.50 p.m.

Mr. Arthur Henderson: I follow my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Mr. Philip Noel-Baker) in congratulating the Foreign Secretary on his very fine debut in making his first speech in the House as Foreign Secretary, and I couple with that my congratulations and strong support to the Prime Minister for the rôle he is seeking to pursue as peace-maker.
No doubt, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has already found out that the rôle of peace-maker, certainly if it is carried on outside the glare of publicity, is liable to be underestimated and even misunderstood. None the less, the situation confronting us today only enhances the importance of the work which both he and the Foreign Secretary are seeking to do.
I understood the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Liberal Party, when drawing attention to the situation in the Middle East and the dispute over the Jordan waters, to say that this country might be brought into a very dangerous situation if hostilities broke out. I was rather surprised that the right hon. Gentleman did not refer to the responsibilities of the United Nations. There is a United Nations police force stationed in the Gaza Strip today. The Security Council is seized of the matter. As one who has consistently supported the United Nations over the last 20 years, I am disappointed not only that no account is taken of its responsibilities in relation to the Middle East, but that it has not even been invited to take part in a settlement of the dispute in South-East Asia.
It is true that Ambassador Stevenson said a few weeks ago that, if circumstances justified it, the United States would take the South Vietnam dispute to the Security Council. I cannot help feeling that it is a great mistake to bypass the Security Council if we really believe in the establishment of the United Nations as the organisation with the main responsibility for safeguarding the peace of the world.
I am glad—it may not be altogether agreeable to some of my hon. Friends below the Gangway—that Her Majesty's Government declined to be associated with any public criticism of the actions of the United States Government in South Vietnam, or to express publicly their dissociation from the Americans in the terrible situation confronting them in South-East Asia. Whatever may be one's views about the origin or the extent of the aggression between North and South Vietnam—I agree to this extent with the Leader of the Opposition—I do not accept the view that the United States has no business to be in South Vietnam.
We are ourselves partners in S.E.A.T.O. The United States Government, endorsed by a joint meeting of the United States Congress composed of the Senate and House of Representatives by a vote of 500 to 1, approved the recognition of South Vietnam as what is called a protocol State under that Treaty. This means that, in the event of aggression against South Vietnam, the powers in

S.E.A.T.O. are obliged to consider giving that State economic or military aid, whatever is required.

Mr. Warbey: It is important to establish the facts. Is it not a fact that this was a unilateral decision by the United States Government, about which neither we nor the other S.E.A.T.O. countries were consulted, and that it was taken at the time when President Johnson had announced a punitive expedition against North Vietnam?

Mr. Henderson: I would not know whether the last Government were consulted, but it is the fact that the present Governments of Australia, the Philippines and Thailand have actually sent military aid into South Vietnam. All I am saying is that, if we examine this question from the point of view of international law and practice, no case can be made for insisting that the United States Government have no authority and no basis whatever for having sent their military advisers into South Vietnam.
Having said that, however, I must add that I have been most perturbed about the weapons which have been used in this war. Like my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South, I am one of the few Members of the House who experienced gas attacks during the First World War. I have an instinctive revulsion against the use of gas, especially when, for the first time since 1915, it is used as an instrument of national policy, as it has been in the war in South Vietnam. But there it is. The war in South Vietnam is establishing for all to see that modern war can not be carried on with kid gloves. The cruelties and brutalities of war will come if nations use war as an instrument of national policy. Whoever starts the violence which is characterised by the sort of thing taking place in South Vietnam today bears an awful responsibility.
But let us face the facts. One has to take a balance sheet of horrors. There were the aerial bombing attacks on radar stations in North Vietnam. Napalm bombs have been used. Even chemicals have been used to burn up the forests. United States pilots—this is a matter for great regret—have been given power to use their own discretion


in choosing the targets which they bomb. Those of us, on either side of the House, who have any experience of war know very well that it is a desperate last step to give pilots discretion to choose their own targets. Pilots should be under planned direction as to which targets they should attack.
On the other hand, while women and children have been killed in aerial attacks by United States and South Vietnamese bombers, women and children have been killed in South Vietnam by the Vietcong mortar attacks on their villages. Dynamite has been used to blow up villages. A 250–lb. bomb has been used in Saigon. Most people who went through the London blitz have a very good idea of what such a bomb can do.
All this establishes the utter futility and inhumanity of war and is another argument for emphasising the importance of the disarmament conference to which my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary referred. I was sorry that the Leader of the Opposition thought fit to denigrate the offer of the Soviet Government to transfer the discussions on disarmament from the 18-Nation Conference to the United Nations Disarmament Commission. He gave no reasons for his criticism. I think that the proposal represents a step forward by Russia.

Mr. Hugh Jenkins: Will my right hon. and learned Friend be kind enough to clarify one point which is not clear to me and may not be clear to the House? He talks about the balance of terror, about the methods which have been used on both sides. He rightly expresses detestation of methods being used not only by the Vietcong, but by the South Vietnam Government and the United States. How does he square that detestation with his earlier statement that he felt it right that the Government should not in any way dissociate themselves from the policy of the United States Government?

Mr. Henderson: Perhaps I have not made myself clear. All these evils are inherent in war. That is why I support very strongly the actions of the Government in seeking to bring this fighting to an end. That seems to me to be the vital basis of their actions. I would

like to see what President Johnson calls a return to the essentials of the 1954 agreements because, if those agreements had been observed by both sides, the war would not have taken place.
The basic agreement was made between representatives of North Vietnam and South Vietnam. I think that the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Liberal Party was a little confused on this aspect. A definite agreement was made, signed, sealed and delivered, containing definite and positive and clear terms which, unfortunately, have not been observed.
First, neither South Vietnam nor North Vietnam was to be utilised for the service of aggressive policies and it is the case, put forward and supported by the majority report of the International Control Commission, that North Vietnam has been utilised for such aggression against South Vietnam. Whether the aggression is direct or indirect, whether it is through training, supplying ammunition and even personnel, it is a contravention of the agreement that North Vietnam entered into not to allow its zone to be used for the service of aggressive policies. To that extent, therefore, the North Vietnam Government are responsible for the initiation of this struggle.
On two other points there is a very different story. The second agreement was that no foreign troops should be stationed in either zone. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary explained that it was not until 1959 that the Americans started to send in their advisers. First of all, 900 of them were sent at the request and invitation of the South Vietnam authorities. None the less, that was a contravention of the agreement. On the other hand, President Johnson has made it clear that, in the event of a return to the essentials of the agreements, there will be no question of retaining the American troops in South Vietnam.
The third agreement was that there should be a free general election within two years of the signing of the agreements in July, 1964, and the responsibility for not holding the election does not rest upon North Vietnam but upon South Vietnam supported by the United States Government. It is evident, therefore, that if we are to get a political


settlement—and there will have to be a political settlement—sooner or later that provision will have to be observed.

Mr. Peter Blaker: Would not the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that President Diem, of South Vietnam, said very clearly on a number of occasions in 1955 and 1956 that he would be prepared to join in free, country-wide elections if he could have clear guarantees that North Vietnam would allow elections in its part of the country under free conditions?

Mr. Henderson: The difficulty there is that the South Vietnam Government under President Diem refused to meet the representatives of North Vietnam in order to discuss the conditions for a general election, although the Agreement itself provided that an election should be held under international supervision. That would mean the International Control Commission.
That brings me to another point made by the Leader of the Opposition with which I agree. I do not think that it should be left to India, Poland and Canada. I think that the Commission should be strengthened by the addition of representatives of China, the Soviet Union and—I would go further than the right hon. Gentleman—of this country and France. I believe that the experiences of the 11 years since 1954 have made it abundantly clear that paper agreements are not sufficient and there must be some kind of guarantee so that the agreements can, if necessary, be enforced.
I hope that what the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary are seeking to do will be directed to the reconvening of the Geneva Conference at the earliest possible moment. I very much doubt whether a cease-fire is essential before that meeting. For example, the last conference was held when there was still fighting and the same thing applied to the 1962 conference on Laos.
I do not believe that the Government of North Vietnam will ever publicly say that they will stop infiltration. Nor do I believe that the United States Government will ever go further than saying that they will be prepared to go into a conference. What is essential is that there should be a cessation of activities. If the North Vietnam Government were

to stop all these guerrilla activities, the United States Government could stop bombing attacks and this, it seems to me, would create the climate for an international conference which might prompt the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary to issue invitations to the Governments concerned to take part in such a conference. I believe that an invitation to the representatives of the Vietcong should also be issued.
There is a precedent for that. At the 1962 conference, representatives of Pathet Lao, Colonel Kong and the Royal Government met. The leaders of the Vietcong should be at the conference, even though they could not be formally received as delegates at the conference table. Along these lines, it may be possible to extract the world from a dangerous situation which might well escalate into something very much more serious and I heartily support the Government in the action that they are taking.

6.10 p.m.

Colonel Sir Tufton Beamish: I always enjoy the speeches of the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson), who speaks with great sincerity. I thought today that he had some excellent advice for the House. I hope that he will forgive me if I do not comment on what he said about the Far East, although I am very interested in that part of the world, but talk about other things instead.
I should like to say at the outset that the Foreign Secretary made a courageous, eloquent and realistic speech. It was statesmanlike and constructive and I warmly welcomed it. I cannot embarrass him, because he is not here, but I will go so far as to say that it was one of the best speeches which I have heard a Foreign Secretary make in the 20 years that I have been in the House.
I agree with my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition that both in manner and matter it was admirable. The right hon. Gentleman can certainly be sure that so long as he continues along those lines he will have the loyal support of Her Majesty's Opposition in conducting foreign policy.
I have always been a very strong believer in a bipartisan foreign policy and I must confess that I had very


serious doubts during the last few years about whether such a thing would be possible if the Labour Party won an election. But I have to confess that many of my doubts have been swept away and that, naturally, gives me great pleasure.
There have been many right about turns in many important aspects of British foreign and defence policy. What the explanation of this is I do not know, nor do I intend to try to find out. I simply welcome the fact that many aspects of foreign and defence policy are now broadly along the lines on which we conducted them, and on which we hope to see them proceed.
Without, I hope, scoring any partisan points, I will draw attention to some of these about turns, because it is important that people should understand just what their nature is. About Germany, for example, we were quite clearly told by the Prime Minister, as reported in The Guardian of 23rd February, 1963, that he was in favour of
the factual recognition of Eastern Germany and her frontiers with Poland and Czechoslovakia.
There has been a change so far as recognition is concerned and, I think, a change in the right direction. I happen to be one who thinks that there is a good deal to be said for recognition of the OderNeisse line.
The Prime Minister also said:
We are completely, utterly and unequivocally opposed now, and in all circumstances, to any suggestion that Germany, West Germany or East Germany, directly or indirectly, should have a finger on the nuclear trigger or any responsibility, direct or indirect, for deciding that nuclear weapons are to be used."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 31st January, 1963; Vol. 670, c. 1246.]
Yet the Foreign Secretary recently said in Brussels:
We are moreover determined that it shall be solved in such a way as to allow all who participate in an Atlantic Nuclear Force equlity of control over all the weapons placed at its disposal.
There has been a substantial change. The Leader of the Opposition expressed the view today that the Atlantic nuclear force was dead. I very much hope that it is. It made no sense to me politically, and even less sense militarily, but I must say that what the Foreign Secretary said in Brussels about giving equality of control over weapons, including nuclear

weapons, of course, to all who participated in the Atlantic nuclear force was inconsistent with the promise given by the Prime Minister which I have just quoted.
There are other aspects of the Government's foreign policy which bear singularly little relation to many of the promises made before. An example is disengagement, about which the hopes of many hon. Members opposite were raised. It was thought that it would be possible and even quite easy to meet the Soviet Union half way in Europe, that we could disengage quite simply and that there were no serious problems standing in the way of such a policy. Yet it has been made quite clear that this is a thoroughly complicated problem, and no progress whatsoever has been made with disengagement. Western Germany, which had great anxieties about this, was given some powerful reassurance by the Prime Minister himself.
Those are only three examples of some of the remarkable changes which have come over hon. Members opposite since they have achieved power, and I warmly welcome them. I do not do so in any partisan spirit. I welcome them on the ground that I believe that the Government are now doing the right things in these respects—this also applies to the independent British nuclear deterrent—in the national interest, and, so long as they do that, the Government will, naturally and automatically, have my support and the support of my hon. Friends.
I want briefly to turn to the problem of Europe and to ask a few questions about where the Government stand on European policy. The Foreign Secretary said—I did not write down his exact words, but this broadly what he said—that this country was a European country economically and politically and that that must also apply to the defence of Europe. I was very glad to hear that. He also said that he would not be a party to taking any steps which would divide us in any way from the countries of Eastern and Central Europe. I welcome that, too. I have always believe that Europe must be regarded as a whole, although that, of course, is a long-term policy. I was, therefore, glad to hear those remarks.
But where does the Labour Party stand with its European policy? It is certainly


divided about it. Until 1962, when it held its party conference, it was broadly in favour, quite clearly, of Britain going into Europe on terms which could be see to be fair and acceptable. But there was a marked change in 1962 and five conditions were laid down and agreed at that Year's conference.
Some hon. Members may have forgotten what those conditions were and it is just as well that they should be clearly on the record. The first was that there must be strong and binding safeguards for the trade and other interests of our friends and partners in the Commonwealth. That is absolutely fine and everybody is in favour of it. But the Prime Minister went rather further when, on 6th February last year, he asked my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition to
give a pledge that no Government of which he is the Head will consider entry into the Common Market on any terms which would reduce Britain's existing freedom to trade with the Commonwealth?'
On behalf of my party I give that pledge."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 6th February, 1964; Vol. 688, c. 1390.]
The truth of the matter—and I do not think that there is any serious doubt about this—is that there is nothing inconsistent in the efforts which we made to join the Six, on terms which we are very close to getting, and our trade interests with the Commonwealth and Commonwealth trading interests with us. I sincerely believe this to be the case. I went to Australia and New Zealand during the course of these negotiations and many of the anxieties I previously held were removed.
I myself am in no doubt that Mr. Marshall, speaking on behalf of New Zealand, as Strasbourg, during the negotiations, was expressing a view which was correct when he said that it should be possible, even where New Zealand was concerned— much the most difficult Commonwealth country to satisfy about trade —to get terms acceptable to the New Zealand Government and people. I do not know whether that position still stands.
The second condition agreed in 1962 was the freedom, as at present, to pursue our own foreign policy. That is fine. I am very much in favour of Britain pursuing a British foreign policy, but I am also very much in favour of pursuing one in conjunction with our friends and allies.

The more we can do that and the more we can establish common interests with them, the better pleased I shall be, and I hope that we shall not be too insular about it.
Thirdly, the Labour Party asked for the fulfilment of the Government's pledge to our associates in the European Free Trade Area. That was common ground to all of us.
The fourth condition was the right to plan our own economy. We are planning our own economy. It is not on the lines along which I would like to see it proceed and I do not know whether it is still the view of the Government that their determination to maintain their rights to plan the British economy is a stumbling block which would make it impossible to negotiate with Europe to get into the Common Market. If that is so, we should be told why because then we would know that negotiations would be impossible.
Fifthly, there was a request for guarantees to safeguard the position of British agriculture. This, again, was common ground. I think that it is quite definite that much of the opposition of the farmers of this country to entering Europe has been removed and that they now look on entry in a more favourable light.
These five conditions were laid down. I do not know whether all of them, or only some of them, apply today, and I think that we are clearly entitled to know. The Foreign Secretary, in his speech in Brussels, from which I have just quoted a short extract, seemed to indicate that there has been a definite modification of the Government's attitude to negotiating with the Six should that prove possible again.
On the other hand, the Prime Minister, in a Written Answer to a Question by my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, North (Mr. Chataway), who asked whether these five conditions were still the basis of Her Majesty's Government's policy, said:
The five conditions we stated in October, 1962, reflect essential aspects of British policy, but we cannot usefully turn these into precise bargaining conditions for a new European negotiation until one is in prospect."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 18th March, 1965; Vol. 708, c, 319.]
With respect to the Prime Minister, that is a prize piece of mumbo-jumbo which


evades the Question. He would not have got away with that reply had the Question been reached. He would have come under very heavy pressure to give a more direct answer to a very important Question.
If one can draw a conclusion from the Prime Minister's reply to my hon. Friend, it would be, I think, that there has been no modification of the Government's attitude to negotiate with Europe over the Common Market. [Interruption.] I gather that there has been no change. I did not know that the hon. Gentleman bad been told that there had been no change. I find that extremely depressing.

Mr. Mendelson: The hon. Gentleman has been told by the Government many times that this is still our policy. He must not pretend that he knows less than he does.

Sir T. Beamish: I assure the hon. Gentleman absolutely that I am not pretending. I find this piece of news very depressing indeed, because I think that two and possibly three of the conditions laid down in October, 1962, mean that there cannot be any new negotiations. That is why I find it depressing to be told that there has been no modification of them. Frankly, I do not believe that that is so. I detect quite clear and very welcome signs that there has been a definite modification in the position of the Labour Party about possible negotiations.
I have made these few remarks as a convinced European. I thought that the breakdown of the negotiations was a tragedy of a major character. We were, without doubt, very close indeed to getting an agreement which the British public would have accepted with little demur. We have as much to offer Europe as Europe has to offer us. I have never thought that there was anything inconsistent between our obligations to the Commonwealth and our obligations to Europe. They can be perfectly well dovetailed with advantage to both.
Unless the Government make it crystal clear—this was said by the Leader of the Liberal Party earlier this afternoon—that they accept the economic and political objects of the Rome Treaty, Britain's part in European unity will be only on the fringe. The Channel Tunnel, Concord, E.L.D.O., E.S.R.O. and many other

important things are only on the fringe of Europe. I do not see how there can be negotiations again unless it is made absolutely clear by the Government that they accept the economic and political objects of the Rome Treaty.
I see that the Prime Minister has now come into the Chamber. 1 hope that before he goes to Paris for very important discussions with President de Gaulle he will make this point absolutely clear, because to leave it in doubt seems to me absolutely wrong.
I have always rejected—and I admit that this could be a serious stumbling block in further negotiations—the third force idea. I am a firm believer in what the late President Kennedy called the twin pillars of the civilised Western world —the twin pillars which have the same function. Europe, I believe, will be weaker and poorer without Britain.

The Prime Minister: I am sorry to interrupt the hon. and gallant Gentleman and that I missed some of the important things which he said. So that I can deal with it tonight, would he repeat the point which I have just been told he made concerning an about-turn in relation to East Germany which I was supposed to have done in 1963? Would he mind wearying the House by repeating it? I should be glad to hear what it was.

Sir T. Beamish: I was referring to a report in The Guardian on 23rd February, 1963, in which the Prime Minister was reported as saying that one of the measures which might be taken to achieve access to West Berlin and to maintain its freedom—which is of the greatest importance—would be factual recognition of East Germany and her frontiers with Poland and Czechoslovakia. I did not read this, but The Guardian commented recently that
Mr. Wilson's emphasis is quite different from what it was two years ago.
That was my point.
I was saying that I have always thought that there was probably a great deal to be said for recognition of the Oder-Neisse line. This is one respect in which we might follow in the footsteps of France, although I have not positively made up my mind about it. I am wholly opposed to the factual recognition of Eastern Germany. I am glad that the


Prime Minister, when he was in Western Germany, made it clear that he is, too, although that seems to be quite inconsistent with the views which he is reported by The Guardian to have held in 1963.

The Prime Minister: I remember that report very well—there was another in The Times on the same day. It is based on an answer which I gave to the students at Cardiff University. It was an agency report. It contained about two-thirds of a complete sentence. Fortunately, since I was being televised for a "World in Action" programme, I was able to get the full text. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that there has been no change in my policy or in my party's policy on this matter.

Sir T. Beamish: I am delighted to hear that. I have no wish to pursue the point. The Prime Minister has made his position clear in this respect, and it is a perfectly tenable one.
I conclude by saying that, while Europe is left in doubt about what the Government's real attitude to a possible resumption of negotiations is, there is no hope of our getting an invitation to negotiate again. There will not even be an invitation to take part in attempts being made to co-ordinate more closely political unity and foreign policies and defence inside the Six or in talks in which the Prime Minister has made it absolutely clear he would like the British Government to take part. Because his attitude to a possible resumption of negotiations and to the Rome Treaty is not clear, we will not get this invitation to take part in these very important talks. I greatly regret it, but that is the case.
M. Spaak was right when he said a few days ago that the longer negotiations are put off, and the more the Six develop their economic and political unity, the harder it will be for Britain to join. That is why I beg the Prime Minister, when he speaks tonight, to clear up the serious and inevitable doubts in our minds about the Government's real policy towards Europe.

6.29 p.m.

Mr. Tom Driberg: The hon. Member for Lewes (Sir T. Beamish) would be both surprised and distressed

if I were to say that I agreed with anything that he said. Least of all can I agree with the astonishing claim early in his speech, which he presumably soon forgot about, that he would make a non-partisan speech. The whole speech, except for a few bits towards the end, was one long sneer at the Labour Party and the Labour Government—either because, according to him, perhaps through force of changing circumstances, some aspects of policy may have been slightly modified, or because, like any other party which is alive and has any significance, including the Conservative Party, there are differences of emphasis within the Labour Party.

Mr. Stanley Orme: As in the Conservative Party.

Mr. Driberg: Yes. I challenge any hon. Gentleman opposite to deny that. However, it is refreshing that both he and I should be called to speak after listening to the wisdom of the galaxy of right hon. Members who have preceded us. I agreed with much that was said by most of them. I was amused by the observations which the Leader of the Liberal Party addressed to my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Zilliacus), about the axis between Gorton and the New York Times, and it occurred to me that one might on that point say that one would rather be Left and suspect and correct, than Right and wrong.
It is, indeed, rather remarkable how often over the last 20 to 21 years—starting perhaps in December, 1944— quite a small group of us who have ventured, usually on foreign affairs, to be critical of Her Majesty's Government, or of some of the policies of the United States Administration, have later been proved correct; or if not proved correct—because that, perhaps, is never possible, except hundreds of years hence in the light of history—at least we have found that the often unpopular and derided views which we have expressed have come to be very widely accepted.
One outstanding example of that—not on foreign policy, of course—was the courageous action, very soon proved correct, of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister when he and our late friend Aneurin Bevan resigned from office in 1951. Minorities are not always wrong;


and the minority in this case, the case of the subject which has been overshadowing this debate today, the subject of Vietnam, is, after all, a pretty substantial minority. The Motion in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Mr. Philip Noel-Baker) and others has now been signed by more than 100 hon. Members, mostly on this side of the House, but some from the Liberal bench opposite.
This cannot be dismissed as some romantic or sentimental gesture by a few disgruntled Left-wingers or anti Americans. I agreed most strongly with what the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) said about the silly accusations of anti-Americanism. If it is anti-American ever to be critical of the policies or conduct of our American ally, then Senator Mansfield and Walter Lippmann are anti-American, too, which is rather an absurd proposition.
Of course we are not anti-American, but, of course, one should never accept an extension of the appalling Chauvinistic slogan, "my country right or wrong", to "my ally right or wrong". We are all entitled to criticise each other, though naturally one does so with some restraint, bearing in mind that the main object which we all have is not so much to score off the Americans, or to "have a bash" at them, as to bring about a cease-fire, and get a settlement by political and diplomatic means—which, as my right hon. Friend said, must come about in the end.
In our Motion we deplore the use of napalm and of gas. In view of what has been said, I do not think that I need defend our mention of the use of gas, which has been subjected to some very ignorant ridicule in the Press and by hon. Members in another Motion. As will have been apparent to those who were present this afternoon, when my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies was answering Questions on this subject, the kind or kinds of gas used experimentally in Vietnam, with the Vietnamese people, or some of them, as guinea-pigs, is apparently very different from, and much more toxic or noxious than, what one might call the ordinary tear-gas often used to disperse riots.
I thought that one right hon. Gentleman was absolutely correct when he said that the use of even a relatively mild form of gas not only shocks the conscience of the world and gives a tremendous propaganda point to the Communists throughout Asia and elsewhere: it also opens the door to a possible escalation both of the war in general and in the use of unconventional weapons, the use of worse gases, and so on.
Subject to that, I agree that napalm is a far more appalling weapon than a non-killing gas. I first saw it used in Korea. It was a horrifying sight to stand on a hillside and watch a whole village, about a mile away, engulfed in a sheet of liquid flame which ran through all the houses, consuming everything. It is the most horrible kind of indiscriminate weapon that can be imagined—or almost the most horrible kind, short only, I suppose, of nuclear and atomic weapons.
Our Motion also draws attention to what appeared to be an alarming statement by the United States Ambassador in Saigon, a statement which— I think my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister himself would agree—has not been entirely clarified by his Answers to us in this House on Tuesday. I do not know whether he will be able to say anything more about that in his speech tonight. I hope and believe that he meant in those Answers that, so far as he can, President Johnson himself is still exercising some restraining influence over the military operations in Vietnam. If he is doing so it may be because some time ago, when the late General MacArthur was dying, President Johnson visited him in hospital. The President, so one reads, himself recalls that, when they fell to talking about the Far East, General MacArthur said to him, "Son, don't ever get yourself bogged down in a land war in Asia"; and I am sure that that was extremely good advice.

Mr. Michael Alison: I am interested in the hon. Gentleman's reference to the legitimacy of what he calls friendly criticism which it is proper to make as between friends. As it is clear that the Government have not dissociated themselves from the use by the Americans of napalm and gas, may we take it that the Motion to which the hon.


Gentleman has referred is explicit, friendly, and constructive criticism of the Government as well as of the United States?

Mr. Driberg: I was about to come to the last line or two of the Motion, so the hon. Gentleman has wasted a minute or two of somebody else's time by that intervention. However, I am glad that he was eager to find out more about the Motion. It calls on the Government
to dissociate Great Britain from these actions and views…
That is, of course, referring to the use of napalm and of gas—as actions—and to the comments of the United States Ambassador in Saigon—as views. I hope very much indeed that the Government have done so, or will do so. So far, it is true, the Government have not seen fit to do so publicly—though I think that all of us, certainly on this side of the House, were gratified when my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said publicly in America that the United States Administration must pay some decent regard to human opinions. I think that that was on the very day after this Motion was tabled and after the news about the gas and the threat of escalation.
I cannot answer for all my hon. Friends, but I would not myself venture to say that Her Majesty's Government ought to have made a public dissociation from these actions and views at any particular moment in time, because I do see that the one possibly valid argument against such a public dissociation is precisely that it could have the opposite effect to that which we all desire. What we all desire, as I was saying a little earlier, is not just to "have a bash" at the Americans. That is childish. What we all desire is to get the killing stopped and get everybody, including the Americans, round the conference table.
One can certainly engage in a remonstrance of this kind, and it can on occasion be quite useful to do so, but I would not expect Her Majesty's Government to come out with a violent, flaming denunciation of the atrocities committed by the United States: that would be unrealistic and stupid and would not have the effect of getting the Americans into the mood of agreeing to come to the conference table.

Mr. Reginald Maudling: I think that the hon. Gentleman used the word "dissociate". Is it possible to dissociate oneself from something other than publicly?

Mr. Driberg: I am not sure I think it may be. I am trying to make a serious and honest speech. I am not trying to make party points. I think that it is possible to dissociate oneself by saying so either publicly or privately.
No one knows what my right hon. Friend said on his recent visit to Washington, but when the news of our telegram and of this Motion reached him, and, above all, when the news of events which prompted the telegram and the Motion reached him, he may well have said, "I do not know about your nation, but our nation will not stand for this kind of thing very much longer". That is probably why he did make that slight public remonstrance. Of course, Her Majesty's Government have not gone as far yet publicly in dissociation as some of us would like, if it were possible for them to do so, but one must grant them a certain margin on the timing.
All the same, with all due respect to my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, I would recall what happened at a crucial moment in the Korean War, when it seemed that that war was going to escalate— a word not then in vogue —and when it seemed that General MacArthur would do something exceptionally foolish and bomb, possibly with atomic weapons, the main land of China. It will be remembered by everybody here—certainly by hon. Members who were in the House at that time—that the then Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, flew to Washington immediately, on the very night that this alarming report appeared on the tape.
Mr. Attlee had talks with President Truman— and this, I think, is highly relevant and significant—and at the end of those talks a joint communiqué was issued saying quite frankly that the two leaders had agreed to differ on a number of points. They were not unanimous and were not afraid to say so. Hence —although, as I have said, one must leave the timing of any actual statement of dissociation to the judgment of Her Majesty's Government—I certainly hope


that some such definite dissociation will become increasingly manifest—unless, indeed, there is a sharp modification of the methods used in South Vietnam by the South Vietnamese and the Americans.
I could, of course, agree with hardly anything that was said by the right hon. Gentleman who leads the Opposition. What I found particularly insufferable was his patronising little lecture to those of us who sit below the Gangway on this side, about whom, too, he generalises in his usual rather shallow way. The shallow naive character of his thinking on this subject—I will not use a ruder word about him, since that might be out of order here as elsewhere—was illustrated by the brisk, but still patronising, way in which he said, "We must really get clear why this war started". Of course, it was all done by a few naughty agitators and infiltrators and trouble-makers from the North.
The right hon. Gentleman did not attempt to sketch the historical background, starting perhaps even with the conduct of the French in 1945—because, after all, it was they who really started all the trouble in Saigon. The French double-crossed both the Nationalists and the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, Lord Mountbatten, who had extracted a promise from the French that they would take no action at all without consulting him first.
They broke that promise, they took action at two or three o'clock in the morning, they raided the town hall, which was the Nationalists' headquarters, and that started the whole evil chain of events which has gone on ever since, with immense loss of life and wealth to the French, with immense loss of life and damage to the people of Vietnam, with immense loss now as well to the Americans, in an appalling series of errors and disasters. But the Leader of the Opposition thinks that it all started with a few agitators from the North.
The right hon. Gentleman shares, really, the late Mr. Dulles's mythological view of life—that peasants everywhere, all over Asia and Africa and, of course, Scotland, would always behave quite well and keep their place and touch their caps to their betters if only it were not for the naughty trouble-makers who

come and stir them up and put ideas into their heads.

Sir T. Beamish: When I gave very high and most sincere praise to the Foreign Secretary for one of the best speeches I have heard, the hon. Gentleman accused me of sneering at the party opposite. Is he not now sneering at my right hon. Friend?

Mr. Driberg: If the hon. Gentleman likes to call it sneering, I am sneering at the Leader of the Opposition—but I did not preface it by saying that I was not going to. Since the hon. and gallant Gentleman has referred again to his praise of the Foreign Secretary, I must assure him that, despite his saying that this would not embarrass the Foreign Secretary because he did not happen to be in the Chamber at the moment, it will be extremely embarrassing to him when he reads it in the morning, or hears about it later. I think that it may give him a sleepless night in Paris. Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes. I am quite sure that my right hon. Friend will not welcome that meed of praise.
However, perhaps I can get back to my speech and finish it. I am sorry that it has gone on so long. I was just dealing with this Dulles mythology which seems to be shared by the Leader of the Opposition. One point which has not so far been sufficiently stressed in this debate, either by other speakers or by the Foreign Secretary in opening it, is the impossibility that there has been, over the last 10 years, of getting a stable settlement in South Vietnam. The simple cause of this failure has been the appalling nature of the regimes which have been propped up very largely by billions of American dollars—a whole series of corrupt, autocratic, bullying, tyrannical regimes.
The most notorious of all was the regime of Diem, which embarrassed the Americans so much that President Kennedy sent a Senatorial Committee, a bipartisan Senate Committee, to South Vietnam to investigate the situation. This Committee reported just over two years ago, in February, 1963, through the Senate Majority Leader Mansfield, that it felt "deep concern over the trend of events" in Vietnam:
All of the current difficulties existed in 1955, along with hope and energy to meet


them. But it is seven years later and two billion dollars of United States aid later.
The Republic of South Vietnam then appeared to this Committee "less, not more, stable than it was at the outset," and "more removed from, rather than closer to, the achievement of popularly responsible and responsive Government." Then—and this is significant, in view of what has been said in this debate about the Vietcong—the Committee added:
The pressures of the Vietcong guerrillas do not entirety explain the situation. In retrospect, the Government of Vietnam and our policies"—
that is to say, the policies of the U.S. Administration—
particularly in the design and administration of aid, must bear a substantial, a very substantial, share of the responsibility.
One cannot just blame it on a few agitators and infiltrators from the North. There is a popular revolution in South Vietnam as well as in the North. They have been given no alternative to Communism to believe in: they cannot believe in a regime like that of Diem and the notorious Madame Nhu, with her cynical and inhuman remarks about "barbecued monks", and so on.
I quote now from a letter which appeared last week in an English-language newspaper in Tokyo:
Year after year, the great United States and its powerful allies have chosen to believe in rulers instead of believing in people, in the principle of fuehrers and gauleiters instead of in real democracy. They countenanced rigged elections, filched funds and the ruthless suppression of liberal opposition and religious freedom.
This letter, which is from a non-Communist South Vietnamese who is known to many people in this country, ends:
And the Laotians, the South Vietnamese, the South Koreans have had nothing to live for, nothing worth dying for. You simply cannot carry out a revolution with fossils—he they only mental fossils—of another age.

6.53 p.m.

Sir Robert Cary: Before dealing with one or two points raised by the hon. Member for Barking (Mr. Driberg), may I join with my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition and my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Lewes (Sir T. Beamish) in adding my praise to the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary for the speech with which he opened the

debate. Over the last 30 or 35 years I have heard most of the speeches of Foreign Secretaries drawn from both sides of the House. The right hon. Gentleman sustained the reputation of the great Office which he holds. I liked his text of resolution and imagination in foreign policy. He opened on that note and he ended on it. When I see emerging a fusion between both Front Benches in the conduct of the foreign policy of this country 1 think there is greater hope for the future.
I do not resent the Motion of the hon. Member for Barking, and it may quite well represent the views of a substantial majority of hon. Members on that side of the House. I do not resent the fact that the name of the right hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. Philip Noel-Baker), whom I have known for many years as a colleague and a personal friend, heads the Motion. When I saw the headline "Gas used by the Americans in Vietnam" I should have been greatly surprised had there not been a Motion on the Order Paper in the terms of this Motion.
The right hon. Member for Derby, South told us that he was in the first gas attack in the Ypres salient in 1915, and I well remember the horror and shock in the world when this new weapon of war was unleashed. Later in the battles of the Somme I suffered myself. Fortunately, it was tear gas, not the chlorine or phosgene gas referred to by the right hon. Member for Derby, South, or the gas with which it is feared that propaganda tries to frighten the world and which may be the sort of gas used in Vietnam.
This debate coincides with a Question which appeared on today's Order Paper, which some hon. Members may have heard answered, put down to the Colonial Secretary, asking whether he would
enumerate and identify the number of occasions in the last five years on which gas had been used as a weapon to maintain order in dependent territories".
I think the answer was something like 104 or 105 occasions. The right hon. Gentleman, who has a sensitive mind with regard to the use of words, used in his answer the expression, "tear smoke". The right hon. Member for Derby, South referred to the horrors of the Ypres gas attacks. Fortunately, what I suffered was from a form of gas which was useless. It was the kind of gas which Americans


have used on this occasion, but the interesting thing is that the Colonial Secretary justified the use of what he called tear smoke as a device which was preferable to the indiscriminate use of batons or firearms to disperse riots.

Mr. Eric S. Heffer: Would not the hon. Gentleman agree that, in the reply which my right hon. Friend gave, he indicated that the gas he was asked about was not exactly the same gas as was used in Vietnam and, in relation to the type of gas used in Vietnam, there were definite harmful effects and permanent effects on people who had been affected by it?

Sir R. Cary: I thank the hon. Member for his intervention. It comes as news to me that there are permanent harmful effects from the gas already used. I referred to the gas from which I suffered as tear gas, leaving no permanent effect, and I imagine the sort of gas used by Americans on the Vietnamese is the sort of gas used in our dependent territories in dealing with riots.
I think that hon. Members on both sides of the House have been concerned about this. It is a staggering thing that we got through the whole of the Second World War and the Korean War and never once did even the worst person in those years—Hitler himself—in his extreme madness descend to the use of this horror weapon, gas. And one can think of the organisations on both sides which could have have been used to produce this weapon had the participants turned to I.G. Farben and I.C.I. It is a strange thing. Napalm was used in Korea, but not gas, and suddenly, right from the Ypres Salient— "Wipers" as I prefer to call it—

Mrs. Anne Kerr: Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting that it was better to use napalm than gas in any conceivable circumstances? I would suggest that any such weapons are equally evil and wicked, that all war is bad and wrong, and that we should be against the whole thing rather than against selected weapons.

Sir R. Cary: The hon. Lady is answering the question posed by her hon. Friend the Member for Barking. He said that the main object was to get people round a conference table to stop the use

of weapons in Vietnam, to make people talk for peaceful purposes and to bring to an end this unwanted small war which could escalate into something bigger. But what concerns me most at the moment is the propaganda use which will be made of what is said by the hon. Member for Barking and his right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South.
An immense struggle is going on in the Far East, so much so that the quick match to war may have been moved from the European scene of 1914 and 1939 to the Far East with an explosive power which cannot yet be predicted. No doubt hon. Members on both sides of the House will have followed the articles by Patrick Keatley, the well-known correspondent of The Guardian, who is carrying out a tour of India and Far Eastern countries and writing frequently in The Guardian. He gives an account of the propaganda broadcasts against our interests from Peking at the moment, and against the interests of the Free World. It has to be read to be believed.

Mrs. Anne Kerr: Has the hon. Gentleman heard the broadcasts from America on what is called the Free American Radio? They are most interesting.

Sir R. Cary: I am dealing at the moment with Mr. Patrick Keatley's work, although I am aware of what the hon. Lady is speaking about. My concern is that in this vital area of India and the Far East, although we have a case for propaganda, Patrick Keatley is only able to report that we have a few crackling, fading signals from the B.B.C. and that east of Suez it is the voice of the New China which is heard most clearly and with increasing sympathy by 450 million people in India alone. The broadcasts go out from Peking every night in English, French, Urdu, Benghali and many other tongues spread throughout the vast subcontinent of India and neighbouring countries.
Having listened to the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary making that splendid speech today, I hope that the hon. Member for Barking will allow me to say that I thought his observations on the speech of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition were contemptible and unworthy of a good debate in this House of ours. My right hon.


Friend the Leader of the Opposition happens to have been one of the best Foreign Secretaries we have ever had. He gave up that important task to become Prime Minister of this country, and I sincerely hope that on a second occasion he will enjoy the privilege of becoming the country's Prime Minister.

Mr. Driberg: Before the hon. Gentleman sits down, may I ask him whether he heard the scathing condemnation by the Foreign Secretary of the Berwick speech of the Leader of the Opposition?

Sir R. Cary: No. I did not hear that. In a world where walls have ears even I cannot hear everything. So great is the amount of material that one cannot pick up every point, so when the hon. Gentleman asks me if I heard that particular denunciation I must tell him that my memory fails me. There is one point to which I would like an answer. The last debate on foreign affairs was on the 17th and 18th December, but between that and this debate there was another which cannot be divorced from this subject which took place on 3rd and 4th March on defence. The final speech in that debate— and one really cannot discuss either subject without fusing these two questions of defence and foreign policy, as they are being fused in this debate— was by the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Defence. He was interrupted by his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) who said:
As to the Indian Ocean, I entirely believe that we are right, as I said in my speech, to be in Malaysia helping a new nation to be born…"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th March, 1965; Vol. 707, c. 1654.]
He went on to say that when the position in Malaysia had been stabilised it was our duty to withdraw from our commitments in the Indian Ocean and the Far East. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Liberal Party said something to the same effect this afternoon—that we have to scale down our responsibilities and interests in the Indian Ocean and the Far East. On that occasion, the right hon. Gentleman the Minister for Defence agreed with his hon. and learned Friend that when the position in Malaysia was stabilised we should tend to withdraw our interests and commitments from the Indian Ocean and the Far East.
I ask this question: are we to leave Australia and New Zealand to fend for themselves in the Far East which may become more dangerous and could, as the hon. Member for Barking has pointed out, escalate from Vietnam into something larger? Could we subscribe our worth to the S.E.A.T.O. agreements if we were deliberately to contemplate withdrawing from our Indian Ocean and Far Eastern agreements and obligations, moral and written? I beg the right hon. Gentleman to clarify the words used by his right hon. Friend the Minister for Defence at the conclusion of the debate on 4th March.

7.10 p.m.

Mr. William Warbey: Political leaders tend to repeat their speeches, once as tragedy and the second time as farce. The speeches we had from the Leader of the Opposition when he was Foreign Secretary, and later Prime Minister, could be described as tragedy, for at that time he had the power to act upon his fantastic picture of the world. Fortunately, today, we are able to enjoy the humour of his words because they have only a farcial significance.
As the right hon. Gentleman spoke today I was amused to note, and mentally to tick off one by one, the similar sentences and passages which I had previously noticed in documents issued by the Psychological Warfare Branch of the American Defence Department and in some of the hand-outs of the State Department. These were some priceless ones and, to begin, I will mention two of them.
One was when he revived what I thought had been forgotten among my childhood memories, namely, the yellow peril. He talked about China having an ambition to overrun South-East Asia and to use it for its surplus population. That picture of the expanding yellow peril I recall in the dimmest days of my childhood. I am astonished to see it being revived seriously today by one who has claimed to have some expertise in matters of foreign policy.

Mr. Kenneth Lewis: Would the hon. Gentleman consult the Russian leaders and ask them what they think about the yellow peril?

Mr. Warbey: Yes. I have talked to the Russian leaders on this subject. They are well aware that the Soviet Union is primarily an Asian rather than a European Power from the territory point of view, for it includes within its borders citizens whose skins are of various colours; yellow, light and dark brown, and so on. The Soviet Union is very well aware of the necessity of avoiding any kind of propaganda which could have any suspicion of a racialist character. The Leader of Her Majesty's Opposition is not so cautious in these matters.
I come to the right hon. Gentleman's other, main point, about Vietnam. The situation in Vietnam can, according to the right hon. Gentleman, be summed up like this: the Chinese have encouraged and assisted the North Vietnamese Communists to invade South Vietnam. This as it were, the historical summary which the right hon. Gentleman makes as a result of all the briefing which he obtained while at the Foreign Office and when Prime Minister. The situation in Vietnam can be summed up by saying that the Chinese Communists are encouraging and assisting the North Vietnamese Communists to invade South Vietnam, according to the right hon. Gentleman.
Not even the American State Department believes that. Certainly, the American Ambassador in London does not believe it, because he said something very different when I talked to him about the Vietnamese question some months ago. Certainly, the American correspondents who have been to Vietnam do not believe it. Certainly, Senator Mansfield, who headed a commission to South Vietnam and who, upon his return, wrote a long report on the subject, does not believe it. Certainly, half a dozen other senators do not believe it. Most university leaders in the United States as well as university leaders in this country certainly do not believe it, and, likewise, the leading publicists do not believe it. The Guardian, The Times and other responsible elements in this country certainly do not believe it.
I could have told the right hon. Gentleman the facts, had he been in his place, on the basis of a little personal experience. I was in Hanoi a few weeks ago. It is not the Chinese who have been assisting the North Vietnamese up till

now, and assisting them, I might add, first, with their economic development, with some excellent modern machinery, and, secondly, with some purely defensive weapons against attack, attacks which began on them, against the North, last year and which have been continuing—attacks which the Americans began against North Vietnam on 7th August of last year and which they continued, with the aid of the South Vietnamese Air Force and saboteurs, sporadically during the following months and then have re-energised during the last two or three weeks.
These American attacks on North Vietnam are regarded even in the State Department and in the American Defence Department not simply as retaliation for some alleged aggression by North Vietnam against South Vietnam. They are regarded in the American Defence Department as a means of trying to win a war which they have lost in South Vietnam, in the military sense,because the people whom they theoretically went to support, the Saigon Army, are no longer in a position to defend the American forces in South Vietnam, and moreover because the South Vietnam Army is melting away, is going over to the other side and is no longer willing, on American orders, to go on killing their brother Vietnamese.

Mr. Blaker: I was interested in what the hon. Gentleman said about the Chinese arms which had been supplied to the North Vietnamese.

Mr. Warbey: If the hon. Gentleman is to intervene in my speech he must please repeat my words with some accuracy. I said nothing about Chinese arms in North Vietnam.

Mr. Blaker: I apologise to the hon. Gentleman if I misheard him, but I had the distinct impression that he referred to the supply of arms for purely defensive purposes by the Chinese. I wanted to ask him, seince he says that they were supplied for purely defensive purposes. why they are being found so far south in South Vietnam?

Mr. Warbey: I can answer those points, but I hope that the hon. Gentleman will do me the courtesy of listening to what I am saying. Indeed, I am grateful for his intervention, because it brings


me back to what I intended to say about my visit to Hanoi, where I was able to see for myself the assistance which the North Vietnamese have obtained.
For the development of their economy, and to defend themselves against American attack, the assistance has come mainly from the Russians and East European countries; the Russians, Czechs, East Germans, to some extent, incidentally, from the West Germans—I had a look at the markings on the machines— and very little indeed from the Chinese. As far as there has been any assistance to North Vietnam to enable it to defend itself against he Americans, such assistance has come primarily from the Russians and East Europeans. I say this to correct the right hen. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition in case there are some people who have been misled by the nonsense which he talks.
I now come to the speech of my right hon. Friend. The hon. Member for Manchester, Withington (Sir R. Cary) referred to a bipartisan policy. I do not think that there has been any demonstration of a bipartisan policy in the House today, but he referred specifically to the two Front Benches when he said that. I would say that it has been on the basis of the statement of the view that, in present conditions, we dare not openly criticise our American allies. This seems to me to be the sum and substance of the bipartisanship between the two Front Benches. This is a point which I wish to take up.
If one looks at previous history in our relationships since the war, with the United States, without going back into the 19th and 18th centuries, when relationships were varied and complicated, one finds that not only when Lord Attlee flew to Washington in 1951, but also in 1956, on the occasion of the invasion of Egypt by the British Government in collusion with the French and Israeli Governments, our great friends and allies had the courage, because they felt that it was their moral duty in the eyes of the world—even Mr. John Foster Dulles personally had the moral courage—to say to Britain and France, in front of the whole world, "You are wrong in invading Egypt. You have committed a wrong which stinks in the nostrils of world public opinion. You

must withdraw." This is what John Foster Dulles said to us in 1956. Why have not we the courage to say the same to the Americans in 1965?
The whole world outside our narrow little North American and Anglo-Saxon world, especially in Asia and Africa, knows that what is happening now in Vietnam is that a great Power is making war on a little country. Some hon. Members sometimes seem to forget that. Of course, the Americans have their excuses and their pretexts, but this is the fact of the matter. The United States, by its own unilateral decision, is conducting acts of war against a small country in South-East Asia. They are conducting those acts of war in the North of Vietnam and in the South and they are conducting them with the most horrifying of modern weapons; all the great arsenal of modern weapons is at their disposal.
The horror weapons in use in Vietnam were brought into Vietnam first by the French and then by the Americans. They are the ones who introduced them, whoever uses them, whoever set off that 250–1b. bomb outside the Saigon Embassy and killed not only a number of Americans but some Vietnamese civilians, women and children as well. It was a horrible thing which happened the other day. That bomb was probably made from explosives or bombs introduced into Vietnam either by the French or by the Americans, captured by the South Vietnam liberation army and made up into another weapon.

Mr. Edward M. Taylor: Does the hon. Member accept the Foreign Secretary's statement that about 1 million refugees came from the North to the South? If things are so bad in the South, why does he think they came?

Mr. Warbey: I cannot go into the whole past history, but as this has been mentioned, the hon. Member has only to turn up the historical records. All these things are on the record. He will find that, after the 1954 Geneva Agreement, Ngo Dinh Diem, who subsequently became President in Saigon, insisted that the Roman Catholics north of the 17th parallel should come down to the South. Of course, he wanted them because he and his family were ruling


what was predominantly a Buddhist country, and needed some extra support in the South.
The North arranged for them to be evacuated from the North to the South and there was a good deal of propaganda to say, "These poor people, what a terrible life it will be for them, staying in the North under the Communists."

Mr. William Yates: I have visited the Tonkinese people in camps north of Saigon. I did not get the impression that they were forced to come down. I thought that they came of their own free will.

Mr. Warbey: I did not say that they were forced to come down. I said that Ngo Dhin Diem arranged for them to come down. [An HON. MEMBER: "Insisted."] Yes, insisted. I am not suggesting that there was not a spontaneous desire on the part of a large number of these people to go from the North to the South and to get away from Communist rule. Fair enough; but this was a movement of people conducted, in the circumstances, in a very reasonable way. It was not a flight of refugees, as it has been represented by some people.
I noted that my right hon. Friend did not say that this afternoon. It Illustrates one of the key problems of Vietnam and one which the foreign Powers who have intervened in Vietnam have never been concerned about, namely, the welfare of the people of Vietnam themselves. It was the same in the case of Korea. None of the great Powers, and especially not the United States and the Soviet Union, consulted the wishes of the people when they decided to partition Korea contrary to the Cairo Declaration.
In 1945, the people of Vietnam tried to express their wishes for a free and independent country, free from any foreign domination of any kind. The French came back again, brought back by us and by the Americans and then, in 1954, after a great deal of fighting, they tried again, with the Geneva Conference, to give to the people of Vietnam peace, independence and unity, for which they had been asking all those years. This time they thought that they had got it at last, because they had got a large number of countries, including

some great Powers, to sign—or, if not to sign, to adhere to—a declaration to that effect.
As my right hon. Friend knows, tile Geneva Declaration of 1954—and its essential clauses were repeated in a remarkable leading article in The Guardian only yesterday—laid it down that Vietnam should be one independent country, and not be partitioned into two. It laid down that the people there should enjoy peace and independence, and the right to settle their own affairs and elect their own Government. It laid it down that they should have no military alliances with any foreign Power and that no foreign troops, no foreign bases should be introduced into their country. That, in essence, is what the Geneva agreement laid down, and that is what was accepted and adhered to by Mr. Anthony Eden, as he then was, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government.
All that is on the official records, although the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition in a letter that he wrote to me last August, has since publicly repudiated Lord Avon. In that letter he said:
…the British representative did not sign anything at all at Geneva. Like other participants, Mr. Eden took note of the Final Declaration of the Conference…
This is a lie, written to me by the Leader of the Opposition, when he was Prime Minister, on 7th August, and this lie has been used as the basis for a great deal of subsequent propaganda in Vietnam—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I understood the hon. Member to be referring to a letter written by a Member of this House—

Mr. Warbey: The Leader of the Opposition.

Mr. Speaker: —asserting that he had lied therein. The expression must be withdrawn.

Mr. Warbey: With very great respect, Mr. Speaker, I do withdraw the expression "lie", because it is not a Parliamentary expression. I will substitute the word "untruth".

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Gentleman may do that. It does not, with respect, sound very gracious.

Lady Tweedsmuir: The hon. Gentleman has made a very


serious charge. He will no doubt have noticed hat this afternoon my right hon. Friend welcomed the Foreign Secretary's speech, and particularly his long historical analysis of the situation. Does the hon. Gentleman, therefore, repudiate his own Foreign Secretary?

Mr. Warbey: I will come to that. I do not know why the noble Lady is in such a hurry. I am dealing with her right hon. Friend at the moment and, when I have finished with him, I will come to my own Front Bench.
I am establishing that we have here an untrue statement about an important matter relating to Vietnam, made by the then Prime Minister in a letter written to me. Curiously enough, it happened to be on the same day as the American Congress voted full powers to President Johnson to undertake any warlike action he thought fit in the Straits of Tongking and in the area of Vietnam—a very remarkable coincidence.
The coincidence is all the more significant because subsequent events show how, step by step in this whole history, the Americans have sought to justify their actions in first of all intervening in a civil war on the wrong side—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Yes, on the Fascist side. If they are to intervene at all, they should intervene on the popular side—on the side that has popular support. I would prefer them not to intervene at all, but if they want to intervene or give any assistance I would prefer them to take the advice given by my right hon. Friend—only he gave it in reference to African leaders.
I would want my right hon. Friend to extend that advice to Asian leaders as well. It was that we should recognise that these African leaders who enjoy the confidence of their people have the right to the support of the Western as well as of the Communist countries. That is what my right hon. Friend said about Africa, the African countries and the African leaders who have risen to popular support by methods that I would say have not always been as respectable as those used by Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, and who, moreover, have fought against the great colonial Powers and have been put in gaol for many years for doing so.
The advice I would give the United States of America and to my own Govern-

ment in this respect is that they should apply these very wise principles not only to Africa, but to Asia; not only to Kenya and Uganda, Tanganyika and Ghana, but to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. They should apply them not only to Yugoslavia and Poland and Roumania, which have now become countries with which we can have respectable dealings and whose Communists are now recognised as being leaders, first and primarily, of a movement for national liberation from foreign intervention, and, secondly, as social reformers eager to raise the living standards of their people and get rid of foreign and internal exploiters—only in Vietnam they happen to be called Communists, or the Lao Dong, or Workers' Party.
Incidentally, the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam is by no means controlled by the Communists, but includes Buddhists and other sections which are ten times more representative of the people there than that tiny military junta in Saigon which the Americans are now driven to support because there is no one else who will suport them. That is the situation there and we have to understand it.
I am sorry that when my right hon. Friend talked of Vietnam he did not apply the same principles as he is willing to apply to the Africans; did not apply the wisdom expressed in a leading article in the Observer the other day, recognising and comparing the position of Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam with that of Tito in Yugoslavia, and other Communist representatives in Europe, or the other leading article in The Guardian, which recognised that the National Liberation Front in Vietnam is the key to the civil war and must no longer be treated as though it were an irrelevance.
Those are the facts or life in Vietnam which have to be brought home to the people here at home and in the United States. I am sorry that instead of giving some of those facts of the situation in Vietnam, my right hon. Friend should instead have preferred, although in much milder terms, more moderate and reasonable terms, but nevertheless in terms, to give the kind of version of the events in Vietnam which we are getting today from the American State Department.
I would hope that we can have a real investigation, a real fact-finding mission to Vietnam. I should be very glad to help my right hon. Friend. I have presented my report to the Foreign Secretary. I have tried for eight weeks to present a report to the Prime Minister, but he has been unable to see me. I should be very glad to help him to find what he called the other day "a line to Hanoi". I should be very glad indeed to supply him with some true information to set beside the false information which is being supplied through the American State Department and the American Embassy and through sections of the Foreign Office and used to brief our Foreign Secretary and our Prime Minister these days. I should be very glad to assist in correcting these false reports which are coming in these ways.
If Mr. Gordon Walker does go to the Far East, and if he hopes to carry out a genuine fact-finding mission and exercise a genuine mediating rôle on behalf of the British Government, I would hope that the British Government, through my right hon. Friend, when he winds up the debate tonight, will make it clear that we are not merely partisans of the Americans or of this military junta in Saigon; that we are genuinely trying to be mediators and that therefore, we are not and cannot be partisans; moreover, that Mr. Gordon Walker, when he goes to Hanoi, will be going in that spirit, as a mediator and with a genuine desire to find out what the true facts are and what the true desires of the Vietnamese people are, and with a desire to see how they can be effectively implemented with our assistance.

7.43 p.m.

Mr. Godfrey Lagden: The Foreign Secretary's speech this afternoon was one of the very best and most sincere speeches I have heard since I entered the House 10 years ago. When that speech was followed by the excellent speech of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, hon. Members became aware of how much harmony there was in this vital theatre of foreign affairs. It was obvious that both Front Bench speakers had but one object—to come to a peaceful settlement in as many arenas as possible.
What a pity it was that, as the evening came, that sincerity disappeared. The Foreign Secretary's speech was forward-looking. How unfortunate it would have been if he had looked behind him, for below the Gangway he would have seen white-faced anger and sullen opposition to what he was saying. I sincerely hope that the Foreign Secretary will understand that he has the full support of this side of the House and of hon. Members sitting immediately behind him.
Then came the speech of the hon. Member for Barking (Mr. Driberg). We are used to hearing that type of speech from the hon. Gentleman. The word "sneer" cropped up. The hon. Gentleman is the master of the sneer, but that word could well have been kept out of this afternoon's deliberations. The hon. Gentleman reached a very low standard in this debate, but he did not hold that record for long, because the hon. Member for Ashfield (Mr. Warbey) introduced an even lower standard, particularly when he tried, by innuendo, to suggest that it was the French and the Americans who made the powder which caused this dreadful havoc when the bomb was lately exploded. I do not know what satisfaction the hon. Gentleman gets from that, but it must be a satisfaction which, thank God, is denied to most Members of the House.
This "Government" below the Gangway opposite is a dangerous "Government" below the Gangway, and I sincerely hope that it will not have any effect whatsoever on those on the Government Front Bench who, since the election, have shown a much better understanding of foreign affairs than we could have hoped for.
I intend to speak about an arena which so far has not been mentioned. I want to speak about our general policy with regard to Spain. It is an important arena and it is one in which I believe much delay has taken place. We heard at Question Time that a White Paper is shortly to be published. I do not say this in any party spirit, but I sincerely hope that that White Paper comes forward quickly and that today's announcement will not be used, as has sometimes happened in the past, merely to delay the discussion of this very important subject.
Last October, I was a member of an all-party delegation which visited Gibraltar. We saw for ourselves what was happening there. We saw what has been widely reported in the Press. We saw some of the frontier incidents, when motor cars were held up for six or seven hours. We went into Spain. We went as a united delegation. We had with us an hon. Member opposite who is a very important and very honoured trade union representative. During our stay there, he was able to obtain the considered opinion of trade unionists on the Rock.
Wherever we went we found one thing, that this was a united people who looked upon themselves as a part of this country. It did not matter whether they were business men or trade unionists, and it did not matter much whether they were the Spaniards who were actually coming in to work; all of them seemed to appreciate what the Government's rule could give them.
All hon. Members would do well to obtain and read the speech made by Sir Joshua Hassan, the Chief Minister of Gibraltar, which went out over radio and television on 11th March. In that speech, Sir Joshua expressed not only the feelings of the people of Gibraltar, but also the sentiment which I am sure is shared by vast numbers of people here. I want to quote one or two important passages from the speech:
And let us be quite clear in our minds that it is we who have to make the sacrifices.
He was speaking of his own people on the Rock.
Assistance will come. Of that there is no doubt.
I believe that those are the sort of words which express the thoughts of the people who live there. They cannot contemplate the people of this country or a Government of either side of this House letting them down.

Mrs. Anne Kerr: Does the hon. Gentleman share the views of the Leader of the Opposition that the British Government should send frigates to Spain?

Mr. Lagden: If the hon. Lady will contain herself, I will come to that subject. I would not miss it for the world.
The words which I have quoted seem to me to show that the people on the

Rock feel that we are with them. Sir Joshua Hassan added:
They will no doubt take into account the desirability of maintaining good relations with another European country and also the fact that British subjects are being subjected to an economic blockade…
I beg Her Majesty's Government to take this matter seriously, because for any British subject anywhere to be subjected to an economic blockade is a far more serious matter than it might seem to be on the surface.
I am not anti-Spanish, but when any nation wants to establish an economic blockade against English people or against our Colonies it is high time that any Government, of whatever complexion, acted on behalf of the people of this country. If they do, I am sure they will receive their reward for so doing. I was delighted to read the day before yesterday that the Foreign Secretary had called the Spanish Ambassador to see him. I sincerely hope that when the Prime Minister winds up the debate he may find it possible to tell the House something of what occurred at that meeting. The Spanish Ambassador is a very fine diplomat, and I have reason to believe that much could be done by his intervention with his own Government.
I should be extremely grateful also if the Prime Minister could tell us whether he has received, as I imagine he must have done by now, a report from Sir Percy Selwyn, Senior Economic Adviser to the Colonial Office, who some months ago visited the Rock to gather information. Can the House be told what his report contained and whether it was helpful?
After having said something about the way we should treat other Governments when they start to knock our people about, I ask the House to consider whether the blame is entirely theirs. Here we come to the point which the hon. Lady the Member for Rochester and Chatham (Mrs. Anne Kerr) mentioned. When the Prime Minister first came to high office, I thought—if I may he forgiven for using a word which recently has caused so much trouble—that he was a little drunk with power. One of the first things he did was to have this little fuss over no frigates for Spain. Naturally, the Spanish did not like it. The Prime Minister may


have been right or wrong—I am not prepared to argue that now—but the Spaniards did not like it, and he must have known that they did not like it. But not being content with that, the right hon. Gentleman then cancelled the naval manœuvres agreed between our ships and the Spaniards, and they did not like that either.

Mrs. Kerr: Did the hon. Gentleman?

Mr. Lagden: It is not a question of whether I did. The point is that they did not like it, and the Prime Minister must have known that. If the Prime Minister had been man enough and stood up and said—and I am sure that the hon. Lady would have liked that — "The Spaniards can take this from me", that would be one thing, but he said that the reason for the cancellation was insufficient time to prepare the manoeuvres. Yet those who have been to Gibraltar since have been told on the highest authority that long before the Prime Minister gave that reason for the cancellation the whole plan had been prepared, the i's dotted and the t's crossed, and all our people who were to take part in the manoeuvres and all the Spaniards knew it.

Mr. Will Griffiths: Will the hon. Gentleman allow me?

Mr. Lagden: No, not now. If a person goes to the Dispatch Box, as the Prime Minister did, and deliberately tells untruths—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—he must expect—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Samuel Storey): Order. The hon. Member must withdraw that remark.

Mr. Lagden: I wish you had been here, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, half an hour ago when Mr. Speaker, if I understood him correctly—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order. I understand that "deliberately untrue" were not the words used then.

Mr. Lagden: I withdraw the word "untrue" and substitute "unfortunately not accurate". If a person does this he must be prepared for other people to take even worse action. The Spaniards reacted extremely badly. Their reactions

are quite uncalled for in every way, but there was a great deal of irritation from the Prime Minister at that time.

Mr. Will Griffths: Mr. Will Griffths rose——

Mr. Lagden: No, not at the moment.

Mr. Griffiths: I thank the hon. Member very much.

Mr. Lagden: Let us get together. The two nations, ourselves and Spain, have had a long friendship. Let us get together quickly, because it would be a bad thing if the thousands of people who leave this country every year to enjoy what Spain has to offer in the way of holidays go there with this cloud hanging over the heads of the two Governments. I hope that when the Prime Minister replies to the debate he will be able to tell us that since the Spanish Ambassador visited the Foreign Secretary, and since the preparation of the White Paper has started, things have greatly improved and that we shall be able to go forward this year with the happy associations which we have had in the past.

Mr. Griffiths: I am obliged to the hon. Member for giving way. The point that I wanted to put to him was simple. He said that the Prime Minister gave reasons for the cancellation of British participation in the naval man œuvres which the hon. Member had been informed on the highest authority in Gibraltar were inaccurate. This is an extremely serious charge to make against the Government. I put it to the hon. Member that he has an obligation to the Government, the Prime Minister and the House to name the highest authority to whom he referred.

Mr. Lagden: I would be most happy, if the Prime Minister wishes that, to do so—and I do not want any jeer or cheer —in private, because it would not be in the interest of everybody to do it in public.

Mr. Griffiths: The hon. Member has been in the House a long time and he knows that the weight which is attached to an hon. Member's speech and statements of that kind very much depends upon his quoting the authorities to whom he attributes the statements. It is a matter of considerable importance.

Mr. Lagden: I also know that when an hon. Member who has been in the


House some time offers in the public interest to give the information to the Prime Minister or to the Foreign Secretary that is usually accepted.

Mr. Dan Jones: I invite the hon. Member to agree with me that the truth about this unfortunate dispute between Gibraltar and Spain is that it has been in existence long before the present Prime Minister made any reference at all to frigates. I invite the hon. Member, with great respect, to say with me that all Gibraltarians would say that this trouble has gone on from the time of Her Majesty The Queen's visit in 1954.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Samuel Storey): This is becoming a speech, not an intervention.

Mr. Lagden: I agree entirely that this has gone on for the length of time the hon. Gentleman mentions. I did not wish to convey, and I willingly withdraw it if I did, that it was caused by the Prime Minister. What I wanted to suggest was that the unfortunate actions which he took fanned the fires and made the heat far greater.

The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Walter Padley): This really needs to be put right. Party political points ought not to be made about the plight of Gibraltar. For six long years, when the party opposite were in Government, Spain restricted movement from Gibraltar into Spain.

Viscount Lambton: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. Is this a question?

Mr. Padley: The question I am putting—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order. I think that it looked like becoming a speech. I was waiting to see whether the Minister of State would make an intervention. We cannot have so many speeches under the guise of interventions.

8.1 p.m.

Mr. Richard Crawshaw: The difficulty in speaking in a foreign affairs debate is that, however inadequate hon. Members are on other subjects, everyone is an authority on foreign affairs. I am sure that there are at least 315 Members on this side waiting to take over as Foreign Secretary.
Hon. Members on both sides will have found some comfort in some of the remarks of the Foreign Secretary today. I was intrigued by the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, who said on several occasions that he echoed some of the things said by my right hon. Friend. I began to wonder whether he was the original "Little Sir Echo". He echoed my right hon. Friend's remarks at point after point, and, in the circumstances, I feel that my right hon. Friend ought to take warning that, with too many friends opposite, he cannot afford to have enemies.
In our approach to this debate, we must get rid of prejudice, emotion and hypocrisy. When I speak of hypocrisy, I refer to hon. Members who say such things as, "We do not care what form of government they have so long as the people have democratic freedom and individual freedom". These remarks come from those who, for generations, have denied just such rights to so many millions of people.
I take to task my hon. Friend the Member for Ashfield (Mr. Warbey). I do not think that he does a service to the cause which he wishes to promote. When prejudice enters into it, as, I submit, it enters into his argument, it does no good for his cause. I cannot for the life of me see how he can argue that material which is found in South Vietnam with Chinese markings on it can possibly be for the defence of North Vietnam.
I want to see both sides of the picture, because I do not believe that there is only one side to it. Hon. Members cannot expect us to regard the Vietcong, who, apparently, dress in black pyjamas, as people one would really expect to see in white robes, with wings and a halo. One cannot expect to find that sort of thing on either side of the fighting in South Vietnam.
It is important to find out the cause of the struggle. However difficult it is to overcome the present problems in South-East Asia, troubles will still arise if we allow the same state of affairs to continue. At the risk of derisory laughter from the other side of the House, I will say what I believe to be the basic causes of trouble in the Far East today.
It will take a long time to live down the atomic bomb on Japan. I know that


there are arguments for and against—it may have been right; it is not for me to say—but one can only look at the effect it has on the people concerned when white people use weapons of this sort on people who are not white. Another factor to be considered is that of the countries which fought in the last war two came out with added possessions, and one was America. Those possessions happen to be on the perimeter of the Far Eastern area. It may be right. I do not know. I am not saying that it is wrong. All I am trying to do is to see things as the people of China and other Asiatic people see them.
If those things are not sufficient, there is the fact that, for years, the Americans have backed Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan, maintaining a large army there, and for what purpose?—the avowed intention of returning to the Chinese mainland. For years, the Americans have refused to accept China into the United Nations, I am glad that this country has made it quite clear—hon. and right hon. Members opposite have joined in this—that we believe that only by bringing China into the community of nations can we hope to exert any influence of her whatever.
After the war, Russia was an aggressive nation. I believe that there has been a change of heart in many ways in Russia. Many of the things which Russia did after the war were done out of a basic fear. I may be wrong—I do not know—but that is my belief. Again, I believe that many of the things happening in the Far East today are done basically out of a sense of fear. The Chinese fear complete encirclement by the Americans. The Americans are terrified lest they lose the last base in the Far East from which they could mount an offensive against China.
The only way to bring peace in the Far East is to overcome these fears. They will not be overcome by bombing North Vietnam. What is more, there will be no military victory for either side in what is taking place there now, not for North Vietnam, for South Vietnam or for the Americans.
It has been argued that the people of South Vietnam are behind the Government and that the Americans are backing a lawful Government which has

popular support. I should like to think so. I should like to be able to subscribe to everything the Foreign Secretary has had to say about it, but, try as I may, I just cannot subscribe to it. I doubt that, without looking at the morning post from day to day, one can tell who controls the Government in South Vietnam.
It is a difficult situation. Many of the things that the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) said had a considerable amount of sense. He did not come to tell us what the situation was as though he knew it from A to Z. Anyone who pretends to have the answer to the problem is deceiving the House. But hon. Members opposite should be very careful when using an argument about the need to support a democratic Government in South Vietnam. That does not come very easily from a party which, apparently, could not diagnose a democratic Government in Abyssinia, or in Austria, or in Czechoslovakia and other places.

Mr. William Yates: Which hon. Member on this side, or which Member of the Opposition Front Bench, has said that either we or the Americans were supporting a democratic Government in South Vietnam?

Mr. Crawshaw: I understood the Leader of the Opposition to say that the Americans were supporting a popular Government. I understood him to use words to that effect. It is fair to say that the right hon. Gentleman was suggesting that we were supporting a Government that was representing the people. I do not want to put it higher than that.
In the old days, we talked about the Czechs as being people in a far-off land with whom we had no concern. How, therefore, can we talk today with such affinity for the people of South Vietnam? To my way of thinking, it is because we are still pursuing a policy which has brought wars throughout the world for generations.
I believe that there are two prerequisites before we should enter anyone else's country. First, we must ask ourselves whether we have a moral right to be there. Without a moral right to be there, whatever military success we have, we will never win that country heart and soul. I do not see, judging from what I


have read and heard, that we have such a right to be in South Vietnam. I wish that we did. I wish that I could give wholehearted support to the Government on this point, but I think that they are deceiving themselves.
The second prerequisite is military. We have heard about the remark, attributed to General MacArthur before lie died, about not getting bogged down. Does anyone consider that, in terrain like that of South Vietnam, either with conventional weapons or even by pouring in millions of men, we shall ever win a war there? This is just the sort of territory which lends itself to independent fighting, and behind it is China with her vast manpower. I ask myself, therefore, why the Americans are holding South Vietnam.

Mr. William Yates: Face.

Mr. Crawshaw: The hon. Member says "face". I believe that in 1965, when there are so many vital things in the world to win, "face" plays a considerable part, but does anyone really believe that the Americans are negotiating from a position of weakness? We all know that they are negotiating from strength. If the Americans are convinced that they cannot by fighting against North Vietnam stop the fighting in South Vietnam, what are they hoping for?
We have seen them going north towards the Chinese frontier. What would the Americans feel like if China were bombing Mexico? [Laughter.] Hon. Members opposite laugh, but it is because people laugh at things like that that we get landed in positions like this. The party opposite has a tremendous responsibility to bear in this matter. This situation has not arisen only this week. It is something to which it contributed over the years by the idea that one should hold on to a land irrespective of whether one is required or wanted there by the people.
I do not believe that view to be correct. I do not believe that it ever brings victory or good results. If the Americans do not make a success of what they are doing at the moment, what is the answer? Do they continue to bomb North Vietnam? Are they doing it in the hope that China will send in troops? The fear I have is not of the fighting in

North and South Vietnam, but that China will send in troops. Is that what the Americans really want?
Let us remember that the situation now is not the same as it was two years ago. China has made an atomic explosion. Within the next year or two it will probably have an atomic weapon. What worries me is that perhaps America has now decided that it cannot allow that to happen. If that is so, there will be only one answer to this escalation, and it is a terrible thought.
I have sat in the House day after day while Questions have been put to my right hon. Friend on this subject. I have had to hold myself down because I realised that by saying certain things when diplomacy is in a delicate situation one can do more harm than good. But I believe that the situation is now such that one ought to speak plainly, and to ask the United States, "Are you anxious to bring in China in order to destroy her atomic power?"

Mr. William Yates: I am certain, from my visits and lectures in the United States, when I have met very important people in the universities, that the United States does not on any account want to get into a confrontation with Communist China, with all her millions, in Vietnam.

Mr. Crawshaw: The hon. Gentleman misses the point. If the United States gets into a confrontation with China now it does so with atomic weapons in its possession alone. If it goes in for that confrontation in another two years' time it will do so on an equal footing with China. That is what worries me. Does the United States think that the time has come for this confrontation? I hope that the hon. Member is right. Nevertheless, when one knows that certain implements of war have been used without the knowledge of the President it makes one shudder a little as to the outcome.
I believe that several things are expected in an alliance. Loyalty—yes. But I do not believe that it is loyalty to allow an ally to bog itself down, to bring discredit on the alliance as I believe the United States is doing in Vietnam. I believe that one of the things expected in an alliance is that one should say to that ally firmly, "We think that you are wrong in what you are doing. We


do not believe that you are keeping this war going solely for the benefit of the people of South Vietnam".
Let us face the facts. The people in Asia want a good meal every day. For 18 years the people in both North and South Vietnam have not known what it is to have a day's peace. Here we talk about democracy. Do they care whether it comes from the West or whether it is Communism as long as they get food? These are the ways in which we shall win in the Far East—not by bombing but by bringing help to these countries long before we have to start doing it in order to buy them with the object of saving them from the Communists.
We are now in the middle of a decade organised by the United Nations to give help to the impoverished nations, a decade in which we are asked to give 1 percent. of the country's output. We have managed to give only percent. Is this the way that we shall win the hearts and souls of the people in the Far East?
We can win them. This country still has a great part to play in the world, but it will not be played by playing second string to an ally whom we believe to be on the wrong road. The time has now come when we should say firmly, but in a friendly way, "If you go any further, you cannot expect to take us along with you." I hope that the Foreign Secretary will say just that.

8.21 p.m.

Viscount Lambton: When the late Mr. Ernest Bevin had been Foreign Secretary for a year, he won such constant applause from the Conservative benches that Conservative Members were asked in private not to applaud him in the House of Commons. The right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary won for himself in one afternoon the affection which Mr. Bevin took a year to win. I will not go any further or embarrass him any more with any praise.
The hon. Member for Liverpool, Toxteth (Mr. Crawshaw) dwelt upon the situation in Vietnam, as have many other hon. Members this afternoon. This was inevitable, but in a sense the Rubicon there has been crossed. While the House may deplore, as the hon. Gentleman did, or praise the action of the United States Government, and while some hon. Members opposite may go out of their way

to praise the North Vietnamese Government, the fact remains that nothing that has been said here or that will be said here is likely to bring an end to the existing conflict, or to alter the settled plans of the United States of America, or North Vietnam, or China. Therefore, anything said on this subject, whether sentimental, angry or regrettable, can hardly be constructive.
I should like, therefore, to turn to a part of the world which is threatened, but not overwhelmed, with disturbances and war, the Middle East, and where it may still be possible for Her Majesty's Government, in association with that of the United States, to arrest the steady decline which appears to be going on unabated.
Anyone impartially looking round the countries of the Middle East will be struck by the fact that Arab unity, of which we all heard so much in the past, is further off today than ever, and, what is more, is perhaps less desired by many Arab countries. In the Lebanon we have what amounts to the Switzerland of the Middle East, whose leaders wish to keep out of the turmoil of international politics and look after their own prosperous affairs.
In Syria, regrettably, we have perpetual plotting, and the country is more than ever in need of a respite from the eternal strife which has shaken it in the last few years. In Jordan we have a king, by any standards a brave young man, attempting to modernise and raise the standard living of his tiny State. In Saudi Arabia and the oil sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf there exists a great desire for the oil to continue to flow and for its benefits to be felt.
I freely admit that I have made a series of rather sweeping statements and have omitted to mention the imperfections which exist in many of these countries, the corruption and the length of time it takes for the money to percolate from the top to the bottom. Nevertheless, I contend that this is a time when the Middle Eastern countries in the main wish to look after their internal affairs and increase the efficiency of their various administrations without being bothered by the gigantic shadow of Arab unity which they are incessantly made to feel is over their heads.
But the fact is that they are not allowed this moment of rest. They are


not allowed that period which is necessary for construction and advance, for President Nasser will not allow it. From the Persian Gulf to the Dead Sea and from Aden to Teheran his schemes are in opposition to any period of rest.
The House has grown used to the policies of Nasser. Hon. Members have grown used to his vituperations and his schemes, to his threats and blandishments, and we have come to regard him as a Permanent figure in the Middle Eastern scene. As he has survived in the past so, some will argue, will he continue to survive, and as he has proved ineffective in the past so in future will he prove ineffective. It is, therefore, thought to be quite all right to leave the Middle East slowly simmering in the belief that as nothing has happened there in the last nine years nothing will happen in the next nine years.
This, I contend, is a dangerous misconception, and it would be wise to realise that while Nasser is by no means comparable to Hitler in terms of power, his actions are as unalterable as those of the Third Reich and he has declared them as simply as Hitler ever did in his "Mein Kampf ". They are simply that Egypt should dominate the Arab world and its neighbours and that Egyptian sovereignty should dominate the whole of the North African coast of the Middle East from Morocco to the Gulf.
To accomplish this aim he needs above all things money, and in the last few years, with this object in view, he has constantly interfered with those countries rich in oil which he hopes will eventually pass under Egyptian domination.

Mr. Tam Dalyell: Will the hon. Member accept that those of us who in the last two years have had the opportunity to see Nasser privately, while admitting that it is possible to be naive, feel that any comparison between Nasser and Hitler is grotesque?

Viscount Lambton: All I would say is that for the President of an Arab country to keep troops in another Arab country, to use napalm bombs against them and to use the most hideous weapons of war makes him comparable with Hitler.
It is not my intention to dwell upon the implications which would arise if he followed out his oil aggrandisement and brought about an Egyptian coup d'etat in

Libya. I would merely say in passing that in my opinion—and I hope that the Foreign Secretary will take note of this —not nearly enough was done by the last Government and not nearly enough has been done by this Government to counteract anti-British propaganda there. Considering the benefits likely to flow to Her Majesty's Government through the rich oil strike which has been made by British Petroleum in Libya, I suggest that we do not spend anything like enough money or allow our embassy there anything like adequate resources either to present the case for pro-Western association or to combat the very effective and clever Egyptian propaganda.
I return to my main point. Nasser and the Government of Egypt are still bent upon conquest and domination. Such are the threats to his country of the population growth, such are the commercial problems and such is the gravity of the economic problems which face him, it is almost as necessary to him as it was to the European dictators before the war to keep on the move and perpetually to take the initiative.
This has resulted in a change in the balance of power in the Middle East in the last few years, for all the evidence suggests that by attempting to include the Yemen against its will in his Arab empire Nasser has seriously weakened both his internal position and his external position.

Mr. William Yates: If he has done that, how will he go on with this terrific expansion about which my hon. Friend is speaking?

Viscount Lambton: If my hon. Friend will wait, I was about to come to that point.
Externally, it has been necessary for Nasser to bomb those whom he describes as his blood brothers. He has used against them the very weapons which I referred to when answering the intervention of the hon. Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell). I cannot help observing how all this was unremarked upon and unprotested against by what I might call the "red wing" of the party opposite in the past. It has been necessary for Nasser to maintain an army of over 40,000 soldiers in territory which is becoming increasingly


antagonistic to him. This has without doubt had its effect in the Arab world. After all, it is not convincing to preach blood-brotherhood and at the same time shed one's brother's blood. It has resulted in certain other Arab countries looking askance at their total involvement with Egyptian policies which Nasser so passionately desires.
Internally as well Nasser cannot afford to pay the price of failure, or he would have to pay exactly the price which those who went before him paid and, perhaps, will be turned out of office in the most savage way. Therefore, the strain which the war in the Yemen has inflicted on the economy and the mutterings internally which it has caused make it more essential than ever to Nasser that he should have some military, financial or economic success which can divert the attention of the Egyptians from the realities of the situation.
Without doubt, military success in the Yemen would be ideal, for it would have inevitable and serious repercussions in the Aden Protectorate and the trucial coast. But all the signs are that such success is further away and that even those who once gave their support to the Egyptians are now desiring to withdraw it so that the Yemenis can put their own house in order.

Mr. Hugh Jenkins: In his reference to the use of napalm and, I think he said, gas—

Viscount Lambton: No.

Mr. Jenkins: What did the hon. Gentleman say?

Viscount Lambton: I said napalm.

Mr. Jenkins: In the hon. Gentleman's reference to the use of napalm, is he alluding to the report given on 8th July, 1963, which was subsequently found by the United Nations mission in the Yemen to have no substance in fact whatsoever?

Viscount Lambton: I cannot refer the hon. Gentleman to the exact date. Is he saying that napalm has never been used at any time in the Yemen?

Mr. Jenkins: indicated assent.

Viscount Lambton: Perhaps we will merely agree to differ on this subject.
It is possible, I believe, that Nasser will have to look for other fields of diversion. As I have said, Libya was the obvious opportunity, and so would be Iraq if it had not a war on its hands with the Kurds, which might yet further stretch and weaken the military power of Egypt.
The disadvantage of any further takeover of any country would be that it would further upset those Arabs already affronted by Egypt's conduct in the Yemen, and I do not believe that at this moment Nasser is in a position to incur further disapproval.
There remains unfortunately, but fortunately for him, one subject which is sure to create a diversion, the obliteration of Israel, and it may well be that the tension which we have seen rising in the Middle East in the last few months reflects the desperate need of Nasser for a diversion to take the eyes of the world off his failures.
I think that it is of the greatest importance that we should realise precisely what Nasser's aims and intentions are, and what position this country is in at the present time. What do we stand for today? What is our policy in the Middle East? Do we still believe in the Tripartite Agreement which pledges support to any country that is attacked, or any country against which warlike operations are made?
It is difficult to know, and I hope that the Foreign Secretary will enlighten us further tonight, what has happened to the Tripartite Agreement, whether it is alive, or whether it is dead, whether it is living, or whether it is dying, but one thing, above all, which I believe is essential is that the Government should attempt to guarantee the peace of the Middle East, against either the Arab or the Israeli aggressor.
Unless some action is taken, there will, I believe, be a general deterioration in the situation and a slow drift towards action against Israel, followed by retaliation, followed by an uneasy peace, followed by war. It is surely wise to attempt to prevent such a melancholy chain, and I suggest that now is the time for the initiation of policy by the Government. I believe that they should not wait until


the situation has deteriorated as it has in Vietnam, for by then it will be too late. The time to move is while peace yet exists, and not when war comes and makes inevitable the acceptance of unwise decisions.
I think that we should look carefully at the situation with regard to the waters of the Jordan, because I believe that these are liable to be the most likely pretext for a war in the future. There are three countries which can divert water from the Jordan. Of these Syria is no doubt the weakest, and its Government most subject to extreme pressure. At the same time—and this is a problem about which we may hear much in the future—the source of the River Dan is an extra complication, for while it is shown on the maps to be rising in Israel, geographicaly it would appear to be rising in Syria.
If, therefore, at some future date the Syrians were to divert these headwaters, the situation would be overwhelmingly complicated, for Syria could legally argue that if territorial lines were drawn which excluded from its territory the River Dan, they could not divert something which was not in their territory. Equally, Israel could argue that as the River Dan was marked in her territory, the frontier lines were wrongly drawn, and must be reorganised. I merely mention this complication because it seems to me that we are fast approaching a crisis, that in some way or another an attempt will be made to divert water from Israel, an action which the Israeli Government will inevitably regard as one of agression, and one which they will inevitably react against by the use of armed force.
In this event, Israel will be cursed throughout the Arab world as the aggressor, and while, if Israel uses force, the probable immediate result will be the extension of the territory under the United Nations, and the creation of a Ghaza strip type authority in the areas of the headwaters, in the long term I am afraid that a step will have been taken towards the outbreak of an Arab-Israeli war, with all its unforeseeable consequences. This, I believe, is something which should be prevented. Now is the time for Her Majesty Government, in association with America and France, to see whether they cannot bring about

some sort of agreement which would favour neither side particularly, but which would do something to guarantee peace for the Middle East.

8.41 p.m.

Mr. Stanley Orme: This debate is of vital importance not only to this country, but to the world at large. The position at present, particularly in South-East Asia, is one of great importance and grave danger. This is not a time for a bipartisan policy between the Opposition and the Government Front Bench. The first note against this was struck by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond), who, in dealing with this matter, drew attention to many of the differences that exist and will continue to exist, and also the need for an independent policy at the present time.
I feel that in 1965, in the present world situation, we have moved a long way since Suez and since Korea, but we have also moved a long way in the production and manufacture of more weapons of a deadly nature. There has also been an extension of nuclear weapons under pressure by some sections of the Armed Forces. Therefore, because of this situation we are in a most desperate and dangerous state.
If I may turn for a moment to our rôle which has been referred to as "east of Suez", many of us, particularly on this side of the House, quite fail to see where this rôle east of Suez fits into a British Labour foreign policy. We feel it is in our own interests that we should not extend, or attempt to extend, our sphere of international influence into the Far East, but that we should be playing a part in bringing about a peaceful settlement rather than extending bases, sending V-bombers and continuing wars which are taking place there, but which, in many cases, are wars of liberation being fought by people trying to find a new democracy for themselves.
I am not one of those who believes that everything that happens in North Vietnam is right and that everything that happens in South Vietnam is wrong, but I am a signatory to the Motion which has been signed by 104 Members of this side of the House, and some Liberal Members, which abhors the attacks that the


Americans have made into North Vietnam, the use of napalm bombs, and the use of gas. We have done this because we feel that if the United States has taken action which is wrong it should be condemned and we feel that in the interests of world peace we should speak out. When we hear the Leader of the Opposition talking as he did this afternoon about Members below the Gangway criticising the Americans, and when we think of the speech which he made about the United Nations and which inflamed the Congo situation, and when we think of the attitude adopted by him and his hon. Friends in relation to Suez, then, surely, if we consider the United States to be wrong, it is time to make our own criticisms.
I believe that Britain has a vital rôle to play east of Suez, but it is a rôle of conciliation and negotiation and an attempt to see whether we can bring mediation to South-East Asia. I think, therefore, that it was wrong that this afternoon my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary should refer only to the atrocities which have been committed by North Vietnam against the South. Let us face the fact that atrocities have been committed by both sides. No one could regard, except with horror, the destruction the other day of a school and a village. If one condemns the atrocities of one side, those of the other side should also be condemned. Hon. Members have said that there are two sides to the problem and we should look at the matter from a global point of view.
I think that the extension by the United States of bombing in the North was an action similar to that proposed by General MacArthur during the Korean War in 1951. Such action would precipitate the entry of China and the Soviet Union. It is no use saying that these Powers will not be brought in when we know that they could be involved, and that the whole of South-East Asia—Indonesia, Malaysia and stretching to the Inidan Ocean with India and Pakistan—could be embroiled in a conflagration which could destroy the world. Because of that we must speak out now and say to the Americans, not only privately and diplomatically, but, if necessary, publicly, that their actions are not leading to the right kind of solution.
When, with some of my colleagues, I went to the American Embassy last week to protest about the use of gas and napalm bombs officials there tried to tell us that they were defending democracy in South Vietnam. It is evident that so such thing as democracy exists in that area. No attempt has been made since the 1964 agreement to break up the large landed estates an dto give the peasants land, with the right to develop in their own way which they have been denied and which they seek. When we stated that seven-tenths of the country is controlled by the Vietcong it was not denied by the American representatives. Because of this situation and because the Americans cannot see that Asian people, who talk of democracy, do not know whether they are talking of the democracy of Selma Alabama, or Brookland, New York, Her Majesty's Government have to speak out.
I welcome the initiative being taken to reopen the Geneva talks and the fact that Mr. Patrick Gordon Walker is going to South Vietnam. It will not be entirely satisfactory if he is going only on a fact-finding tour. Most of the facts are already known. He should try to promote some form of mediation and endeavour to persuade the Americans and the North Vietnamese to regard the situation from the point of view of a possible world conflict. After President Johnson's dissociation from the use of gas, I feel that he is not entirely in control and that elements of the Pentagon are running the show. We want to see the issue taken out of the hands of the military and put into a political context. After all the fighting is done, after all the destruction that could take place in South-East Asia. which could even lead to its extension into China, this conflict will still have to be settled by negotiation.
Finally, we will have to get Governments which are popularly based with the desires and aspirations of their people and we will not get a settlement unless we get Governments of that nature. Therefore, our rôle east of Suez needs to be drastically revised and I hope that when the Prime Minister replies tonight he will have something more positive to say on that.
Another aspect which is vitally important in this situation is the question of the United Nations. If the United


Nations were functioning on a real world basis it could be brought into effect on this issue. I deplore the weakening of the United Nations at this time. Whatever differences nations big or small may have, whether over payments or anything else, they should not at this stage in our history do anything to damage the United Nations.
That goes as much for the Soviet Union as for the United States of America, Great Britain, or any other country. It is absolutely essential, in a world where we could be thrown into anarchy, for the United Nations to be strengthened, not weakened. We still need a real United Nations force that could prevent such actions, whether in the Congo or Vietnam.
What makes this issue so serious and frightening is that there is still the shadow of nuclear weapons over us and over the world as a whole. I am a unilateralist. I still want to see Britain playing her part as an independent nation in the United Nations and the world, free from alliances and in a position to be a real force in diplomacy in this
world. I would deplore any nuclear testing at the present time, whether underground, above the ground, or in any other form. With the number of weapons we have at present, that is totally unjustifiable and a threat against the world and the people who live in it. To live as we do, under the shadow of the bomb, creates in our world and in our society a neurosis of which we must try to get rid.
The hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lambton) mentioned the Middle East and the problems existing in that area. There are problems there, as there are in other parts of the world, but they will not be solved today or tomorrow. Consider the position if, with the proliferation of nuclear weapons, both Israel and the United Arab Republic come to possess them. That is the kind of thing which we must try to prevent. The Labour Government was elected on a policy of a nuclear-free zone in Europe, to try to bring about a lessening of tension in that area. That is the policy which should still be pursued by the Labour Government. We all know about the problem of the German elections and other things which are in the way, but Britain, sooner or

later, must grasp this nettle and get genuine negotiations started.
The British public are sorely concerned about nuclear weapons. Many of my hon. Friends and I have received numerous letters, petitions and correspondence on this issue. Because we live in a democracy we find ways of expressing ourselves and getting our opinions over to the nation. It is peculiar, therefore, that while hon. Gentlemen opposite talk about democracy, as soon as anybody takes some action of which they do not approve they either sneer or denounce it. This is detestable at a time when we live in a world which is precariously balanced between annihilation and peace.
One can only hope that in the weeks to come the episode at the American Embassy in Saigon will not be used by the Americans to escalate this problem further, or to use the incident in the way that such incidents have been used in the past, for example, at the time of the Irish troubles. We all agree that it was a serious and deplorable incident. We deplore all atrocities, but in civil wars these things do happen.
Until the civil war in Vietnam comes to an end and until a way of mediation is found, I fear that these things will continue. It is to be regretted that the Americans are extending it further and further into North Vietnam, for such action can never produce a solution.
Many of my hon. Friends and I have protested against nuclear weapons. We will be doing the same again at Easter. We protest with a genuine desire to see a victory, not of one side over the other, but a victory which will see the emergence of a world in which sanity prevails. We must stop talking about this or that weapon, tactical or otherwise. We must seek a means which will secure a genuine desire for disarmament.
When this time comes we will be able to really start tackling some of the problems in Africa, Asia, South America and elsewhere. These countries do not want weapons, but food and a decent standard of life. In the twentieth century the peoples of these countries see that with modern methods and communication they could, if we were willing, have a chance of a decent standard of life today and not tomorrow. We must start thinking


about building a world in which peaceful co-existence is a cornerstone. The United Nations must be a reality in tie fullest sense of the word and negotiations must be genuinely conducted.
On the issues which we have discussed today, Her Majesty's Government must speak out, even if doing so means attacking an ally or taking an opposite point of view from a friend.

Mr. Will Griffiths: If Her Majesty's Government make every effort, through diplomatic channels and in every possible way open to them, to persuade the Americans not to escalate the war and if the Americans refuse to co-operate, would my hon. Friend consider it right for us nevertheless to stand by the Americans, whatever the consequences?

Mr. Orme: Certainly not. In fact, such a position arose we would have to face using our ultimate veto, which is the alliance itself. We could not, in such circumstances, shirk our responsibilities. Fortunately, we have not reached that position, although I agree with my hon. Friend that the Americans must be made to realise that such a thing could happen.
Millions of people in America want to see a peaceful solution of this problem and to avoid the danger of escalation. Since the Americans claim to be the plainest speakers in the world, I suggest that we speak plainly to them. The time has come, irrespective of loans and other economic considerations, to speak plainly. World peace supersedes all these things. Peace is what we want more than anything. We do not want it by capitulation; we want it by negotiations. We want to see the position which I have been trying to describe, the kind of world towards which we are trying to move, a world of sanity.
We walk about at times on a beautiful morning, and it appears to be good to be alive, but then we read some of the things which are happening and some of the insane things which people are saying and planning to do, and we realise what a dangerous society we live in, with apparently sane men making insane suggestions. We should move away from that. I think that when the people elected a Labour Government they took

the first step in that direction. I hope that my right hon. Friends on the Front Bench will understand the tone and the meaning of my speech.
Those of us on this side of the House who signed those Motions did not do so in favour of one side or the other. We were expressing an honest point of view, that we want a foreign policy which is real and which can be developed in the interests of this nation and of every nation. We do not want to try to pose in the world as a first-class Power, when we can be doing much better things in the normal run of a normal nation. These are the things for which we are working and it is to that end that I am speaking. It is in that spirit that I hope that the Government will take the meaning of what I have been trying to say.

9.2 p.m.

Mr. Reginald Maudling: The hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) spoke with great vigour. I should like to say how much we all appreciate the sincerity with which he was speaking. I do not agree with all his views in any way, but I appreciate that he holds them strongly. In particular, I cannot understand him saying that there is no east of Suez rôle to be found—or that none should be found—in Labour foreign policy, that our only rôle in that part of the world should be conciliation. Can he really say that to our friends in Malaysia, or about our solemn treaty obligations to Thailand?
Can we say—certainly the Government do not, and I am glad that they do not—that we as country have no immensely important rôle in that part of the world, where Britain has obligations of a serious nature which must be discharged? With respect, I think he is wrong in that criticism of the present Government.

Mr. Orme: I did not say that. I said that we do not have a military rôle east of Suez: we obviously have a political rôle.

Mr. Maudling: I think I took the hon. Member's point. If we are to help the Malaysians we must have a military rôle as of now, of that there can be no question.
The hon. Member also said that we must speak frankly and openly to the


Americans. I agree with that, and I think that everyone agrees, but where there appears to be some disagreement is about what we should say to them. That has been argued today. The Foreign Secretary made an opening speech which was of great clarity and distinction. It has been accepted as such by my hon. and right hon. Friends. Some suggested that it was given a bipartisan reception, but that was repudiated on the other side of the House. To be quite frank, the Foreign Secretary's speech has been criticised more from that side of the House than from this. We found convincing his analysis of the situation, both in its historic origins and its present facts: the deductions to be made from policy and his arguments. We thought that it was not also true of his hon. Friends. The right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) was in agreement with him. I am not quite so sure what the right hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. Philip Noel-Baker) did agree with. I think he was full of reservations. Subsequent speeches from the hon. Members for Barking (Mr. Driberg), Ashfield (Mr. Warbey) and Liverpool, Toxteth (Mr. Crawshaw)—in fact, all the other four speeches from the Government side —showed a great degree of disagreement with the Government's policy.
I hope, therefore, that the Prime Minister will tonight make it absolutely clear what the voice of the Government is at this present moment, because the situation is too serious for ambiguity, too serious for misunderstanding, too serious for allowing any of our friends—or even those who are not our friends—in various parts of the world to have any misunderstanding at all about where Britain stands at this moment.
I should like, first, to deal with what has been the main subject of our discussion today, and that is Vietnam, and to analyse what seem to me to be the basic interests of the countries primarily concerned. First, of course, there are the people of South Vietnam themselves, whose interests must be peace and freedom from Communist aggression. When the question was raised about whether it is a matter of Communist aggression from the North, I thought that the most formidable fact was the Foreign Secre-

tary's reference to a million refugees—a million refugees in a country of this size—from the North to the South at the conclusion of hostilities a few years ago. Surely, this is the fundamental fact of the situation. Surely, it is clear what the people of South Vietnam want.
Then there is the American interest. Here, again, there is some difference of opinion about what the Americans want. The Foreign Secretary made it clear that the Americans went to South Vietnam a few years ago when the aggression was clearly under way from the North. Of this there can be no doubt at all in my mind, from the evidence adduced by the right hon. Gentleman, but there is some difference of opinion, apparently, below the Gangway opposite. The hon. Member for Ashfield talked of aggression by a large Power against a small nation. The aggression comes from the North—of this there is the clear evidence of the Commission and American documents, mentioned in the Foreign Secretary's speech.
Let us be clear of this: the Americans can have only one interest in being present now in South Vietnam, and that is to protect that country against Communist aggression, to help those people—[HON. MEMBERS: "Nonsense."] If hon. Members opposite say "nonsense", do they or do they not agree with their Foreign Secretary? What else are the Americans doing there? Does anyone in his sane senses think that the Americans, this great powerful progressive nation, are spending their blood and their treasure in maintaining a position in the South-East Asia because they want to extend their own territories and to earn money? What possible motive can they have other than the defence of South Vietnam against the aggression of the Communists?

Mr. Will Griffiths: I speak for myself, and I say that there is a civil war going on and that the Americans have intervened on one side.

Mr. Maudling: And I say, following the Foreign Secretary, that the Americans, at the request of the people of South Vietnam, are protecting them against aggression from the North, and are generally supporting free peoples against Communist aggression. This must clearly be the American position.
Let us look at the position of North Vietnam. It is clearly their desire to complete the occupation of South Vietnam as well. It is quite clear from the evidence that is available in large quantities that from the start they never really accepted the Agreements; that from the beginning they set up these cells, these inter-penetrations of the people of South Vietnam, and have steadily built up—

Mr. Sydney Silverman: Does the right hon. Gentleman remember that in the Geneva Agreements it was decided, first, that the cease-fire line along the 17th Parallel should not be regarded as a territorial or political frontier, and that within a short time thereafter, within two years, there should be free elections in order to get one Government for the whole of Vietnam? Is the right hon. Gentleman saying that the Americans were there to assist in the carrying out of those objectives of the Geneva Agreements?

Mr. Maudling: As the Foreign Secretary made clear today, the Americans were not there at that time in any substantial numbers. That was a very important point in the right hon. Gentleman's speech, but perhaps the hon. Gentleman overlooked it.
The interest of the people of North Vietnam, or of the Government of North Vietnam, is clearly to extend their own influence over the southern part of the country. I do not imagine that they want to be a satellite of China. Why should they want to be? Clearly, in their desire to extend their influence southwards they must be limited to some extent, first, by the desire not to be too deeply committed to their vast Chinese neighbours, and, secondly, I should have thought increasingly, by the effect they must be feeling from the retaliatory action of the Americans. It is important to bear in mind, which possibly has not been mentioned today, that from the point of view of the Government of North Vietnam there must be considerable disadvantages in their present course, which progressively should have an effect on the posture which they take towards negotiations.
The next interested party is China. I suppose that, from the Chinese point of view, the present situation gives an opportunity to score off both enemies of China, both the main Chinese opponents—the

United States and Russia. If the United States were forced to a humiliating withdrawal, that would suit the Chinese. At the same time, if this should come about apparently largely by Chinese assistance, this would give the Chinese an advantage in their struggle within the Communist world against the Soviet Union. Therefore, I should have thought that the Chinese interest must be to keep this struggle going by all means short of open war, by all means short of conflict which would bring them into direct confrontation with the United States Forces.
Next, the Soviet Union. What is the Russian interest in this conflict? I should have thought they must be interested in anything which tends to weaken the influence of the United States, but can they really be interested in anything that strengthens at the same time the influence of China? After all, one of the historic facts of recent years has been the development of this split within the Communist world. It is impossible for anyone to tell how permanent it is. It is difficult for anyone to judge how lasting or how deep it is. It certainly exists. One can see all the time evidence of this growing difference of interest between the Soviet Union and China. Therefore, one cannot feel that the Soviet Union really wants to see a conflict continuing if the result would be to strengthen the Chinese influence.
Of course, there is from the Soviet point of view the very grave danger, which I am sure they understand extremely well with their knowledge of modern weapons, of the escalation of the conflict into something on a broader world scale which would involve themselves as well. The continuation of the conflict must surely face the Russians all the time with this very serious dilemma of the degree to which they give aid to the people of North Vietnam. The evidence of what they are doing at present is conflicting. Certainly it must be a continuing problem for them to know precisely how far to go. They, too, therefore, despite the apparent stony composure of Mr. Gromyko, have, and must surely in the real analysis have, an interest in seeing some solution to this problem.
There is, finally, the interest of the United Kingdom. This surely is based upon the international engagements we have in South-East Asia, the solemn


obligation to the people of Malaysia, the solemn treaty obligation to our treaty partners in Thailand. It is true that we have no direct part in the actual operations in South Vietnam, but we are engaged in Malaysia and would be engaged directly in any aggression against Thailand. Surely, as my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition said this afternoon, the fact that the Americans are in Practice keeping this conflict well away from the borders of the S.E.A.T.O. area must mean that the British and American interests are intertwined inextricably in this part of the world. If the American position should collapse and if the Communist tide should sweep on, surely there cannot be any doubt where the next waves would start moving, where next they would go after they had overwhelmed South Vietnam—Thailand, Malaysia, Burma. The tide would move on. If the barrier of the American position were removed, then we should certainly he facing with very little delay problems of the greatest urgency and difficulty for the people of this country, problems involving support and aid to people in that part of the world to whom we have pledged our solemn word.
Therefore, I am convinced that the British interest in this part of the world is bound up with the American interest, and we must stand shoulder to shoulder as allies and as people fighting the same cause.
What about the American policy? It has been discussed from many angles today—supported and opposed. They really have only two alternatives, either to withdraw or to react as they are doing. They cannot just stand still and watch the situation crumble in front of them. I am sure that there is no other choice. Until there is some sign that the North Vietnam Government will stop their aggressive actions, I cannot see that the Americans have any alternative whatsoever.
President Johnson, in a speech which has been quoted several times today, made it clear that
The United States will never be second in seeking a settlement in Vietnam if based on an end of Communist aggression.
I am sure that that is a very right position, as I am sure Her Majesty's Government are right in supporting them in it.
What can the Government do? We welcome the measures which they are taking to try to probe the situation, to try to find more about people's thoughts in that part of the world, the various ways which the Foreign Secretary described, the mission of Mr. Gordon Walker, and other ways. All these ways of finding positions and attitudes must be valuable, but they must not be a sign of weakening. That is very important.
The course upon which the Americans are set in this part of the world is a dangerous course. It is a terrible part of the world to fight a war. Wars, as has been said today, are terrible anyway, but possibly more terrible in the jungles of this part of the world. It is a terrible task and great dangers are being faced.
I believe, however, that the dangers of the alternative course are even greater —the danger of withdrawal, the danger of lack of unity, and the danger, possibly the worst of all, of ineffective agreement which people think is binding and which shortly collapses and all the tasks which we have undertaken prove once again to have been in vain. These are possibly greater dangers than the admittedly great dangers which the Americans are now facing.
It is essential that the Prime Minister should make it quite clear where the Government and his party stand on these matters. The hon. Member for Barking made a speech, to which I listened with interest, in which he was very offensive about my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition and very obsequious about his own Government. He did his best to work his way out of a Motion on the Order Paper about the use of gas in Vietnam in which he and many of his prominent hon. Friends called upon Her Majesty's Government dissociate Britain from the actions and views of the Americans.
The hon. Member said today that this need not be done in public, of course—it was no time for that—but I ask the hon. Member how we can dissociate ourselves from other people's actions unless we say so honestly and openly. The Motion
…calls on Her Majesty's Government to dissociate Great Britain from these actions and views, in order to be able more effectively to mediate in this conflict.


How can the Government do something more effectively unless they are seen to be dissociating themselves? This is a quite deliberate and clear proposition or challenge to the Government that, in order to play the pant which the hon. Member and his hon. Friends want them to play, the Government must openly and deliberately dissociate themselves from American actions and views. I hope the Prime Minister will make quite clear the attitude which he takes. I am sure that I know what it is. I hope that he will make his position and that of Britain in this part of the world very clear.

Mr. Michael Foot: Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether he disagrees with the statement made by the Foreign Secretary in Washington on gas warfare in Vietnam?

Mr. Maudling: As I understood it, his statement was that the Americans should pay proper attention to the views of the rest of the world. That seems to me to be an unexceptionable statement. If it has any implications, they have not yet been explained by the Government, and perhaps they will be later if the hon. Gentleman wants to know what they are.

Mr. Driberg: May I intervene?, The right hon. Gentleman has referred to me, and he interrupted me. Throughout his speech so far he has referred to the people of South Vietnam as though he identified them with the Government of South Vietnam. Does he really suggest that the people of South Vietnam are living in ideal conditions under a perfect democratic Government?

Mr. Maudling: The hon. Gentleman misheard me. I referred several times to the people of North Vietnam. Whether he thinks that they are not the same as the Government of North Vietnam, I do not know.
I turn now to Malaysia, where a potentially dangerous situation exists. We on this side strongly endorse and welcome the support which the Government are giving to Malaysia. It is particularly important that the economic help which Malaysia needs should be forthcoming. Although Malaysia has large sterling balances and big natural resources, it has a big economic strain, with, for instance, a very high level of taxation for that part of the world. Last

autumn, at the meeting at Kuala Lumpur, I arranged to meet the Finance Ministers of Canada, Australia and New Zealand to concert Commonwealth economic aid to Malaysia. I hope that this is proceeding and that the Prime Minister will be able to assure us—perhaps he may not know offhand—that it is going ahead.
I am surprised that there is no mention of Japan in our discussions of South-East Asia. Obviously, Japan is not a factor in a military sense, but these are political and economic problems of great importance. South-East Asia lies in a triangle bounded by the Indian subcontinent, Australasia and Japan. Japan is a country of immense economic strength and potential political strength. It is important not to overlook the contribution which the Japanese can make to events in this part of the world, a contribution which, I believe, they would be willing and anxious to make. I mention it only in passing because I believe it to be a mistake to underestimate how important this contribution could be.
I had a number of observations to make about the economic aspects of foreign policy, but, as time is short, I shall concentrate on one first of all, having in mind that the Prime Minister is tomorrow going to talk to General de Gaulle. I hope that he will talk to General de Gaulle fairly clearly—I am sure that he will—about the question of international liquidity and the position of the dollar. There are dangers for the whole structure of N.A.T.O. and the Western Alliance in the present monetary situation, possibly as serious as some of the more obvious military or political dissensions.
There is no doubt that the dollar is the bedrock of our international monetary system. It is the source of access to gold for the convertible currencies of the West. It is a currency of immense strength. The United States economy is the dominant economy of the West, and American prices are and probably have been more stable than those in any other country of the West for several years.
The dollar itself is a strong currency, but there has been a good deal of talk in recent years about the so-called weakness of the dollar based upon the United


States overseas deficit which has persisted for some years. Of course, the origin of the American deficit is not a trading position; it is the degree of American investment abroad and the degree of American aid abroad. Those who have been urging the Americans that they must abolish their deficit have been pursuing a dangerous course, because the Americans could at any time solve their problem at the expense of the rest of the world. In my view, they have been very forbearing in not doing so. But we have seen from the recent movements which the Americans have made and their effect in the Eurodollar market how serious can be the effect on the European economy and how serious can be the effect on the balance of payments of many countries if the Americans are driven into a corner in this way. There is no need whatever why the Americans should be so driven into a corner.
It is true that there is a basic difference of view about certain aspects of the situation between what is known as the Anglo-Saxon world and the Group of Ten or some European members of the Group of Ten. It is becoming more and more urgent that a solution should be found to this problem of international liquidity, which we raised as a Government in Washington in 1962 and have pursued ever since. In the meantime, unless solutions can be found, there must be an end to monetary aggression. I am sure that if any European countries find that a surplus of dollars is troubling them, they should try to solve the problem by means appropriate to their own economy and not by means of upsetting the general economy of the Western world as a whole.
I want now to say something about the Middle East. The situation there has been raised by a number of hon. Members, including my hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lambton). This is clearly a part of the world where very considerable movements are taking place. The position of Nasser in the Yemen is very difficult to follow. I imagine that it is getting more awkward from his point of view. His dominance over the Arab world seems to some extent to have been diminished as a result of the recent contretemps with West Germany. There

is a good deal of movement in the Arab world, and there are dangers.
We would like to hear from the Prime Minister how the Government view two problems in this area. First, to what extent—for there seems to be some difference of opinion about it—do they think that the troubles in the South Arabian Federation derive from deliberate actions by Egyptian agitators and Egyptian policy? Secondly, what is their view upon the potential dangers of the Jordan waters dispute? The Prime Minister has recently seen the Israeli Prime Minister.
It is difficult to understand this problem of the Jordan waters, because much of it is so technical, but, as far as I can judge, the potential damage to Israel by the diversion of the waters by the Lebanon and Syria could be very large. It is alleged that such a diversion would be wholly contrary to the agreement reached in the 1950s as a result of Mr. Johnson's intervention. It seems that, if this is so, a potentially very dangerous situation could arise between Israel and her Arab neighbours. What is the Government's assessment? Do they consider whether any useful initiative could be taken by this country to prevent what could potentially be a very awkward situation developing in that part of the world?
Finally, I want to say a few things about our relations with Europe, to which the Foreign Secretary referred. The right hon. Gentleman said that we are part of Europe. With this we agree very much. We on this side believe that this country is part of Europe and that its future lies with Europe. It was for that reason that my hon. Friend the Member for Bexley (Mr. Heath) laboured so hard to achieve an agreement for our entry into the European Economic Community —a labour that was very nearly completed. In fact, it was because we were so near to agreement that it became necessary for other people to impose a political veto. Had agreement not been so closely at hand, the political veto would not have been required.
The position now clearly is that there can be no prospect of immediate further negotiations. That chapter closed in 1963 with the end of the Brussels negotiations, but it was only the end of a chapter and not of the story. It is of fundamental


importance that we should not take this setback as anything more than temporary.
We must find ways—and the Government, I agree, believe this also—of working with the French and our other continental neighbours on joint projects such as the Concord and the Channel Tunnel —about which, incidentally, we have not heard recently. We must try to find ways and means in which E.F.T.A. and the Community can work together, and we must try to avoid actions or policies on our part that make the gap between us wider than it need be.
These are all practical steps, but probably we should go further. We should be trying to prepare the way with the clearest thinking we can achieve and the most vision we can summon up as to what is likely to be the shape and sort of settlement of a united Europe that we are all looking forward to.
The Community itself is evolving very fast. Upon the foundation of the Treaty of Rome a great superstructure is being built of law, practice, doctrine and economic activity. It is the whole Community—its superstructure and not merely the fundamental Treaty—that we must keep our eyes fixed on. First, we must look to joining the Community as it will be in the future and not just as it might have appeared a little while ago. Secondly, we must recognise that the European problem is economic, political and military and that these three aspects of the problem are bound always to be tied together.
I do not know whether the Prime Minister intends, or to what extent he intends—perhaps he will enlighten us this evening—to discuss with General de Gaulle the political problems of Europe. It appears that progress towards political integration among the Six is on a different scale and an entirely different time schedule from that applying in the economic aspect. I do not know to what extent he intends to talk about the military problem, or whether he intends to mention the A.N.F. Perhaps he will tell us; it would be interesting to know.
It must be recognised that the growth of the Community, based on the Treaty of Rome on the economic side, has been at a different pace from that of the equally important and growing vision of

the European military and political setup, and the military development is, of course, bound to tie in with any rearrangement of N.A.T.O. which we are bound to achieve within the next few years.
I think that it was my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Lewes (Sir T. Beamish) who referred to the famous five conditions. I want to ask the Prime Minister only one question about his attitude to Europe. I had gathered this afternoon that there was some doubt about the five conditions, but the hon. Member for Penistone (Mr. Mendelson) authoritatively confirmed to us that the five conditions are still the policy of the Labour Government. What I want to know is whether the Prime Minister still believes, as he did in 1963, that the whole philosophy and basis of the Treaty of Rome is anti-planning and based on the promoting of free competition. Does he still believe that this is so, and, if he does, does he think that it is a bad thing? If he does not believe in a system based on free competition, it is difficult to see how he can reach any agreement with the European economic system, which is and will continue to be based on the very free competition which is proving so successful.
I have endeavoured to cover some of the main issues which have arisen in the debate. Obviously, it takes far longer than I have had available to deal thoroughly with such a wide range of problems. We hope to hear from the Prime Minister this evening whether he can tell us something about what he expects to discuss in Paris. I hope that he can say something about the Middle East. I hope above all that he will make it clear that the speech of the Foreign Secretary this afternoon about our attitude to Vietnam is the view of the whole Government and of at any rate the majority of the right hon. Gentleman's party.

9.32 p.m.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson): I should like, if I may, to congratulate the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) on his maiden speech as Foreign Office spokesman for the Opposition. He seemed unequally happy in his rôle. There were parts when he was extremely


lucid and happy, especially when he got back to his old subject of liquidity. I was interested in some of his philosophising towards the end of his speech. I had a very different impression of what the right hon. Gentleman's attitude to the breakdown of the European negotiations was just two years ago. There were manly people who thought that he greeted that breakdown with feelings much short of enthusiasm.
We realise that the right hon. Gentleman is going through a difficult reappraisal, for reasons which it would be inappropriate to go into tonight. We have just had an account of his philosophising to the Conservative ladies of Barnet, which I read very carefully to see whether it could tell me anything.

Sir Douglas Glover: Speak like a Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister: It would be a change, after the last 13 years.
I want to make this one point on this subject, if hon. Members will permit me. I want to follow the right hon. Gentleman into the depths of liquidity and other subjects, but I was saying that I was interested in his speech this week in Barnet, when all we got was that the Conservative Party was a party of the Right. We entirely endorse that.
The interesting thing about his speech tonight was that there was quite a bit of foreign affairs, but, to judge from his kind of anatomical posture, he seemed to be directing drastically all of his speech to my hon. Friends below the Gangway. [Interruption.] I want to tell the right hon. Gentleman that wherever else he may look, he will get no votes in that direction. We are not going through these agonies.
Like many other right hon. and hon. Members who spoke this afternoon, the right hon. Gentleman devoted a considerable part of his speech to Vietnam, and I will come to that in a moment. Before I do so, I should like to refer to some of his concluding words about the talks which my right hon. Friend and I shall be having with President de Gaulle and the French Government tomorrow. The right hon. Gentleman referred to the problems of liquidity and the need to discuss these matters with the President. It is not usual, as the right hon. Gentle-

man knows, to say in advance what will be on the agenda, what we shall be talking about, but I shall be surprised if economic questions do not come up. Perhaps I may put it like that.
I agreed with everything that the right hon. Gentleman said about the problem of world liquidity and some of the recent dangers to the expansion of trade, the freeing of the channels of trade, particularly in the West, as a result of what, from time to time, looks almost like undeclared war in the monetary field. it is a war free of atrocities. It is a war where it is difficult from time to time to know exactly what is going on, or who is doing the firing. It is all taking place behind a smokescreen.
But, certainly, there is no doubt at all that recent decisions on the Continent of Europe—indeed, in France—have had an effect on our Western liquidity position and that this has led undoubtedly to counter-measures being taken by the United States. I do not think that it is any secret, because the whole House knows that, when these things have been done, at any rate part of the fall-out has affected this country and the sterling area as a whole.
I therefore agree with the right hon. Gentleman about the need both to deal with the short-term situation which he has described and to look at the whole problem of world liquidity. Three years ago, as he said, he put forward his own scheme. Admittedly, it was rather limited, because probably he felt that he would be able to get acceptance for it. In the end, even that proved not to be possible, for reasons which we all understand. When I was on the benches opposite I made a number of speeches on this problem. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that the need for an imaginative advance in this direction is no less great than it was then. In many ways it is even greater.
The right hon. Gentleman referred to problems about our relations with Europe, on which my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary spoke this afternoon. When, towards the end of his speech, he referred to developments in Europe—economic, political and military —I was not sure whether he was advocating, as I think some of his right hon. Friends have, progress towards the


creation of a European political unit and of a European military unit.
I hope that there is no change in the position of right hon. Gentlemen opposite in support of the N.A.T.O. Alliance as a whole on an Atlantic basis as far as our political and military relations are concerned, and that they are not putting forward any idea of, for example, a separate European deterrent, or a separate European grouping, apart from a unified N.A.T.O. grouping as a whole. I hope that this will be made clear, because words which the right hon. Gentleman used left me in some doubt about what he had in mind.
Before turning to some of the main themes of the debate, perhaps I should refer—it is one of the main themes—to questions raised about the Middle East by the Leader of the Opposition, the Leader of the Liberal Party, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Barnet and other speakers. The Leader of the Opposition asked about the hopes expressed by Mr. Gordon Walker, when he was at the Foreign office, of some improvement in relations with the United Arab Republic. The right hon. Gentleman suggested that this expressed hope by Mr. Gordon Walker implied that, to quote the right hon. Gentleman's own words, the late Government were not doing their duty. I do not think that he has the point of what Mr. Gordon Walker had in mind.
I do not propose to say this in a controversial sense. If I wanted to be controversial I could be, but I am not putting it in this spirit. The Government start with one advantage in this matter. We have no responsibility for the Suez operation, which, undoubtedly—I am not saying it in an argumentative way—has muddied our relations with the Middle East for a very long time. I will not press this point now, as there may be other occasions for debating it, but there was reason for hoping—and this is what Mr. Gordon Walker had in mind—that we could achieve some improvement in relations with Egypt, perhaps quite a substantial improvement.
We have made it clear at every point, and this has been said throughout the dialogue which has taken place between

the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Gordon Walker, and the U.A.R. Ambassador, that while we would like to see better relations with Egypt, as I am sure we all would, we are not going to change the general basis of our policy in the Middle East, for example, by sacrificing our ties with Israel or with Iran, or with other countries with whom we have established good relations. Within that, I hope that we may have better relations with Egypt than we have had up to now.
I believe that some improvement is possible, but there is one condition on which we have insisted and must continue to insist, and that is that any really significant improvement is ruled out as long as the U.A.R. itself, or U.A.R. inspired individuals or organisations, continue to endanger stability, indeed to endanger life itself, in South Arabia. This is a condition which must be satisfied before we can really move towards a significant improvement. Given this condition, I believe that there can be that improvement.
The right hon. Gentleman referred to the Yemen. In answer to his question I must say that we understand that there are not far short of 50,000 Egyptian troops in the Yemen at this time. The right hon. Gentleman asked about our attitude to any possible flare-up of fighting in the area of South Arabia for which we have a responsibility. I hope that we have made our position clear about this; indeed I did from the Opposition Front Bench during the debate last June. We are engaged in a deep, searching defence review, including rôles and commitments. I do not want to prejudice the result of that review, but I say now, as I did last year, that on all we know at present, we need to have a base in this area if we are to discharge our rôle of giving assistance to Commonwealth Governments when they ask for it. But, again as I said last year, and as I hope we have all learned, perhaps the hard way, over the last 10 to 12 years, we cannot have an effective base unless it is held with the agreement of the Government of the country in which it is situated.
I would be going outside the scope of the debate if I were to talk about the future of Aden, or about the hard and patient efforts which my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary is making towards constitutional advances not only in Aden,


but in the surrounding areas. The House knows the supreme difficulties he faces, and enough of what he has been doing to appreciate and applaud the work that he is carrying on.
As we are talking about the Middle East, I must refer to the point made by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Liberal Party about the Jordan waters—this was referred to also by the right hon. Gentleman—because this is one of the immediate causes of tension in that part of the world. The House will understand that I can hardly go into this subject in very much detail. The right hon. Gentleman knows the great complexity of it, the Johnston plan and all the rest. Our position is that we are involved as well wishers of all the countries concerned, and as a Government interested in the peace and stability of the area. The threats of diversion are a matter for concern to us in that rôle and we have expressed the view, and shall express it, that there should be the greatest restraint and care about any plan to divert water on a scale which would deny to Israel water which, in that area, is life itself. Anyone who has been there knows what water means to Israel. The diversion of water would be a very serious matter indeed.
At the same time, we have made clear to the Israeli Government our strong feeling that if anything happens which they regard as provocative, as excessive, as dangerous from the point of view of cutting off the life-giving supply of sweet water, they should not try to settle the problem by recourse to any imposed solution, or to any military solution, but that they will take the issue to the United Nations so that it can be settled there—does the hon. Gentleman wish to say something? I heard a snigger.
I must refer now briefly to the situation in Cyprus, because, as the House knows, the report of the mediator has just become available and we are giving the most careful consideration to it, as are all the nations concerned. There is just one point I should mention before I continue. As the report makes plain, Her Majesty's Government have indicated their willingness to do everything possible to facilitate the mediator's efforts. Clearly, the report is likely to contain difficulties for all parties—any report of this kind must. We hope that it will lead to useful discussions and that we shall make progress, but as

regards our sovereign bases the report correctly sets out our position now. It is our clear view—and this is contained in the report—that since these bases lie outside the territory of the Republic they do not form part of the present dispute.
Nor can I leave the Mediterranean without referring to Gibraltar. I think that the restrictions which the Spanish Government have applied on the frontier during the past six months have caused increasing anxiety on both sides of the House. Throughout this period we have made persistent efforts to secure the restoration of conditions there to normal. I think that we have shown great patience and great restraint and every desire on our part not to rough it up with Spain itself, but to act on the narrow Gibraltar issue.
Unforunately, these efforts have so far proved unsuccessful. As my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary informed the House this afternoon, arrangements are being made to present a White Paper to the House during the next few days which will set out a great deal of the history of the present situation, but I wish to make it clear that while Her Majesty's Government have no desire whatever to quarrel with Spain they will not be bullied into abandoning our interests and obligations in Gibraltar.
Does the hon. Gentleman want to help in this matter? I thought I heard him mutter.

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing: I mentioned the fact that very early on the Government cancelled naval manœuvres with Spain and I wondered whether this was conducive to good relations with that country.

The Prime Minister: I think that the same point was made by the hon. Member for Hornchurch (Mr. Lagden), in a different context. What is happening in this Gibraltar situation has nothing to do either with the cancellation or with the question of frigates, about which we had the controversy last year. This was a decision which was taken by the Spanish Government in response to the action by the late Government, which we supported and do support, to give a measure of self-government to the people of Gibraltar. This is what the Spanish Government were angry about, and are


Still angry about, and it has been made clear.
We shall continue to try to persuade the Spanish authorities to remove these unreasonable restrictions which have been imposed on the Gibraltar frontier. Meanwhile, we shall continue to stand by the people of Gibraltar in their present difficulty and do everything necessary to defend and sustain them.
I turn now to South-East Asia, on which most right hon. Gentlemen and hon. Gentlemen who have spoken today have concentrated so much of their remarks. Before I come to the situation in Vietnam, the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition asked a question about arms supplies to Indonesia.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I did not ask it.

The Prime Minister: Someone else raised it when the right hon. Gentleman was speaking, but the position is that there have been no supplies of arms by the United States for about 18 months past. Before that, some spare parts for C.130 aircraft were supplied, but these were stopped early in 1964.
The Malaysian position is well understood, namely, that we do not seek any continuation of the problem we are facing there. We would be only too happy on every ground, including that of the deployment of our forces, cost and everything else, to see this matter peacefully and quickly settled. As the right hon. Gentleman said, there is nothing to mediate about here at all. This is a straight issue of the refusal of Indonesia, so far, to accept the fact that Malaysia has been formed and the way in which it has been formed, with the support of the United Nations and of this country. Infiltration, confrontation, aggressive raids across the frontier, are totally unnecessary, and so long as they continue we must stand by Malaysia in accordance with the alliance, under our Commonwealth position. We must stand by Malaysia.
I have been again asked today whether the Government would take the lead in mediating in this matter. I have made plain that this is not a rôle for us. Other countries in Asia have tried, and made assays in this direction, but it should be clearly understood that if we were

to undertake such a rôle, it would only lend support to the doctrine that the Indonesian Government are only too ready to put about, that this is still a colonial State and we are an imperial Power. I think it important that we do nothing to lend support to that view.
Turning to Vietnam, today my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary went into considerable detail about the history of this tragic situation. Of course, it is possible to have different interpretations of the historical background. One thing, I think, must be said now quite clearly. It is that the 1954 Geneva settlement, which we all welcomed at the time—I do not underrate the tremendous difficulties faced in getting the settlement, or the achievement on the part of those who succeeded in getting it—hardly could be said to have provided conditions for a permanent solution to the problem.
In the first place, neither the United States nor the then South Vietnam Government signed it. In the second place, although it seemed reasonable to many of us at the time—I remember supporting it—the hope of an early election, covering the whole area, particularly if one felt it would, or could be conducted in a democratic way—was far too optimistic a hope in the conditions of that area. Democracy was not ingrained in the southern part of the country. Nor could one claim that the then South Vietnam Government fulfilled the requirements of democracy in the sense that we understand it. Having regard to the characteristics of the country in the North, conditions were not there for an election as we in this House would understand a democratic election.
My right hon. Friend set out the facts leading to the present grave situation. Perhaps the Leader of the Opposition, judging from the reference he made this afternoon, misunderstood what I said at Question Time recently, when I talked about a change of kind rather than degree in the fighting there. I think that the change of kind was the clear admission, the clear evidence, that the Government of Vietnam were intervening in what until then was regarded by many as primarily a civil war aggravated by external intervention.
The change in kind dated from the degree and type of response of the Americans stationed in that area. Until that


time any response was by South Vietnamese. It was not until there were attacks on American military positions that it escalated in this way. From that time it was right to say that it was not only a change in degree, but a change in kind on both sides so far as the fighting was concerned.
This afternoon, my right hon. Friend gave some of the evidence for the implication of North Vietnam and there is other evidence following the interception of vessels from the North. I am not concerned tonight to go so much into the question of the history of this, who is responsible and how it has come about. Hon. and right hon. Members have mentioned atrocities, cruelties, the murder of defenceless civilians, torture and horror. I think that all of us have been appalled by some of the photographs which we have seen in the newspapers; and, again, this has occurred on both sides.
Of course, none of us will really make progress in this matter simply by making declarations about our horror. This week we have been shocked by the bombing of the United States Embassy in Saigon. I think that what all this adds up to is to underline particularly the revolting consequencies of a war in this kind of area and to emphasise the vital need to end the fighting. So far as Her Majesty's Government are concerned I repeat, as I have said many times before, that we have made absolutely plain our support of the American stand against the Communist infiltration in South Vietnam.
That is the point from which we started. The people of South Vietnam, like the people of North Vietnam and every other area, are entitled to be able to lead their own lives free of terror, free from the danger of sudden death, or from the threat of a Communist take-over, and the Government of South Vietnam are entitled to call in aid allies who could help in that purpose. Her Majesty's Government have not disguised their anxieties about certain developments within this war, but I said in the House two weeks ago that anxieties were better expressed directly and privately than by public statements. It makes us feel good to make public statements but we are more concerned with securing the end which we all want.
I do not believe that the House is in any doubt about my right hon. Friend's statement in Washington, a fortnight ago. He made it clear that he supported the United States policy in Vietnam and expressed the view that these actions, as opposed to the object of them, should be carried out in a way acceptable to world opinion. I take the view of the right hon. Gentleman. We shall speak frankly whenever this is needed, but let there be no doubt about where we stand on the general policy.
No right hon. or hon. Gentleman on either side of the House should feel that he has a monopoly of anxiety about the problem, or the danger of escalation and of other countries joining in. It is really this possibility, in view of the terrible things that are involved in modern warfare, which justify the patient efforts of Her Majesty's Government in trying to work towards a peacefully effective and defensible settlement.
I expressed to the House a week last Tuesday anxieties which my right hon. Friend and I felt, together with hon. Members on both sides of the House, over Press reports about certain statements made in Vietnam. As I have told the House, my right hon. Friend was able to secure complete satisfaction on this point so far as the policy and objective of our American allies are concerned. This afternoon, my right hon. Friend has quoted the objectives as stated by the President of the United States when he said that the United States seeks no wider war, but looks forward to the day when the people of South-East Asia will not need military support and assistance against aggression, but only economic and social co-operation for progress in peace.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Mr. Philip Noel-Baker) expressed warm congratulations to the Foreign Secretary and welcomed the discussions that he and I had with Mr. Gromyko, my right hon. Friend's visit to the United States and his talks with Mr. Dean Rusk and the President, and the public statement made by my right hon. Friend in the United States, and the decision to send Mr. Gordon Walker on a fact-finding tour, as a new initiative; but, of course, this is not new. We have been working steadily towards a


peaceful settlement of the problem for a long time past. It may be true that we have only just surfaced so far as public announcements are concerned, but I have already pointed out that what has guided our action—and sometimes it has been very difficult to be restrained in these matters—has been the desire to get the right answer.
We would have liked to proceed in agreement with my right hon. Friend's agreement with Mr. Gromyko, as fellow co-chairman. We waited three and a half weeks for a reply to the initiative which we had taken in Moscow. I am not saying this in criticism, because we understand the difficulties which the Soviet Union was facing at this time, in common with others, but, as Mr. Gromyko's visit made it plain that at present, at least—and my right hon. Friend stressed the phrase "at present" —it did not feel able to join us in this kind of initiative we felt that we must go on alone.
We could, of course, on finding that the Soviet Government would be unable to join with us, have said that the rôle of the co-chairman had no present part to play in solving this problem. We decided that if we cannot operate on a joint basis we must take the initiative; and that is why my hon. Friend is taking the initiative which he announced this afternoon and why Mr. Gordon Walker is visiting South-East Asia. There is the need to find many more facts. I hope that it will be possible for him to find out the attitude of Hanoi and other centres concerned; and I confirm that he will be going to Thailand. [An HON. MEMBER: "And Australia?"] I want to get to the centre of the trouble which is not Australia, and, therefore, I hope to get him to these areas as quickly as possible.
I hope that every Member of the House will wish him success in a mission whose only object is to get peace in a troubled area.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Edward Short): I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

DOUBLE TAXATION RELIEF (GERMANY)

10.0 p.m.

The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Niall MacDermot): I beg to move,
That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that on the ratification by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany of the Convention set out in the Schedule to an Order entitled the Double Taxation Relief (Taxes on Income) (Federal Republic of Germany) Order, 1965, a draft of which was laid before this House on 11th March, an Order may be made in the form of that draft.
This Motion relates to a Double Taxation Convention with the Federal Republic of Germany with respect—

Mr. Speaker: Order. We cannot hear about our Income Tax.

Mr. MacDermot: When you can hear, Mr. Speaker, you will be glad to know that it relates to a Double Taxation Convention with the Federal Republic of Germany with respect to taxes on income. This Convention was sinned in Bonn on 26th November last and was laid before the House on 11th March of this year. This new Convention replaces the existing one between the two countries which was signed on 18th August, 1954.
The new Convention was negotiated at the request of the German authorities, since some of the provisions of the former Convention were no longer entirely in keeping with developments in the German tax system. The principal change effected by the Convention arises out of a German tax known as the "Nachsteuer". Hon. Members will realise that as a result of the long period of Government by the party opposite the Germans have got rather ahead of us in the modernisation of their taxation system. They have, and have had for some time, a corporation tax, the rate of which is 51 percent. on undistributed profits and 15 percent. on distributed profits.
Where a subsidiary company pays dividends to a parent company—and for this purpose a parent company is one having a shareholding of 25 percent. or more in the subsidiary—and where that dividend is retained by the parent company, this "Nachsteuer" is applied so as


to impose the balance of that corporation tax; in other words, the remaining 36 percent. on the parent company.
This tax cannot be levied on dividends payable to a parent company outside the Federal Republic, including in the United Kingdom. The Government of the Federal Republic argued that, in order to redress the balance, the limit for the German tax on dividends to a United Kingdom parent company in the circumstances should be able to be increased from 15 percent. to 25 percent. In the circumstances, it was difficult for this country to oppose the German Government's arguments.
Article VI(2) therefore of the Convention will permit the German Government to do this. That is undoubtedly the major change brought about by the new convention. For the rest, the new Convention makes only minor changes in the arrangements laid down in the former Convention, but this opportunity has been taken, in so far as it is possible, to bring the provisions of the Convention into line with the model articles of the Fiscal Committee of the O.E.C.D. Under that Convention of 1963, to which both we and the German Government are parties, we are under an obligation, in any new Convention we make, to adopt the form of that model Convention. In fact, I think that not all the provisions of this new Convention were formulated at the time that agreement was reached with the German Government on the various points in our new agreement. But in many respects we have the advantage of being able to follow the guidance of this model Convention. Hon. Members interested in the subject will agree that the Fiscal Committee of the O.E.C.D. has done a very good job in formulating this new model Convention.
As a result of the revision, the new Convention is more extensive in scope than the previous one. In particular, it brings within its scope the new German taxes for which we have no comparable tax. They are referred to in Article I(1)(a). They have a Vermogensteuer, which is described in the Convention as a capital tax. I think that it is of a nature more usually referred to in this country as a wealth tax. It is a 1 percent. wealth tax. In addition, they have a somewhat complicated tax, the Gewerbesteuer, which is partly a tax on income, partly

a tax on capital and partly a payroll tax. In any event, under the new Convention, the Germans have agreed to conform to the rules limiting the amount of tax chargeable on United Kingdom enterprises. These provisions are wholly to our advantage.
Negotiations for this Convention were somewhat protracted. It was a very complicated matter, and, although it was signed in November 1964, hon. Members will notice from, I think, Article 23, that most of the provisions in relation to tax will take effect as from, approximately, the year 1960. There is, however, a provision inserted in paragraph 4 of that Article virtually to eliminate any adverse effect upon any taxpayer of the retrospective nature of the provisions. In other words, he is entitled to take advantage of whichever is the more advantageous to him, either the new agreement or the old agreement in respect of the tax years before the year of ratification of the convention.
That, very broadly, is the effect of that provision. I shall not seek to outline in any more detail the provisions of the draft Convention. I hope to be able to answer any points which hon. Members may raise.

10.9 p.m.

Mr. William Clark: I am sure the House is grateful to the Financial Secretary. As he says, the Convention is fairly complicated. It has taken a long time to negotiate, and we appreciate the reasons for that. He said that the two extra taxes which the Germans have inserted are the capital tax and the trade tax. I think the Financial Secretary said that Germany was forward looking, that it is changing the structure of its taxation and that it has anticipated in this Convention many of the modern faults in taxation.
One thing which strikes me is the fact that, two or three days before the Budget, we are signing a Convention in which there is no mention of our proposed capital gains tax or our proposed corporation tax. I should have thought—and, as the Financial Secretary will appreciate—this goes right through the Convention—that this is a gross omission.
I find Article III(5) difficult to understand. As I read it, the inference is that one could have double taxation on the same income, and I hope that the hon.


and learned Gentleman will be able to say something about that. As to Article IV(a), the Financial Secretary spoke about 15 percent., and so on, but here, again, I must return to my original point that nothing is said about the 35 percent.—presumably—corporation tax we are to impose next week.
I think that Article VIII(1) needs some explanation. I do not wish to bore the House, but this is a short paragraph and it reads:
Gains from the sale, transfer or exchange of capital assets derived from sources within one of the territories"—
that is, either Germany or the United Kingdom:
by a resident of the other territory shall be subjected to tax only in that other territory.
I should have thought that to be quite conclusive and categoric, but if one seeks to tie it up with the Chancellor of the Exchequer's Written Answer in December last year, one finds that the right hon. Gentleman, talking about capital gains tax, which is directly affected by this Article, said:
Persons, including companies, who are resident in the United Kingdom will be liable to tax on all realised gains wherever the underlying assets are situated."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th December, 1964; Vol. 703, c. 166.]
One cannot have it both ways. We are signing a Convention excluding the capital gain from liability, yet the Chancellor in December last said that it does not matter where the assets are, one will be taxed.
Surely, that will give to the Germans some advantage from which residents in this country are not also to benefit. I appreciate that the definition of "capital" is slightly different and that Article XII(2) talks of "immovable property", but even taking out immovable property there are still all the other assets where there may be a capital gain. I should like the Financial Secretary, somehow, to reconcile Article VIII with the Chancellor's statement of 8th December.
In Article XVIII(2) there is a reference to ordinary dividend paid by a company resident in the Federal Republic. My reading is that it applies to payments from Germany, but I should like to know whether the converse will apply to companies in this country.
Again, Article XXIII shows the glaring omission in the Convention of not mentioning the capital gains tax or the proposed corporation tax—

Mr. MacDermot: Before the hon. Gentleman leaves Article XVIII, I am afraid that I have not quite got his point there.

Mr. Clark: I fully appreciate that I may be misreading paragraph (2) of the Article, where it says:
Where such income is an ordinary dividend paid by a company resident in the Federal Republic…
and so on. I will not read the whole of the paragraph, which is long. My reading of it is that this provision applies to payments from Germany. Will the converse apply or will it not?
I turn now to the Explanatory Note, which again talks about the maximum rate of German tax of 25 percent. I should probably have given the hon. and learned Gentleman notice of this point, but I should like to know what the effect of a corporation tax of 35 percent. will be in the context of this Convention.
The Financial Secretary has explained the recommendations of the O.E.C.D. Perhaps at some time he will let us have a copy of them, or place one in the Library. I should have thought that the Convention will be out of date even before it is signed. If it is effective from now, what will happen after 6th April? The Convention cannot be broken at the earliest until 1968. What will happen if between now and 1968, forgetting Budget Day next week, our whole tax structure changes? At the moment the inference is that there will be a major change in our tax structure, particularly with the corporation tax. If our tax structure is to be radically altered, can the Financial Secretary definitely say that we shall not have to re-negotiate not only this Convention but many others?
I can understand the reason for the Convention. The previous one was out of step with developments in the German tax system. I understand that our present tax structure is roughly the same as the new German system. Fifteen percent. is charged on German distributed profits, as against 51 percent. on undistributed profits. The attitude this


country is taking is a flat rate 35 percent. corporation tax which will affect the payment of dividends. The Chancellor is on record as saying that the Corporation tax will mean that companies in this country will have to plough back, or it will pay them to plough back, their profits. If they plough back their profits, their tax liability under a 35 percent. corporation tax will be decreased. Under the German tax system, progressive as it is, as the Finance Secretary said when he introduced the Convention, 15 percent. will be charged on distributed profits and 51 percent. on undistributed profits. This surely is an invitation to any company in Germany to pay the maximum dividends. I personally think that this is right.
I should no doubt be out of order if I pursued the question of the desirability of paying out dividends at a high rate or at a low rate. It is worth making the valid and important point for this country that the Government are saying, "We are changing the Convention simply because the Germans have a more modern approach to tax". Yet there is still this vast difference between tax on distributed profits and tax on undistributed profits. The Neumark Committee recommended to all the E.E.C. countries that they should adopt the German system. What will happen? Our present system is more or less in line with the new German system. Why is it that probably next week we shall take a step back—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Dr. Horace King): Order. I have listened to the hon. Gentleman with care. He has been absolutely in order until this last question. The question, however, cannot be answered.

Mr. Clark: I take that point, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. I apologise. I am sure that the House will understand that when discussing new taxes one is rather inclined to run away. It is valid to point out that we are signing a Convention to fit in with a new German tax structure. The hon. and learned Gentleman said that there has been much delay in reaching agreement on the Convention because of the complicated negotiations. Why cannot we delay a little longer? What is the urgency for the Convention?
I obtained from the Vote Office a copy of the Convention. It is printed in both languages. Is this an innovation? Are we to have all Conventions printed in two languages? Is this another indication of the fact that, despite what the Government say, they will go into the Common Market eventually and they are trying to improve the linguistic abilities of residents here?

10.21 p.m.

Mr. MacDermot: With leave, I will reply to the debate and answer the hon. Member's last question first. There is nothing new about having the Convention in both languages. This is common practice. What is new is that the Government should take the trouble to make the text in both languages available in the Vote Office. This is the first time that it has been done. It was a point which was raised once under the previous Government and we thought that some hon. Members might be interested to see the full text in both languages, which are also the official languages.

Mr. William Clark: May I remind the hon. and learned Gentleman that Cmd. 9570 issued in 1955 is also in both languages?

Mr. MacDermot: I am glad to hear it. A draft Order before the Order itself is made is different and this is the first time that the text of the draft has been available in both languages.
The main purport of the hon. Member's argument, apart from some specific questions, was to suggest that we did wrong to sign the Convention last November rather than seek to protract and delay the matter still further to wait until our new taxes come into force and see whether the new Convention was necessary. It will be realised from the date that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had announced his decision to introduce the corporation and capital gains taxes before the Convention was signed. Therefore it would have been perfectly open to the Federal Republic, if it so wished, to ask for a delay in signing the Convention.
The German authorities did not. They wanted to see this brought into force as soon as possible particularly because the main advantage under the new Convention, which I have explained, is that which accrues to the German Government under Article VT(2). It does not


come into effect until the new Convention comes into effect and therefore any further delay would have been directly against their interests. For that reason, and because the matter had been protracted and the whole of the negotiations had been virtually concluded under the previous Government, we felt that it would have been wrong for us to ask the Germans even to consider any further delay. This was really a commitment which we had inherited.
To turn to the specific questions, the first was on Article III(5) which the hon. Member feared could result, in some circumstances, in double taxation. The general purport of Article III is to deal with trading income, that is to say industrial or commercial profits. As a general rule these are taxable only in the country of residence of the trader, except where those profits are attributable to what is called a permanent establishment in the other country, that is a fixed place of business where he carries on his business in whole or in part.
The effect of Article III(5) is to make clear that the Article does not restrict in the case of either country taxation of dividends and rents arising from immovable property, as it is called—realty we would call it in our legal system—by the country in which the land is situated. The effect, therefore, is that trading incomes or dividends from immovable property will fall to be dealt with under Article XII of the Convention, and the effect of that Article—this is what ensures that there will not be double taxation—is that the German Government agree for their part not to tax such income arising from land in the United Kingdom, and we for our part, under our different system, agree to give credit for any German tax on such income arising from land in Germany.
I was asked questions about Article VIII(1) which deals generally with the capitals gains tax, and I leave my comments on that until I deal with both the capitals gains and corporation taxes at the end of my remarks.
On Article XVIII(2) I was asked whether the converse would apply in relation to payments from the United Kingdom to Germany. Article XVIII is the one which deals with the way in which relief will be given when income continues to be taxable in both countries.

The short answer is that there is a different system adopted, in general, by each country. Our system, as in the example I have just given to the House, is to give credit for the German tax when we tax any income derived from a German source. The German system, where a German resident receives income from United Kingdom sources, is that Germany will exclude that income from the basis upon which the German tax is imposed.
That is the general principle, but there are two exceptions to this rule under the Convention, and they are both, I think, new provisions. The first arises in the case of a dividend received by a German resident from a United Kingdom company other than a payment by a subsidiary to a parent. The Germans will charge the dividend but will give a credit equal to 18 percent. of the net amount of the dividend. The second exception applies to the rather unusual case of an individual resident in Germany who receives remuneration or a pension from the United Kingdom Government or from a local authority in the United Kingdom which is not exempt from tax in Germany (because he is a German national without being also a United Kingdom national). In these circumstances, Germany will charge the tax but will give a credit for the United Kingdom tax which is payable, in other words, adopt our system.
The hon. Gentleman asked me about the O.E.C.D. Convention. I can supply him with a copy if he wishes. There is a copy available in the Library as well.
I was asked what would be the effect after 6th April and after the introduction of our new corporation and capital gains taxes. In our view, the corporation tax will be a tax which is substantially similar within the meaning of Article I of the Convention to the existing profits and income taxes and, consequently, that tax will be subject to the terms of the Convention. I do not think that there will be any doubt about that.
As regards the capital gains tax, the question whether our capital gains tax can be regarded as substantially similar under that Article so that the Convention would apply will depend upon the precise form of the tax. Hon. Members


will appreciate that I am not at liberty to say any more about that tonight.
The hon. Member asked whether there would be any need for us to seek to renegotiate the agreement before its expiration in the year 1968–69. Again, I cannot say whether it will be necessary. I must ask the House to wait to see what the detailed provisions are in the Finance Bill. If, however, there is any need to seek to renegotiate these agreements, I hope that we may look for the same sympathy from the German Federal Government as we have sought to show in dealing with their request concerning this Convention. In any event, as the hon. Member said, any problems that may arise in this connection should be problems with which they will be, if anything, more familiar

than ourselves, since these new taxes which we are introducing will bring our tax system into closer approximation with theirs. I hope that I have dealt with all the points that the hon. Member raised.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,
That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that on the ratification by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany of the Convention set out in the Schedule to an Order entitled the Double Taxation Relief (Taxes on Income) (Federal Republic of Germany) Order, 1965, a draft of which was laid before this House on 11th March, an Order may be made in the form of that draft.

To be presented by Privy Counsellors or Members of Her Majesty's Household.

CENTRAL BANKS (INCOME TAX)

10.31 p.m.

The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Niall MacDermot): I beg to move,
That the Central Banks (Income Tax Schedule C Exemption) Order, 1965, a draft of which was laid before this House on 16th March, be approved.
This Motion seeks approval for the draft Order under Section 22 of the Finance Act, 1957. That Section enables an overseas central bank or the issue department of such a bank to be exempted in certain circumstances by Order in Council from Income Tax on its income from British Government securities. This was designed primarily to meet the situation where the assets of a currency board are taken over by a new central bank. This is a situation which arises frequently when newly-developing countries attain their independence within the Commonwealth.
A currency board is a Government agency and, as such, it enjoys exemption from tax owing to its sovereign immunity. A central bank, on the other hand, may be a separate legal entity from the Government on whose behalf it acts and, therefore, requires specific immunity. This is what Section 22 enables us to do by Order. It is obviously in our interest to help these countries in this way, because it will be an added inducement to them to remain within the sterling area and to maintain their reserves in London in sterling.
The draft Order before the House proposes to give this exemption to the five banks named in the Schedule. They all satisfy the requirements of the Section in that they are entrusted with the custody of the principal foreign exchange reserves of the territory concerned and they are all wholly owned by the responsible Government. Two of them—the Central Bank of Jordan and the Bank of Sierra Leone—have come into existence only recently and they have each taken over the assets of a currency board. The other three—the Reserve Bank of Malawi, the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia and the Bank of Zambia—have all been established as successors to the Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland following the dis-

solution of the Central African Federation. That latter bank itself was the successor of a currency board and it was allowed the tax exemption under Section 22 by an Order of 1958.
I think that the House will agree that it is obviously desirable that the same exemption should apply to the three successor banks.

10.34 p.m.

Mr. William Clark: I should like to ask the Financial Secretary to the Treasury one question. Has any assessment been made of any possible loss of tax—I do not mean avoidance of tax—in this connection? If a foreign resident owns an exempted security, of course, we do not collect tax in this country. If the reserve banks are stepping into the shoes of the federal reserve banks that they have taken over or superseded, if there is a swapping into exempted securities, no tax arises at all. But it could be possible that these banks would swap their securities into non-exempt securities. Have the Treasury made any assessment of the likelihood of any loss to the Exchequer in this sense?
I think that the Financial Secretary has the point. If a bank swaps from exempt securities to non-exempt securities and those non-exempt securities are taken from a United Kingdom resident, there could be a loss of tax to the Revenue.

10.36 p.m.

Mr. MacDermot: With permission, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, may I say that I think that the immediate answer is that the cost will be nil in the sense that these new banks are taking over from currency boards or predecessor banks who enjoy already the same exemption from tax. One can envisage, I suppose, a possible loss of revenue in the future in the event of these banks acquiring securities from vendors who were liable to tax on those securities, and to that extent when they are acquired by an exempt bank we would lose the revenue, but I think that this would be more than counterbalanced by the obvious advantage to us if these banks were themselves to invest funds in this country in this way rather than to invest them elsewhere.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,
That the Central Banks (Income Tax Schedule C Exemption) Order 1965, a draft of which was laid before this House on 16th March, be approved.

HOUSE OF COMMONS MEMBERS' CONTRIBUTORY PENSIONS FUND

Mr. Bellenger, Mr. Herbert W. Bowden, Mr. Roderic Bowen, Sir Robert Cary, Colonel Sir Oliver Crosthwaite-Eyre and Mr. Arthur Tiley appointed Managing Trustees of the House of Commons Members' Contributory Pensions Fund and the. Public Trustee appointed Custodian Trustee of the said Fund in pursuance of section 4 of the Ministerial Salaries and Members' Pensions Act, 1965.—[Mr. Sydney Irving.]

BROADMOOR HOSPITAL

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Howie.]

10.38 p.m.

Mr. W. R. van Straubenzee: I am very gateful to the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health for his courtesy in being here at this comparatively late hour on an inconvenient day of the week, and I want to make it quite clear that since we had a recent opportunity on 19th March, in a debate on mental health, for a broad-ranging discussion of the administration of special hospitals including Broad-moor, I do not want tonight to repeat what I said then or to go into that in any breadth.
I am tonight confining myself to raising one or two comparatively detailed questions which arise directly from the escape of Richard Upcher from Broad-moor on 21st February. On past occasions when there have been escapes from Boadmoor there have been criticisms that the warning siren has not been sounded sufficiently quickly, and I am sure the Parliamentary Secretary will realise that if and when those fears are justified on any occasion it would be a very good and proper cause for anxiety in the neighbourhood.
My information, such as it is, of the escape on 21st February is that the siren was sounded at about five minutes past 11

p.m. and, bearing in mind the proper duty, as I would think, of the medical superintendent to make quite sure before he causes the siren to be sounded, that one of his patients is out of his care and jurisdiction, I would have come to the conclusion that there was on this occasion no unreasonable delay, or indeed delay at all, in sounding the siren.
But it would be very helpful, if the Parliamentary Secretary has had an opportunity of considering the report of the Minister's inquiry, if he were to tell the House whether that is a correct interpretation. If I have my timing right, I think it followed that the night staff had not yet taken over on the night in question. That, in turn, is important because there has been criticism that significant numbers of the night staff at Broadmoor have been doing during the day full-time jobs which impaired, it is alleged, their efficiency for their work. I am quite well aware that members of the staff at Broad-moor have for many years past done modest additional jobs during the day. I do not think that it is well-founded that they do full-time work in such things as the factories of Broadmoor by day if they are on the night staff. But, in any event, it seems to me that on this occasion no blame could attach to them because they were not then on duty.
I should like to raise one detailed point on the question of this escape and then conclude with a major problem. I wonder whether the Parliamentary Secretary is satisfied with the liaison which he has through his Ministry with the B.B.C. when escapes of this kind occur. Perhaps I could put to him the problem of the escape on 21st February. Richard Upcher was in Broadmoor because of being arraigned for armed robbery and, however comparatively quiet a man as a patient he may be, the fact that armed robbery was the reason for his being in Broadmoor I think justifies the feeling that it would have been wise from the start for the B.B.C. to have been provided with the necessary information to make that clear. My information is that it was not until some appreciable time after the escape that he was described as likely to be dangerous, and it would have been helpful had that been made clear from the very start.
In other words, I should like to be assured by the Parliamentary Secretary,


if I may, that he is satisfied with the close liaison which he possesses through his Ministry with the B.B.C., or, if he is not—for this can be an important channel of information—that he will look at it as a result of this escape, without, I hasten to add, any criticism of those involved.
But the central point which I want to raise is this: ever since the last escape, which is mercifully some time ago, I have been insistent on the question of the warning system. I want to make it clear to him that I accept that no system of security at Broadmoor or anywhere else can guarantee 100 percent. that there can be no escape at all. Such a thing, frankly, is not possible, and it is not reasonable that we should expect it. But in a country such as this, if we tell people what is happening as far as we can, if we take them into our confidence as far as we can, we shall gain from them the free co-operation which otherwise we should never get. One of the great criticisms in the past has been that the warning siren—though I quite understand and appreciate that immense trouble was taken with it technically—just was not up to its task.
I remember some three years ago going into it in great detail technically—I realise that this was long before the hon. Gentleman had any responsibility—and being told that this was one of the finest sirens of its kind in the world. I think that I was assured that it would be possible for it to be heard, if necessary, down at Southampton. I am afraid that I ventured the view that it was not interesting whether it could be heard in Southampton but that the problem was technically that it could not be heard in insignificant parts of the countryside immediately around Broadmoor.
I think that I can claim to have been, if I may so put it, the spearhead of the friendly assault upon the then Minister and his advisers which resulted in the decision being taken that sirens linked with the central one should be established in certain centres of population in which I am interested, Wokingham and Bracknell.
I want to know why it is that, in April, 1965, these link sirens are still not in operation. I must honestly say that the effect of the work of the Ministry on the

one hand and the local authorities on the other—both come into it—seems to have resulted in unnecessary delay. I should like very much to know whether the hon. Gentleman can give me something firm in the way of a date from which these warning link sirens will be working, because I put it to him that, if we have an intelligent set of residents who are warned effectively if there is an escape, they can take instant precautions. They can bring in their bicycles; they can lock their garages; they can take the keys out of their cars. They can—and perhaps I should have put this first —look after their children in particular, for that is something which is very important sometimes with patients of this kind.
Finally, I should be most grateful if the hon. Gentleman would consider an idea on which I shall quite understand if he does not feel able to comment tonight. It has been represented to me very responsibly, as a result of the last escape, that it would be an enormous benefit to the countryside and the towns around Broadmoor if they could be given what I will loosely call an "all-clear" signal from these warning sirens.
The hon. Gentleman will, I am sure, understand—and I do not think that I exaggerate—that large numbers of older people who live alone live in real terror —again, that is not overstating the case —during the period that they know an escaped prisoner is at large. He will know from our previous debate that my principal interest is to enlist the understanding support of the surrounding countryside in the work done at Broadmoor and this will not happen if people are afraid of it, so the more that can be done to remove fear the better.
Therefore, if he could devise a method by which these warning sirens also gave news of the fact that the patient has been found—if that is technically possible—I believe this would go a very long way to reducing to a minimum the period of time for which my constituents and others are under very grave fear.
I repeat that the hon. Gentleman might not be able to give me an answer on that tonight but it would be very kind if he would say that he would have the suggestion examined technically. Admittedly these matters are, by comparison with the work of the House, detailed


points, but for the area in which the hospital is situated they are matters of very great importance.

10.50 p.m.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health (Mr. Charles Loughlin): I want first to say that I am very grateful to the hon. Member for Wokingham (Mr. van Straubenzee) for raising this matter and certainly because he has done so in a restrained manner and, if I may say so, without being presumptuous, in the best way possible.
I want to tell the House something about Broadmoor and to try to meet the main issue which is the motivation of the hon. Gentleman's action in bringing the matter before the House this evening, which is to try to let the people of the area know that we are doing absolutely everything we can to ensure not only that they are safe, but that they can have a degree of mental rest about their safety. I am also grateful to the hon. Gentleman for the support he has given and continues to give to the hospital. He has an association with the Friends of the Hospital and it is evident from his attitude that he is concerned with the hospital's good name.
Security is the paramount consideration at Broadmoor, as at the other special hospitals. If this were not so, escapes would be much more frequent. Strong pressures would build up to apply a more restrictive regime and patients would suffer. This is the one thing we want to avoid as far as we can. In a way, it would be putting the clock back and I think that the hon. Gentleman would regret that as much as I would.
Before dealing with the main issue raised by the hon. Member, I should like to remind the House of Broadmoor's history and function. From 1863 to 1949, Broadmoor was a criminal lunatic asylum under the Home Office. During the whole of that period, the day-to-day administration of the hospital was in the hands of a medical superintendent. In 1949, Broadmoor Criminal Lunatic Asylum became Broadmoor Institution and was vested in the Minister of Health and placed under the management of the board of control. It was still administered by a medical superintendent of course. In 1960, it came directly under the management of the Ministry of

Health as a special hospital for mentally disordered persons who
in the opinion of the Minister require treatment under conditions of special security on account of their dangerous, violent or criminal propensities".
The medical superintendent continued in charge of day-to-day administration.
From 1940 to 1949, there were six escapes involving six patients. From 1950 to 1959, there were seven escapes involving nine patients, but since then there have been only three escapes involving four patients. This is something which we want to get clearly on the record, because nothing could he worse than conveying the impression that there are many escapes from this institution. We want to be perfectly clear that this is not a question of restoring the confidence of the people in the area, because confidence about security ought not to be absent.
We are concerned about security and I think that the history, and particularly the recent history, of the institution indicates quite clearly—I do not want to make comparisons with other types of institution—that if comparisons were made in any way, Broadmoor would compare favourably with any other secure type of institution.
The hon. Gentleman devoted the greater portion of his time to the specific issue of Upcher's escape. I am in something of a difficulty, because I do not want to deal too fully with that escape, because the hon. Gentleman has written to my right hon. Friend and has suggested that it would be to the advantage of all of us if he had a discussion on the issue, and a meeting has been agreed. The hon. Gentleman also has down a Question for answer on 31st May.
Briefly, the facts as we have been able to determine them by a very careful investigation are as follows. Richard Upcher was admitted to Broadmoor on 2nd June, 1961, under a hospital order with an unlimited restriction on discharge, after conviction for burglary. By the time of the escape, he had made some progress along the ladder of privilege, and was in a block where considerable liberty of movement is allowed. I do not think that there can be any criticism of that. The hon. Gentleman referred to Upcher's conviction for armed robbery, but if a patient of this kind makes a


reasonable degree of progress, we ought to be able to help his rehabilitation in every possible way.
He escaped from the block on the night of Sunday 21st February, apparently by concealing himself in a hot-plate under the serving hatch in the dining room when other patients left, and then breaking a pane of glass in a window of the dining room and squeezing through the protective bars. I ought to explain that he is rather a small and slightly built man. He then succeeded in scaling an inner and an outer security wall, making use of various aids, including some rubble on a site where patients had been working, and a ladder in a locked shed. I know that there has been some adverse publicity about the alleged loads of rubble in the grounds of the hospital which enabled him to escape, but we have made careful investigations into this, and I can tell the House that there were only about two barrow loads of rubble, and there is no substance in the charges that were made.
I do not want to disclose all the details of the escape, because I think the hon. Gentleman would agree that it would be bad security to give a complete and total picture. He was seen on top of the outer wall at about 10.45 p.m. by a nurse who, realising that he might be accompanied by other patients, ran about 300 yards to the house of another nurse who telephoned at once to the hospital lodge. When the two nurses returned to the wall, the patient had gone. He gave himself up at about 9 p.m. the following evening to troops in the Caesar's Camp area, less than two miles from the hospital, and he had not, while absent, inflicted injury or damage of any kind either to person or to property.
A Departmental inquiry has been held into the circumstances of the escape, and a report has been made. I understand that the hon. Gentleman has some evidence which he may be prepared to make available. If so, of course, this would be helpful to those of us concerned with the inquiry.
Let me make it perfectly clear that the hon. Gentleman is absolutely correct when he says that there was no evidence of any delay in sounding the siren on this occasion. As the hon. Gentleman knows,

the siren, apart from sounding in the hospital itself, is linked to the switchboard at Bracknell Police Station. Nor is there anything in the suggestion that when the siren was sounded the night staff were not on duty. I have here the duty roster of the whole of the night staff. The whole of the night staff completed their duty, and I assure the hon. Gentleman that the night duty staff times are from 9 p.m. to 7.10 the following morning. Consequently there is no substance in the suggestion that the night staff were not available.
My general conclusion is that once the patient's absence had been discovered the escape procedure worked quickly and well. Little time was spent on the necessary check to confirm a suspected absence before sounding the alarm. The weather was dry, and the meteorological report is of a north-easterly wind, Force 2 to 3, east of Bracknell for the period 11 p.m. to midnight. The main siren at Broadmoor should have been clearly heard in the immediate area of the hospital in these conditions. The hon. Gentleman's time of 11.05 is correct for the sounding of the siren, and so there is no question of any delay at all.
The hon. Gentleman asked what progress had been made with the new sirens at Wokingham and Bracknell and what has been the cause of the delay in bringing them into operation. Perhaps I could say a little about the system as a whole. At present there are two escape warning sirens, one at Broadmoor and the other at Little Sandhurst. In 1957 a temporary siren installed in early 1954 was replaced by a more effective electronic siren, and it was hoped that this would give adequate warning within a two-mile radius of the hospital.
Subsequent tests showed that the Little Sandhurst area was still poorly served, and a second siren was therefore installed in March, 1961, which sounds simultaneously with the main siren at the hospital. Further tests showed that although audibility in the Little Sandhurst area was much improved, there were still districts where it was unsatisfactory, and after representations from a local authority and the hon. Gentleman it was decided that some extension of the system was necessary and that a number of satellite sirens should be installed at distances of three to four miles from the hospital.
In all six more sirens are to be provided—at Camberley, Crowthorne, Finchhampstead, Wokingham, Bagshot and Bracknell. The present position in regard to installations is as follows: the sirens at Camberley, Crowthorne, Finchhampstead and Wokingham are already in position and they are expected to be operational by the end of May. This entails connection to the electricity supply and to the main siren at Broadmoor. We have a slight difficulty at Bagshot and Bracknell. Sites have been acquired—the telephone exchange at Bagshot and the corporation maintenance depot at Bracknell—and the installation has begun. These two sirens should come into operation in June.
The hon. Gentleman asked me to give him a firm date, but I cannot yet give him an absolutely firm date. I can, however, give him an assurance that these sirens, if we can get over the difficulty of wayleaves, will be in operation by June. We think that the area of effective warning within a reasonable radius of all the areas I have referred to will be sufficient to ensure that everyone will be perfectly aware when an escape takes place.
I want to try to deal with the sounding of an all-clear. This is a very difficult problem. The present siren is a "bleep, bleep, bleep", and it is going to be very difficult to find an all clear which will not conflict with the present fire service sirens in the area. But I agree with the hon. Gentleman that the one thing that will give absolute relief to the people in the

area is, by some means, to give an all-clear showing that the danger, if there was a danger, has ceased to exist. We are doing everything we possibly can to try to devise some way to overcome this difficulty of confusion with the fire service sirens, and get a distinctive all-clear for the people in the area.
The hon. Gentleman also made another point about arrangements with the B.B.C. The Superintendent of Broadmoor and the Chief Constable of Berkshire have worked out a plan of co-operation between the hospital staff and the police which operates in the event of an escape. The B.B.C., of course, works in concert with the police and the hospital authorities, and they decide whether information should be broadcast. The hon. Gentleman can rest assured that as far as it is humanly possible we will expedite the coming into effect of the type of warning system he wants.
I am absolutely satisfied that the present medical superintendent and his staff are doing a magnificent job and there can be no question about the correctness of the present set-up at the hospital. I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman, in whose constituency this hospital is, the many friends of the hospital and other voluntary workers are doing a wonderful job of work, and we are very grateful indeed to them.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at six minutes past Eleven o'clock.